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This thesis is the study of the role and regulation of the external audit in the UK and US. 
It argues that the current audit model is fundamentally flawed, which has a negative 
impact on the quality of financial audits. This research contributes to the debate on 
external auditing by suggesting a free-standing legal re-conceptualization of the audit 
model, which aims to improve the quality of audits and reduce opportunity for accounting 
fraud. The research findings are drawn from qualitative analysis of legal and financial 
accounting sources.  
The thesis consists of three main themes. Firstly, it provides a comprehensive analysis of 
the regulatory framework for auditing by looking at why, how and by whom audit is 
regulated. Secondly, it analyses numerous flaws inherent in the current audit model. The 
focus throughout the thesis is on problems relating to auditors’ independence, deficiencies 
in the spheres of legal, professional and social accountability of auditors, and excessive 
concentration of the audit market. Thirdly, following the analysis of various theoretical 
and international audit arrangements, the thesis suggests a new audit model. A key 
function in this model would be played by an external, public body - the Public Auditing 
Board, which would be in charge of appointment and remuneration of auditors carrying 
out audits in the public interest. It is submitted that moving audits to the public sector is 
desirable in order to introduce genuinely autonomous auditors, to provide better quality 
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STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the functioning and regulation of the external audit 
function. This study contributes to the debate on audit regulation in two ways. Firstly, it 
provides a critique of the current regulatory framework of auditing. By arguing that 
despite the fact that audit plays a crucial role in maintaining confidence in capital markets, 
contemporary auditing practices remain fundamentally flawed. Secondly, it suggests an 
alternative model, that assumes greater state regulation of the audit process, which has to 
be imposed, in order to protect the stakeholders and the wider community. The aim of 
this thesis is to provide a portable set of arguments, which are intended to be generic, 
although illustrated by examples from the UK and US.1 
An account of the existing literature on the structural and regulatory changes that occurred 
within the accounting profession in the second half of the 20th century is provided in 
chapter one. There, it is explained how the increasing provision of consulting services 
transformed the accounting profession into one of business-focused consultants, and 
negatively impacted on their perceived independence. The chapter also provides an 
outline of the regulatory concessions, such as the introduction of the Limited Liability 
Partnership form, or proportionate liability, which the profession managed to secure 
through its extensive lobbying. This diminished the deterrent function of litigation and 
regulation and decreased the profession’s accountability. The chapter then focuses on 
                                                 
1 This thesis does not deal with substantive accounting. It has to be acknowledged, however, that the origins 
of certain problems inherent in the current audit model can actually be found in accounting treatments, e.g. 
special purpose entities (SPE) can be abused to achieve more desirable financial and capital ratios or to 
manage capital requirements.  
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discuss the excesses of the 1980s and the large corporate collapses, such as Enron, which 
have generally undermined confidence in the world’s capital markets and have raised 
questions about the efficiency of the current audit model and the future of the auditing 
profession. Also, the recent global financial crisis of 2008 has drawn attention to the 
limitations of the auditing process, the need to reform some aspects of practice and 
regulation, and the relative silence of the profession at such a fundamentally important 
time.2 Chapter one also provides a historical background to the numerous mergers 
between the big accounting firms which ultimately led to the excessive concentration of 
the audit market for listed companies.  
Despite the fact that the audit process is well established in a developed society, the 
circumstances of its creation and the conditions necessary for its existence and continuing 
development are little understood.3 These questions have hardly attracted the attention of 
academics and hence there has been little interest in the development of audit theory. The 
notable exceptions are the studies of Limpberg, Mautz and Sharaf and Flint, which are 
discussed in chapter two. Limpberg’s theory is based on the assumption that audit 
practices need to be adjusted to the evolving needs of society.4 He emphasises the 
importance of auditors’ independence and notices that independence cannot be 
maintained if auditors must rely on their clients for appointment and remuneration. Mautz 
and Sharaf, are primarily concerned with the audit of business corporations, and not with 
the concept of audit in a wider sense. They base their theory on scientific logic, assuming 
that audit is a rational process of evaluation of evidence. Flint, similarly to Limpberg, 
                                                 
2 Christopher Humphrey, Anne Loft, and Margaret Woods, 'The Global Audit Profession and the 
International Financial Architecture: Understanding Regulatory Relationships at a Time of Financial Crisis' 
(2009) 34(6-7) Accounting, Organisations and Society 810, p. 810; Prem Sikka, 'Financial Crisis and the 
Silence of the Auditors' (2009) 34(6-7) Accounting, Organizations and Society  868, p. 868. 
3 David Flint, Philosophy and Principles of Auditing: An Introduction ( MacMillan Education, London 
1988), p. xii. 
4 Theodore Limpberg, The Social Responsibility of the Auditor (Limpberg Instituut,  The Netherlands 
1985).                                                     
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builds his theory around the social responsibility of auditors, which should change 
according to the society’s needs. Both Flint’s and Limpberg’s theories provide a 
theoretical underpinning for the proposed model, which aims to restore genuinely 
independent auditors, and which suggests that audit plays an important social function 
and should be performed for the benefit of numerous stakeholders. Finally, chapter two 
discusses the agency theory, developed by economists, which provides one of the 
explanations for the origins and functions of external audit. 
Chapter three provides an analysis of the regulatory framework for auditing. It contributes 
to the discussion on financial reporting by considering why, how and by whom audit is 
regulated. Firstly, the chapter examines various general theories of regulation and applies 
them to the auditing context. It argues that none of the theories of regulation fully explain 
the existing regulation of audit, as most of the regulatory changes are reactive and usually 
take place in the aftermath of major accounting scandals. Secondly, it addresses how audit 
is regulated by examining the discourse on rules versus principles-based regulation within 
the auditing sphere. Thirdly, it examines a variety of players involved in the regulation of 
audit. These include: private and public regulators at national and international level, as 
well as big audit firms. The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the current regulatory framework for auditing, which forms a basis for the following 
chapters to go on to criticise the current auditing model, and to propose a new one. 
One of the main arguments in this thesis is that the current audit model is fundamentally 
flawed. It is therefore necessary to pinpoint the flaws inherent in the audit arrangements. 
To that end, chapter four focuses on three areas which are the subjects of an extensive 
critique in auditing literature: independence, accountability of auditors, and concentration 
of the audit market, which are all initially introduced in chapter one. Regarding 
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independence, the main flaw of the model is caused by the fact that auditors have a 
conflict of interest at the heart of their business in that they are appointed and paid by the 
companies they are supposed to assess objectively. As service providers, they rely on 
repeat business from their customers and it is likely that they will consider the prospects 
of being retained for next year’s audit even as they perform this year’s. This creates an 
incentive for auditors to acquiesce to management demands.5 This cannot be remedied 
without delegating the appointment function to an external body, which is proposed in 
chapter six. Furthermore, auditors are allowed to provide certain consulting services, 
which can in turn damage their perceived independence.  This thesis argues that the only 
solution to this problem is the introduction of a statutory ban on the provision of these 
services concurrently with audits. 
 Furthermore, the current audit architecture is characterised by legal, professional and 
social accountability deficits. Issues of accountability deficits have been considered 
before in the context of public or governmental institutions, but few researchers have 
focused on accountability deficits in the private sector audit model. This thesis therefore 
provides insights into questions that have not previously been given significant attention 
in auditing literature. Over the years auditors managed to shield themselves from the 
effects of litigation by lobbying for a decrease in their exposure to tortious claims by non-
clients, for the introduction of the proportionate liability and limited liability agreements, 
as well as limited liability partnerships. At the same time, professional discipline, with its 
lenient sanctions, does not provide a sufficient deterrent against auditors’ acquiescing to 
managers’ demands. Theoretically, the audit should fulfil a public interest role by 
                                                 
5 The term ‘management’  is not used in a strictly legal sense, but more in a way that would be familiar to 
an economist. It denotes senior management rather than the board of directors.  
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ensuring integrity and public confidence in the market and protecting the investing public 
from corporate fraud. In practice, however, auditors owe their duties only to the 
companies they audit. They do not have to have regard other stakeholders, whose pension 
savings are located in public companies. This makes the number of audit addressees very 
limited. Moreover, for decades the auditing profession has been refusing to accept a duty 
to detect fraud, claiming that its sole responsibility is to provide an opinion as to whether 
financial statements represent a true and fair view of the financial state of their clients. 
This is in stark contrast with what society expects auditors to do. The public want auditors 
to focus on detecting irregularities. The main finding here is that, despite numerous 
regulatory changes, auditors in the current audit arrangement remain undeterred and 
largely unaccountable.  According to Sikka, 
Poor audits are a systemic problem. Auditing firms are the private police force of 
capitalism, but are not subjected to pressures and incentives normally associated 
with the private sector. The market for external audit is created by the state and 
guaranteed to accountants belonging to a select few trade associations. In the 
absence of effective accountability and liability, this rarely encourages reflection 
on poor practices.6 
Chapter four also finds that the audit market is highly concentrated and that there are 
significant barriers to entry for small and mid-size audit firms. This significantly limits 
the listed companies’ choice of auditors and can have an even more severe impact if one 
of the Big Four firms withdraws from the market. It postulates that the state should play 
a bigger role in encouraging competition in the audit market. 
                                                 
6 Prem Sikka, 'Big Auditors Must Be Made Accountable to the Public' The Conversation 17 April 2014,  
available at http://theconversation.com/big-auditors-must-be-made-accountable-to-the-public-25766 
accessed 30 August 2014. 
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Chapter five provides a review of various theoretical and international audit models. It 
also considers whether some of the elements of these models could be transplanted in 
order to improve the financial audit architecture in the UK and US.  Drawing on the 
elements of these models, chapter six proposes an alternative audit arrangement, which 
provides potential solutions to the aforementioned problems.  
The alternative model proposes delegating audits of the listed companies to a designated 
state regulator. The proposed model suggests creating an external, public body – the 
Public Auditing Board – which would be in charge of the appointment and remuneration 
of auditors. Such a model would eliminate the ‘mother of all conflicts’ problem stemming 
from the fact that auditors are paid by the very companies they are supposed to audit.7 
Furthermore, auditors would no longer be able to provide their clients with consulting 
services, due to the suggested statutory ban on their provision. This would alleviate the 
conflict of interest problem and increase their perceived independence.  
The suggested model also emphasises the need for auditors to become more accountable. 
It is an important issue for the public as well as investors as ‘in a capitalist economy, the 
process of wealth creation and political stability depends heavily upon confidence in 
processes of accountability, of which an external audit of financial statements is 
considered to be an important part’.8 Auditors are the recipients of the legal concessions 
such as limited exposure to tortious claims by non-clients, proportionate liability or LLP 
structure. They protect auditors from excessive litigation. The thesis argues that these 
concessions should only stay in place if the quality of audits increases. To that end, the 
                                                 
7 Richard Kaplan, 'The Mother of All Conflicts: Auditors and Their Clients' (2003-2004) 29(2) The Journal 
of Corporation Law 363, p. 363. 
8 Prem Sikka, Anthony Puxty, Hugh Willmott, Christine Cooper, 'The Impossibility of Eliminating the 
Expectations Gap: Some Theory and Evidence' (1998) 9(3) Critical Perspectives on Accounting 299, pp. 
299-300. 
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suggested model offers a reorganisation of the audit architecture, with the Public Auditing 
Board at the centre, which would enable the auditors to be truly independent, and focus 
on the delivery of high quality audits. The thesis also argues that auditors should be more 
accountable to the public, since they perform an important role of protecting public 
interest. Accurate financial reporting is essential for stable capital markets and for 
investors to make informed decisions. Currently, the majority of society invests savings 
in the capital markets, either through pension funds or directly. It is essential then that 
auditors take into account the interests of all stakeholders, whilst performing their duty in 
the public interest. The model also suggests extending audit reports, so that they include 
a detailed risk analysis. This is particularly important in the context of banks and their 
portfolios of volatile, complex financial instruments. Furthermore, the thesis argues that 
delegating audits to a designated state regulator would also increase the supply of audit 
services, reduce the size of big audit firms and enable mid-tier firms to compete and bring 
an end to the ‘too big too close’ regulatory inertia.9 
It is concluded that contemporary auditing practices are fundamentally flawed and if the 
accounting profession continues with business as usual, another major audit disaster is 
almost certainly inevitable. As Bromwich has written: 
The auditing profession may face some very severe challenges. The continued 
success of the profession depends in part on its response to these challenges. 
Research has a role in clarifying the nature of these challenges and in exploring the 
possible responses. To do this successfully, the research has to explore fundamental 
questions about why and where the auditor’s authority and power in society reside 
and how this location changes over time.10 
                                                 
9  Sikka (n 6).  
10 Michael Bromwich and Anthony Hopwood, Introduction, Auditing Research: Issues and Opportunities. 
Pitman Books in Association with Deloitte (Haskins & Sells, Chartered Accountants, London 1982), p. 21. 
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The thesis argues that a shift towards a state-backed audit model that provides better 
quality of audit, eliminates self-serving bias and addresses the public interest is essential 
to restore confidence in capital markets and the accounting profession. 
METHODOLOGY 
The aim of this section is to provide the reader with an understanding of how this research 
was done. The thesis adopts a mix of methods such as doctrinal, problem, policy and law 
reform based research.11 The main focus of chapter one is to provide a literature review, 
whilst chapter two reviews a theoretical framework for auditing. The research presented 
there is based primarily on the analysis of financial reporting and legal secondary sources.   
A doctrinal method is adopted in chapters three and four in order to establish what the 
law is in the area of external auditing in the UK and US. Chapter three looks at why, how 
and who regulates audit. This is done through the analysis of not only legal, but also 
political science and economics literature. This thesis therefore adopts an 
interdisciplinary approach to legal analysis. A particular emphasis is placed on the 
institutional framework and policies of the enforcement agencies such as the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) responsible for the 
effective functioning of audit function. A consideration of problems currently affecting 
the audit model is discussed in chapter four.  To that end, the thesis collects and analyses 
numerous primary sources relating to the independence and accountability of auditors. 
This involves, among others, comparative and historical perspectives on case law related 
to auditors’ liability in the UK and US, the analysis of the provisions of the Sarbanes-
                                                 
11 Ian Dobison and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui 
(eds) Research Methods for Law  (Edinburgh University Press 2007), p.19. 
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Oxley Act 2002 and the FRC’s Ethical Standards regarding auditors’ independence. 
Based on the findings in these chapters, the thesis argues that the current audit model 
needs a regulatory overhaul. 
The analysis of the flaws of the existing audit model also leads to a discussion on various 
theoretical and international audit models in chapter five. The purpose of this chapter is 
to review these models and consider their suitability to improve the regulation of external 
audit in the UK and US. This is done mainly through analysis of the secondary sources 
available in English language.  
Drawing on the evidence presented in the thesis, chapter six proposes a free-standing 
legal reconceptualisation of the external audit function in the Anglo-American system. 
The Audit Commission, as one of the examples of the macro models of audit regulation, 
is used as a theoretical basis of the new model, which suggests moving audits to the public 
sector. The new model is centred on a public agency – the Public Auditing Board - in 
charge of appointment and remuneration of auditors. Chapter six adopts Limperg and 
Flint’s theories, discussed in chapter two, as a theoretical grounding that offers solutions 
to the problems inherent in the current external audit function. The proposed model 
implies policy changes, which aim to introduce truly independent auditors, protect the 






CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter introduces the three problematic areas inherent in the current audit model, 
which are the focus of this thesis. These areas are auditors’ independence, lack of 
accountability and excessive concentration of the audit market. They will be analysed in 
greater detail throughout the thesis. These problems have been subject to intellectual 
inquiry and public debate for decades without resolution, which suggests that the audit 
model is conceptually flawed. The aim of this thesis is to show that only substantial 
reform of the auditors’ business model, which this thesis outlines in chapter six, will 
eliminate the problems inherent in the present auditing arrangement, improve the quality 
of audit and end the cycle of disappointment with auditors’ work.  
This chapter does not attempt to present a complete genealogy of the issues identified, 
but instead focuses on the second half of the twentieth century leading up to the arrival at 
the present position. It is structured as follows; a brief analysis of the origins of audit; the 
issues of auditors’ remuneration including cultural change that occurred within the 
accounting profession leading to the rise of consulting services; discussion of legal 
concessions that the accounting profession extensively lobbied for, which in turn 
contributed to the decrease in the deterrent function of regulation and litigation; and 
finally, an analysis of the rise of short-termism providing two examples of the link 
between short-termism and accounting failure, namely the Enron debacle and the 
financial crisis of 2008. The chapter then discusses mergers between the biggest audit 
firms and their influence on the concentration of the audit market. The final section 
concludes by stating that audit has been built and developed on faulty foundations and 
misaligned incentives, which make it difficult for the accountants to provide good quality 
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audits. This lays the foundation for the rest of the thesis, which further criticizes the 
current auditing arrangement and suggests an alternative audit model. 
1.1.  THE ORIGINS OF AUDIT    
Although there is no legal definition of the external financial audit, systematic attempts 
have been made to describe its meaning and function.12 In 1969 the US Auditing Concepts 
Committee13 described audit as: 
A systematic process of objectively obtaining and evaluating evidence regarding 
assertions about economic actions and events to ascertain the degree of 
correspondence between those assertions and established criteria and 
communicating the results to interested users.14 
More broadly an audit is concerned with evaluation of the data contained in the financial 
statements to determine if the data are presented in accordance with the applicable 
financial reporting framework and whether they properly reflect the events that have 
occurred during the period in question. The audited financial statements are then provided 
to third-party users with a vested interest in an audited company. Power, for example, 
describes audit as an 
independent examination of, and expression of opinion on, the financial statements 
of an enterprise. Here are the most general conceptual ingredients of an audit 
practice: independence from the matter being audited; technical work in the form 
of evidence gathering and the examination of documentation; the expression of a 
                                                 
12 Flint, for example, focuses on the conditions required for an effective audit. Firstly, there must a relation 
of accountability between an agent and a principal. Secondly, the principals must be distant from the actions 
of the agents, above note 3. 
13 The Auditing Concepts Committee was established by the Executive Committee of the American 
Accounting Association in 1969 in order to enhance research and recognition to the field of auditing; in 
Joseph A. Silvoso, ‘Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts, 1969-71' (1972) 47(4) The Accounting 
Review 14, p. 17. 
14 Silvoso (n 13) p.18. 
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view based on this evidence; a clearly defined object of the audit process, in this 
case the financial statements.15  
Additionally, Power emphasises the need for auditors to be independent from the 
companies they audit. The independence of the audit provider from a reporting company 
is important, as it adds credibility to the reported information by enhancing the intended 
users’ degree of confidence in the accuracy of the financial statements. Indeed, some 
writers suggest that independence is the most important indication of the quality of an 
audit.16 The issue of auditors’ independence is further discussed in chapter four. 
The audit process itself consists of many stages. First of all, the auditor acquires an 
understanding of the audited company and its activities through assessment of the 
accounting system and internal control mechanism.17 With this in view, the auditor 
develops an audit strategy and an audit plan that will produce evidence helpful in forming 
an opinion on financial statements. A significant part of this stage is fieldwork, which 
concentrates on transaction testing and communication with the client. It is during this 
phase that an auditor determines whether the controls identified during the preliminary 
review are operating properly and in the manner described by the auditee. This stage 
concludes with a preparation of the draft audit report. In the final stage, the auditor issues 
a final report providing information to shareholders and other third parties. The auditor’s 
opinion on the financial statements is meant to provide a reasonable assurance on whether 
financial statements are free from material misstatements caused by fraud or error, and 
whether they were prepared in accordance with the appropriate accounting standards and 
                                                 
15 Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997), pp. 4-5. 
16 Amanda Ball, David L. Owen, and Rob Gray, 'External Transparency or Internal Capture? The Role of 
Third-Party Statements in Adding Value to Corporate Evironmental Reports' (2000) 9(1) Business Strategy 
and the Environment 1, p. 7. 
17 Brenda Porter, Jon Simon, and David Hatherly, Principles of External Auditing (2nd edn, John Wiley & 
Sons 2003), p. 149. 
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laws.18 If the auditor is satisfied with the evidence and considers that the financial 
statements provide a true and fair view of the company, he issues an unqualified audit 
report.19 The auditor may also decide to issue a qualified audit report as a result of 
misstatements, or due to lack of sufficient evidence about the accuracy of the financial 
statements.20 
There are several hypotheses explaining the origins of audit. First of all, it has been argued 
that the appearance of independent audit is a product of government regulation.21 For 
example in the UK the requirement of a compulsory audit was introduced by the 1900 
Companies Act.22 In the US, the 1933 Securities Act required corporations, subject to the 
Act, to have audits conducted by independent or certified public accountants.23 An 
alternative hypothesis suggests that the development of audit was driven by market forces. 
Audits conducted by an external and independent party were useful in reducing the 
incentive problems that arose when the manager did not supply all the capital.24 
Accordingly, audits were found in the earliest firms where the manager did not own all 
the residual claims on the firm. The latter hypothesis seems much more plausible, as there 
is some evidence pointing to the early existence of audit.25  
                                                 
18 Joshua Ronen, ‘Corporate Audits and How to Fix Them’ (2010) 24(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 
189, p. 191. 
19 ISA 700, para 10. 
20 Before issuing a qualified audit report, an auditor needs to modify the opinion in the report. There are 
three types of modified opinions: a qualified opinion, an adverse opinion, and a disclaimer of opinion. If 
there are material misstatements, but there is nothing pervasive to the financial statements, the auditor issues 
a ‘qualified opinion’. This is still a clean opinion. If the misstatements are material and pervasive to the 
financial statements, the auditor expresses an ‘adverse opinion’. This is an unclean audit opinion. Lastly, 
an auditor may issue a disclaimer of opinion when he is unable to obtain sufficient audit evidence regarding 
the accuracy of financial statements. The auditor disclaims the audit opinion because of the risk that 
undetected misstatements could have a material and pervasive effect on the financial statements; in ISA 
(UK and Ireland) 705, para 7, 8, 9 and US AU-C-00705.   
21 Howard F. Stettler, Auditing Principles (4th edn, Prentice - Hall 1977), pp. 20-21. 
22 Porter (n 17), p.22.  
23 Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman, 'Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some 
Evidence' (1983) 26(3) Journal of Law and Economics 613, p. 614. 
24 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure' (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics 305, pp. 338-339. 
25 Lawrence Robert Dicksee, Auditing: A Practical Manual for Auditors (Gee & Co, London 1892). 
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Watts argues that audits existed early in the development of business corporations 
(C1200AD) and initially were conducted by directors or shareholders forming the 
committees of auditors.26 The use of external professional auditors became the usual 
practice in the latter half of the nineteenth century in the UK, and the early part of the 
twentieth century in the US. However, despite the fact that the use of professional auditors 
became common at that stage, corporate audits were not typically required by law either 
in the UK or the US. This suggests that the use of professional auditors occurred due to 
the changes in the market for auditing rather than government fiat.27 There are some 
market developments which help explain the rise of the professional audit firm. To begin 
with, the demand for audits in the UK in the 1860s and 1870s increased because of the 
complexity of the accounts and the enormous expansion in the size and number of 
corporations. The increased complexity in turn encouraged specialisation in accounting 
and the growth of professional firms.28 The reasons for the development of professional 
audit firms in the US are consistent with this approach, albeit that the change there 
occurred later than in the UK.29 
It has been argued that audit developed as a response to the principal-agent conflict30, 
which lies at the centre of the agency cost theory.31 The agency conflict stems from an 
information asymmetry and the fear that agents might have different motives and interests 
                                                 
26 Watts (n 23), p. 616. 
27 Watts (n 23), p. 614. 
28 Watts (n 23), p. 630. 
29 Watts (n 23), p. 629. 
30 Watts (n 23), p. 614; Rick Antle, 'The Auditor as an Economic Agent' (1982) 20(2) Journal of Accounting 
Research 503, pp. 503-506, D. J. Hardman, 'Towards a Conceptual Framework for Government Auditing' 
(1991) 31(1) Accounting & Finance 22, pp. 22 - 25, Mohinder Parkash and Carol F. Venable, 'Auditee 
Incentives for Auditor Independence: The Case of Nonaudit Services' (1993) 68(1) Accounting Review 
113, p. 115, Chee W. Chow, 'The Demand for External Auditing: Size, Debt and Ownership Influences' 
(1982) 57(2) The Accounting Review 272, p. 272, Ross L. Watts, 'Corporate Financial Statements, a 
Product of the Market and Political Processes' (1977) 2(1) Australian Journal of Management 53, p. 56. 
31 Agency cost theory is also known as a contracting cost theory, which derives from the financial 
economics literature and belongs to the positivist group of economic theories, in Michael B. Adams, 
'Agency Theory and the Internal Audit'  (1994) 9(8) Managerial Auditing Journal 8, p. 8. 
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than the principals.32 Information asymmetry occurs when management (agents) have a 
competitive advantage of information about the company over that of the owners 
(principals).33 This can potentially result in the agents maximising their own interests at 
the expense of the principals34 and problems such as ‘adverse selection’ (e.g. when sellers 
have information that buyers do not) and ‘moral hazard’ (when one person takes more 
risks, because someone else bears the cost of those risks), which are further discussed in 
chapter two.35 Audit is considered to be a partial solution to this, as it provides a 
mechanism which aligns the interests of the agents and principals and reinforces trust 
between them.36 Auditors, as an independent and external party, are hired by the 
companies in order to produce stewardship37 information on the financial status of the 
companies.38 They provide an independent check on the work and information provided 
by the agents, diminishing the negative influence of the agency problem. 
So far this section has provided a definition and explanation of the origins of audit. In 
essence, the auditors’ role has not changed significantly over time. The current regulatory 
audit model can be characterized by the same basic issues that existed at the birth of the 
modern audit in the nineteenth century.39 This means that there may be a deep, historical 
flaw in the functioning of audit. Many of the problems, such as lack of independence and 
                                                 
32 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, 'Separation of Ownership and Control' (1983) 26(2) The Journal 
of Law and Economics 301, pp. 303-304, Eugene F. Fama, 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm' 
(1980) 28(2) Journal of Political Economy 288, pp. 288-295. 
33 Jensen and Meckling (n 24) pp. 310 - 15, Fama (n 32) p. 290. 
34 Beth Arnold and Paul de Lange, 'Enron: An Examination of Agency Problems' (2004) 15(6/7) Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 751, p. 753. 
35 Jensen and Meckling (n 2433) pp. 355-60. 
36 The Institute Of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. The Audit and Assurance Faculty. 
'Agency Theory and the Role of Audit'  (2005), p. 6.  
37 Stewardship embodies responsible planning and management of resources. In the auditing context, 
stewardship refers to the auditor’s function of verifying whether information contained in the financial 
statements represents  a true and fair view of the company’s financial health.  
38 Antle (n 28) p. 504. 
39 Richard P. Brief, 'The Accountant's Responsibility in Historical Perspective' (1975) April Accounting 
Review 285, p. 285; Roy Chandler and John Richard Edwards, 'Recurring Issues in Auditing: Back to the 
Future' (1996) 9(2) Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 4, p. 4. 
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accountability, which are discussed in chapter four, are not capable of permanent solution 
without the fundamental rethinking of the audit model, which is offered in chapter six. 
The objective of the remainder of this chapter is to set the context for the rest of the thesis 
by examining crucial changes that occurred in the last several decades which affected the 
regulation of audit and the accounting profession. The following section will examine one 
of the most contentious issues of the present audit architecture - the conflicts of interests 
inherent in the professions’ organisational structure and their impact on auditors’ 
independence.  
1.2.  CONFLICT OF INTERESTS AND REMUNERATION 
This section starts off with a discussion on the conflict of interests embedded in the 
current audit arrangement, which is derived from the fact that auditors are hired and paid 
by the very companies they are supposed to provide with an independent audit opinion. 
The thesis then moves on to discuss the issue of auditors’ compensation and the 
phenomenon of low-balling. To follow, the use of consulting services is discussed, which 
combined with changes in the earnings pressures on the auditors’ corporate clients, caused 
the value shift inside the big audit firms.40 This, in turn, contributed to the fact that 
auditors became more susceptible to accommodating questionable accounting practices, 
which put a strain on auditors’ independence. 
By its very nature, corporate management has strong incentives to manipulate the 
accounts. Managers want to show their positive input to the corporation’s operations. 
They also have a personal financial stake to do so as well. Various compensation formulae 
tied to corporate financial performance measures and coupled with generous grants of 
                                                 
40 Timothy J. Fogarty and Saad A. Al-Kazemi, 'Leadership in Accounting: The New Face of an Old 
Profession' (2011) 11(1) Accounting & the Public Interest 16, p. 16; Arthur R. Wyatt, 'Accounting 
Professionalism-They Just Don't Get It!' (2004) 18(1) Accounting Horizons 45, p. 45. 
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options on the corporation’s stock, make managers keenly interested in their corporation’s 
financial statements. The discussion in latter sections of this chapter shows that it is a 
frequent occurence that management is actively involved in determining what goes into 
a corporation’s financial reports. The role of the public accounting firms is to provide 
independent and objective scrutiny on attempts to manipulate a company’s accounts 
against these natural tendencies of management. Under the current system, however, 
auditors are hired, paid and fired by the companies they audit, and it is widely known that 
client companies fire auditing firms that deliver adverse audits.41 Despite the fact that an 
auditing firm is large enough to absorb the loss of a single client, individual auditors’ jobs 
and careers may be contingent on success with specific clients. That is why auditors have 
strong business reasons to stay in clients’ good graces and remain highly motivated to 
approve the client companies’ financial statements. This negatively affects auditors’ 
independence.42 
Auditors’ independence is the most important feature of the external audit function. It is, 
in fact, the sole reason for its existence. The mere suggestion that auditors might be 
conflicted while exercising their judgement can damage shareholders’ and public 
confidence in the market and devalue the service they provide. The need for auditors to 
be independent of their client’s management was emphasized very early in the 
development of the audit function - ‘the necessity of [the auditor’s] utter independence of 
any influences which may colour his conclusions must be insisted upon.’43 Even an early 
edition of The Accountant in 1883 identified this conflict of interest as a critical problem:  
                                                 
41 Kaplan (n 7) p. 367. 
42 This problem, frequently described in the accounting literature as the ‘mother of all conflicts’, is difficult 
to solve without severing the direct relationships of auditors with the management; in Kaplan (n 7) p. 367. 
This thesis suggests in chapter six creating an external body in charge of appointing and remunerating the 
auditors, which would solve this conflict of interest at the heart of auditors’ business. 
43 Chandler (n 35) p.4. 
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The audit of Public Companies’ accounts was designed to control and check the 
actions of directors in their administration of the affairs of Public Companies: and 
yet, as a rule, the auditors who are chosen for this purpose owe their employment 
to the very directors whom they are presumed so to control and check in the interests 
of the shareholders. This is one of the evils arising out of the proxy system, which 
I trust we may some day see abolished, as being utterly pernicious and vicious in 
root and branch. It should be laid down as an invariable rule that directors, trustees, 
or other persons in fiduciary positions should never be allowed the direct or indirect 
use of proxies in voting, or in fact to vote personally, on any subject affecting the 
performance of the duties imposed upon them by the trusts under which they act, 
or on the passing of the accounts as presented by them to their proprietary or cestui 
que trust.44 
The pressure to retain as many clients as possible is high. In doing so auditors often agree 
to provide audits for artificially reduced fees, a phenomenon which is often called low-
balling. Kaplan explains it in the following way: as audit of a new client normally requires 
additional work of a one-time nature, the auditing firm will almost certainly lose money 
on this particular audit engagement in the first year, and perhaps in later years as well. 
Accordingly, the accounting firm is confronted with huge economic pressure to retain the 
client. Consequently, once the firm has "invested" or lost significant resources in the new 
client relationship in the form of unbilled hours, it must do everything to keep this client 
to make the investment pay off. 45  
According to the Cohen report ‘accepting an audit engagement with the expectation of 
offsetting early losses or lower revenues with fees to be charged in future audits creates 
the same threat to independence (as an unpaid audit fee)’.46 Though the literature on the 
                                                 
44 Brief (n 35) p. 291. 
45 Kaplan (n 7) p. 368. 
46 Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (Cohen Commission), Report, Conclusions, and 
Recommendations (New York 1978). 
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effects of low-balling on auditors’ independence, is far from clear-cut47, what has been 
relatively uncontroversial, is the negative impact that low-balling has on the quality of 
audits. According to the SEC, for example, low-balling leads to the overproduction of 
dishonest information.48 Shohet claims that one of the dangers ‘is the decline in quality 
clients receive from low-ballers as they take on more customers in order to compensate 
for the low price they charge’.49  
Accounting firms practice low-balling not only to retain their clients for several years. In 
the past decades, they have increasingly used low-cost audits to build relationships that 
allow them to sell their lucrative consulting services. The following section examines the 
provision of consulting services by the accounting firms and their impact on the 
profession’s independence.  
1.3.  CONSULTING SERVICES 
This section looks at the provision of consulting services and their impact on auditors’ 
independence. Consulting is considered to pose a significant threat to the long-term audit 
quality and to perceptions of the audit firms’ commitment to protecting public interest. It 
is also considered to be one of the main reasons why auditors’ independence is 
compromised. Conflicted auditors have incentives to avoid providing negative audit 
opinions to the managers who hired them and paid their auditing and consulting fees. The 
last two decades of the 20th century have witnessed the transformation of professional 
auditors into business oriented consultants.50 
                                                 
47 See for example Linda Elisabeth DeAngelo, 'Auditor Independence, 'Low Balling', and Disclosure 
Regulation' (1981) 3 Journal of Accounting and Economics 113, p. 113. 
48 Securities Act Release No. 33-5869. 
49 Accountancy Age, Low-balling a Continuing Threat to Firms, Claim Analysts, 17 April 2015, available 
at http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/2404522/-lowballing-a-continuing-threat-to-firms-claim-
analysts accessed 26 June 2016. 
50 Dana R. Hermanson, 'How Consulting Services Could Kill Private-Sector Auditing' (2009) 79(1) CPA 
Journal 6, p. 6. 
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The accounting profession had begun diversification into consulting services in the 
second half of the twentieth century.51 They began developing new information-based 
services, gradually expanding beyond their traditional accounting, auditing and taxation 
base.52 This new line of services became known as ‘management services’ or 
‘management advisory services’ (MAS). By 1969 they constituted one quarter of 
accounting firms’ revenue and continued to expand.53 In the UK, this rapid expansion and 
bullish approach to providing consulting services attracted the attention of the UK’s 
Auditing Practices Board (APB), which commented: 
The effects of opening the profession to marketing in the mid-1980s have been 
aggressive competition, the building of other services onto the recurring client base 
and the development of new products by the profession and its firms to meet the 
developing needs of industry and commerce. Whilst the market clearly demands 
such services, it can be argued that such an expansion has led on occasion to 
forgetfulness that the audit service is different in that the auditor’s opinion is for the 
benefit of the users of financial information and confidence in the capital markets 
as well as for the benefit of the company itself. 54 
In the 1970s and 1980s the drive to increase the scope and scale of profitable consulting 
services transformed the Big Eight accounting firms into businesses promoting growth, 
profitability and worldwide reach, which are typically business aims, not necessarily in 
line with the professional values of independence, objectivity, quality of service and 
public interest focus.55 The mergers between the firms in the late 1980s and 1990s created 
                                                 
51 John C. Coffee, Gatekeepers : The Professions and Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press, 
New York 2006), p. 146. 
52 Stephen A. Zeff, 'How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It Is Today: Part 1' (2003) 17(3) 
Accounting Horizons 189, p. 194. 
53 Zeff (n 52) p. 194.  
54 Auditing Practices Board, The Audit Agenda  (Auditing Practices Board, London 1994), p. 3. 
55 The accounting professions both in the UK and US claim to adhere to these values, available via 
http://www.aicpa.org/ABOUT/MISSIONANDHISTORY/Pages/MissionHistory.aspx  accessed  25 
January 2015, http://www.icaew.com/en/about-icaew/who-we-are/our-business-values-and-standards-of-
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the ‘Big Five’ worldwide oligopoly. At the same time the dialogue of the profession over 
the accounting standards, which was so vivid in the 1960s, had declined in the 1980s 
largely due to the increasing business focus of the profession.56  All of the big accounting 
firms aimed at being business firms more than professional accountants. In the mid-
1980s, chief executive of Deloitte, Michael Cook, defined the goal of his company ‘to 
change Deloitte’s self-image from that of a professional firm that happened to be in 
business… to a business that happened to market professional services’.57  
The drive towards profitability and growth put extra pressure on partners to generate more 
income by securing new clients. This was getting increasingly hard due to the saturation 
of the audit market. According to Coffee, firms began to compete with each other based 
on the ‘low-balling’ strategy, under which they were setting audit fees below cost during 
the initial audit engagements.58 It operated effectively as a marketing practice, which 
enabled the accounting firms to access the companies in order to sell other services.59 
Moreover, major audit firms were rewarding senior personnel for completing audits in as 
short time as possible. Senior personnel then pressurised junior staff, who sometimes 
engaged in falsifying audit schedules in order to deliver audits on time.60 Low cost audit 
became the audit of low quality. The profession’s traditional function, auditing, became 
a ‘loss-leader’ and the pressure was shifted onto audit partners to cross-sell consulting 
services.61 Cross-selling became a main tactic for increased revenue and the most 
                                                 
behaviour  accessed 25 January 2015. On accountants as part of ‘the system of professions’ see Andrew 
Delano Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 1988), p. 26. 
56 Zeff (n 52) p. 200. 
57 Stephen A. Zeff, 'How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It Is Today: Part 2' (2003) 17(4) 
Accounting Horizons 267, p. 271. 
58 Coffee (n 51) p.151. 
59 Lee Berton, 'Audit Fees Fall as CPA Firms Jockey for Bids', Wall Street Journal, 28 January 1985,  p. 
33. 
60 C. Willet and M. Page, 'A Survey of Time Budget Pressure and Irregular Auditing Practices Amongst 
Newly Qualified UK Chartered Accountants' (1996) 28(2) British Accounting Review 101, p. 105. 
61 Berton (n 59) p. 33. 
 34 
significant criteria in evaluation of the audit partners’ contribution to the firm. Not 
meeting the ‘income targets’ frequently resulted in forced resignations, thereby ending 
the old norm of ‘partnership for life’.62  Furthermore, some of the accounting firms 
compensated their audit partners with incentive fees or bonuses dependent on the amount 
of consulting services they cross-sold.63 After the collapse of Enron in 2001, the SEC 
expressed its strong view that ‘such incentives programs … are inconsistent with the 
independence and objectivity of external auditors that is necessary for them to maintain, 
both in fact and appearance.’64 As a result of that, the accounting firms’ culture changed. 
Arthur Wyatt, once a Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) member and a 
senior partner at Arthur Andersen, noted that ‘primarily commercial interests had 
undermined the core values of the professional firm’.65  
The drive towards profitability associated with the increasing provision of consulting 
services meant that client service had become more important than accounting and 
stewardship. Pleasing client was put higher in a value hierarchy than a public accounting 
firm’s central responsibility to protect the public interest.66 According to William R. 
Gregory, the Board Chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA): 
The effects of the phenomenal growth in the profession and competitive pressures 
have created in some CPAs attitudes that are intensely commercial and nearly 
devoid of the high-principled conduct that we have come to expect of a true 
professional. It is sad that we seem to have become a breed of highly skilled 
technicians and businessmen, but have subordinated courtesy, mutual respect, self-
                                                 
62 Zeff (n 57) p. 271. 
63 Coffee (n 41) p. 151. 
64 Securities Act Release No.33-8154, ‘Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor 
Independence’, 2 December 2002, pp. 95-96 
65 Wyatt  (n 40) p. 50. 
66 Susan E. Squires, Inside Arthur Andersen: Shifting Values, Unexpected Consequences ( FT Prentice Hall, 
Upper Saddle River, NJ 2003), p. 63. 
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restraint, and fairness for a quest for firm growth and a preoccupation with the 
bottom line.67  
As the firms were more closely involved with their clients through providing consulting 
services, and thought of themselves more as consultants that happened to do audits, they 
continued to reward sales and marketing over stewardship and professionalism.68 
Consulting revenues more than doubled from 1990 to 1999 and the accounting firms were 
subject to the countervailing pressures, a conflict between client sales and protecting the 
public.69 This was no longer an environment where the auditors could oppose 
questionable accounting and disclosure treatments. Despite the major accounting scandals 
of 2002 and the subsequent regulatory reforms, the problem of auditors’ independence 
remains unresolved and accounting firms continue violating the independence rules.70  
To conclude, the evidence shows that the rapid expansion of accounting firms blurred the 
traditional boundaries between a client relationship and a public obligation. Public 
accounting firms blended into consulting firms through hiring and training information 
specialists, cross-selling and compensation practices.71 The traditional hallmarks of the 
profession and the duty to protect the public had been gradually eroded and substituted 
by the business aims of increasing profit and worldwide reach.  
                                                 
67 Zeff (n 57) p. 267. 
68 Mark Stevens, The Big Six: The Selling out of America's Top Accounting Firms (Simon & Schuster 1991), 
p. 26. 
69 John C. Coffee, 'What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s' (2004) 89(2) 
Cornell Law Review 269, p. 291. 
70 On 24th January 2014 the SEC charged the public accounting firm KPMG with violating independence 
rules by providing prohibited non-audit services such as bookkeeping and expert services to the affiliates 
of companies whose books they were auditing. Also some of the KPMG staff owned stock in companies 
that were KPMG clients, which constituted a further violation of the independence rules, available via 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540667080 accessed 10 February 2016.  
71 Wanda A. Wallace, 'The Economic Role of the Audit in Free and Regulated Markets: A Look Back and 
a Look Forward' (2004) 17 Research in Accounting Regulation 267, p. 268. 
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This thesis argues that the cultural change that occurred within the accounting profession 
and the repeated breaches of auditors’ independence rules call for a fundamental 
reconsideration of the current audit model. Auditors should not be allowed to offer 
consulting services to management, as this impairs the appearance of independence and 
siphones their efforts away from protecting the public. This thesis suggests in chapter six 
a new regime under which auditors are banned from providing consulting services to their 
audit clients. 
The issue of compromised independence and the excessive provision of the consulting 
services is only one of the problems in the current audit arrangement. Another issue is the 
decline in deterrence.  In the past few decades, the legal threat facing auditors for their 
involvement in audit failure declined dramatically.72 Auditors, less deterred by the threat 
of private litigation, could more easily get involved in managerial attempts to inflate the 
results. The following section will discuss the regulatory changes that led to the decline 
in expected liability costs for auditors, which left the auditors undeterred and more willing 
to acquiesce to the managers’ demands. 
1.4.  THE DECLINE IN DETERRENCE 
This section looks at the judicial and regulatory changes in the expected liability costs 
that faced auditors who were considering whether or not to submit to the risky accounting 
practices favoured by managers.  It examines judicial changes in tort rules governing third 
party claims, which restrict the liability of auditors for negligent misstatements. It also 
analyses the provisions allowing for the introduction of the proportionate liability and the 
limited liability partnership structure. This section argues that these considerable 
privileges diminished the deterrent function of regulation and litigation and left the 
                                                 
72 Coffee (n 51) p. 55. 
 37 
accounting profession largely unaccountable. This in turn created an environment where 
auditors were more inclined to engage in risky accounting practices rather than focus on 
the quality of the audit. 
Accountants have suffered from numerous liability crises, which at times threatened to 
overwhelm the entire profession. Nineteenth century accounting practitioners in Britain 
were faced with legal difficulties and a confidence crisis bearing remarkable similarities 
to the one of the 1990s. The 1890s saw the start of negligence suits against professional 
auditors. These included famous auditors of the time, such as F.W. Pixley in Woodhouse 
Rawson United or William Barclay Peat in the Millwall Dock case.73 This litigation trend 
persisted even after the professional class of auditors had gained the monopolistic position 
over corporate audits. This regularly raised doubts over the value of audit, and the 
standards of the profession’s most competent individuals who had been questioned by the 
courts.74 
Numerous auditing scandals of the 1960s, 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s such as 
the Continental Vending Machines, National Student Marketing Corporation, Equity 
Funding Corporation and The Four Seasons Nursing Homes increased litigation for 
auditors in the US. In the UK, scandals at London and County Securities Bank and 
Johnson Matthey Bankers called into question the auditors’ responsibilities and increased 
their legal exposure.75 A liability wave had its peak in the 1980s and early 1990s, and 
then decreased rapidly during the 1990s.76 Most of the scandals followed a similar pattern; 
management in each firm used a unique set of methods of creative accounting or fraud in 
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order to cover up poor performance, to preserve the company’s stock price, and to further 
personal benefit. There was often an involvement of a charismatic and ‘overstrong’ 
individual who succeeded to convince the business community that everything was fine, 
even though it was not. On top of that, there was always a failure of either internal control 
system or external auditor.77 
During the four year period ending in 1984, Arthur Andersen alone paid over $137 million 
in private lawsuit settlements.78 A study conducted in 1984 estimated that ‘more lawsuits 
had been filed against accountants in the last decade-and-a-half than in the entire history 
of the profession.’79 By 1994, the accounting profession settled fifty class actions for $482 
million.80 In the UK, there were only three outstanding claims against auditors in 1983, 
ten years later that number had increased to over 600.81 Many of these cases turned out to 
be the biggest accounting failures in the UK. These included the audits of Barlow Clowes 
by Spicer & Pegler, Polly Peck by Stoy Hayward, BCCI by Price Waterhouse and Ernst 
& Whinney, and Maxwell’s Mirror Group Newspapers by Coopers & Lybrand.82 
Litigation expenses represented a big part of the cost of doing business and there was a 
significant risk of an accounting firm going bankrupt in case of an adverse judgement. 
That was a risk that the profession could not control. The accounting profession argued 
that big damages awarded against one of the larger accounting firms could actually 
contribute to its bankruptcy and the further concentration of the audit market. The 
profession used a variety of arguments to justify the need to reduce its liability exposure. 
                                                 
77 Michael J. Jones, Creative Accounting, Fraud and International Accounting Scandals (John Wiley & 
Sons, Chichester 2011), p. 520. 
78 Coffee (n 51) p.153. 
79 Coffee (n 51) p.153. 
80 Coffee (n 51) p.153. 
81 Chandler and Edwards (n 39) p. 6. 
82 Chandler and Edwards (n 39) p. 6. 
 39 
First, the potential difficulty in recruiting and retaining business students.83 Second, new 
and risky businesses could struggle to obtain audit services.84 Third, the profession could 
be forced to reduce the type of audit services available. Fourth, the auditor might not be 
able to obtain sufficient insurance.85 The profession presented the need to reduce their 
liability exposure as a matter of public welfare with consequences for the capital markets 
and employment.86 The increased level of litigation, however, did not act as a spur to 
promote better quality audits. Instead, it encouraged the accounting profession to lobby 
extensively for the passage of various regulatory changes, which did ease their litigation 
pressure. 
One of the regulatory arrangements, which the auditors welcomed, was the judicial 
change to tort rules governing third party claims. Over many decades the courts struggled 
to find a balance between the two dominant views – one arguing for the narrow scope of 
liability based on the contractual nature of audit, and the other arguing for broader liability 
centred on the foreseeability of harm to third parties from a negligently performed audit.87 
In the US, public accountants may incur liability based on the federal securities laws, or 
on state law theories of negligence, misrepresentation and fraud.88 Even though the 
configuration of these rules varies from state to state, courts have increasingly rejected 
expansive liability rules in favour of a more balanced approach in most of the states. This 
is based on the Restatement of Torts approach, according to which third parties are able 
to sue a negligent auditor if they belong to the group of foreseen individuals whom the 
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public accountant would expect to rely on audit. In the UK, the House of Lords in the 
Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 89 decision also retreated from expansive liability 
rules and adopted an approach favourable to auditors. In accordance with this decision, 
auditors owe their duty of care only to their clients and as a general rule this duty will not 
extend to third parties relying on the audited financial statements. The issue of litigation 
against accountants for negligent audits is analysed in detail in chapter four. 
The contraction of auditors’ liability towards third parties is consistent with other 
arrangements the accounting profession had lobbied for. A further change that diluted the 
deterrent effect of auditor liability was an introduction of proportionate liability in 1995 
in the US and its UK counterpart in 2008.90 For many decades due to their joint and 
several liability, auditors were usually sued alongside other co-defendants irrespectively 
of the level of their culpability. At the time of the trial other co-defendants were most 
often bankrupt, so auditors were left to pay the whole amount.91 This phenomenon was 
often referred to as a ‘deep pockets syndrome’92, which implied that auditors were sued, 
not because of their fault or negligence, but because of their wealth.93 In the US, this 
change came with the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) 
in 1995. The Act was designed to thwart frivolous securities class action lawsuits brought 
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under federal securities laws against companies whose stock performed below 
expectations. 94 It improved the accountants’ situation by introducing proportionate 
liability, enabling the sued accountant to be liable only for a percentage of the whole 
amount.95 
The available data suggest that the class actions against secondary defendants such as 
accountants or lawyers declined in the second half of the 1990s. In 1996 the SEC 
conducted a study, which revealed that out of 105 securities class actions, accounting 
firms were named in only six cases. 96 From 1990 to 1992 the relevant numbers were 192, 
172 and 144 respectively.97 This decline was attributable not only to the PSLRA, but also 
to several Supreme Court decisions, most notably the Central Bank of Denver v First 
Interstate Bank of Denver [1994]98, which eliminated ‘aiding and abetting’ liability for 
private actions under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act. Lawsuits filed 
under this section followed a similar pattern. At first, investors filed civil actions against 
the bankrupt corporations for violations of section 10 (b) of the SEA and rule 10b-5 of 
the SEC, claiming the companies’ officers were fraudulent in preparing financial 
statements. Following this, investors accused accountants, brokers and attorneys - ‘deep 
pocket’ constituencies - alleging that they aided and abetted fraud against them.99 The 
Central Bank decision eliminated the right of an individual to pursue a corporate 
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gatekeeper on an aiding and abetting claim and at the same time deprived the investors of 
recourse at times when gatekeepers failed to deter fraud.100  
In the UK, proportionate liability is not explicitly envisaged in the Companies Act 2006. 
The Act, however, allows contractual liability limitation agreements, which purport to 
limit the amount of a liability owed to a company by its auditor in respect of any 
negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, occurring in the course of the audit 
of accounts, of which the auditor may be guilty in relation to the company.101 It seems 
that contractual restrictions of liability to the proportionate share of the auditor’s loss are 
a viable form of the liability limitation agreements.102 
Another concession granted to the accounting profession, which further eroded the 
regulatory deterrence function, has been the introduction of the Limited Liability 
Partnerships (LLP), which gave accounting firm partners considerable protection from 
negligence lawsuits. The LLPs emerged in the US in the early 1990s. At first only two 
US states allowed the LLP form. By the mid-1990s LLPs were available in most states. 
All of the major accounting firms have adopted the LLPs structure. In the UK, the 
accounting profession had lobbied the national government to introduce the LLP 
legislation in the early 1990s, at approximately the time when Ernst & Young and Price 
Waterhouse worked on the law on the LLPs for Jersey in the Channel Islands.103 Initially, 
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the Law Commission declined to pursue this issue, but since April 2001, UK accounting 
firms have been permitted to operate as LLPs. 104  
The LLP gives partners an advantage of limited personal liability. In traditional 
partnership structures partners are jointly and severally liable for the professional 
negligence and malfeasance of other partners.105 This induces partners to monitor each 
other. In limited liability partnerships members who are not actively involved in the 
management are shielded from liability.106  This creates a situation, where partners lack 
the incentives to watch other partners work. If partners face the financial pressure to hold 
on to their clients and there is no one to supervise and monitor their work, there is a danger 
that audits can become less reliable.107   
There is little doubt that there has been a significant increase in the size and number of 
claims brought against audit firms over the past 40 years. The profession has argued that 
the regulatory changes limiting their liability were essential to prevent another Arthur 
Andersen-like failure. They also claimed the protection offered by the availability of 
insurance has significant gaps and does not outweigh the risks of one of the big companies 
going bust, which would cause even further concentration of the audit market.108 A study 
conducted by Andrew Likierman on behalf of the DTI in 1989 concluded that larger 
accounting firms were finding it problematic to obtain the cover they needed and 
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consequently were under pressure to pull back from more-risky engagements.109 It 
became even worse with time. For example in 1993, the maximum cover available for the 
auditing firms was approximately $105 million. Such limitations covers were insufficient, 
with the three largest claims averaging $340 million that year. Today, claims go well 
beyond these sums, with a notable example of Equitable Life’s £2.6 billion claim against 
Ernst & Young.110 These types of risks make the Big Four uninsurable and hence the 
profession’s case for lobbying for regulatory concessions is not unreasonable. 
It is difficult to strike the right balance between having regulation in place, which would 
deter auditors from acquiescing to managers’ demands, and the profession, which still 
persists in lobbying in favour of more regulatory protection.111 The model suggested in 
chapter six asserts that the ultimate focus should be on delivering audits of the highest 
quality. To that end, under the proposed regime, the profession should be able to benefit 
from the current regulatory protection, but only at the cost of substantial reorganisation. 
The new model suggests creating an independent agency responsible for appointment and 
remuneration of auditors. It also recommends imposing a ban on the simultaneous 
provision of audit and consulting services by the auditors. This arrangement would 
eliminate conflicts of interest inherent in the current audit model, restore auditors’ 
independence and enhance the quality of audits. 
The following section will analyse the move towards short-termism and the excessive 
focus on quarterly earnings and short-term incentive bonuses, which has had a significant 
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impact on the quality of audits and the auditing industry. It will show that as management 
insisted on favourable accounting treatments in order to inflate earnings, the auditors 
found it increasingly hard to resist these pressures and remain independent. This further 
builds on this thesis’ proposition that compromised independence of auditors remains one 
of the biggest flaws of the current audit model.  
1.5. THE MOVE TOWARDS SHORT-TERMISM AND ITS   
EFFECT ON AUDIT PROFESSION 
The aim of this section is to analyse the increasing trend towards short-termism, which 
has had significant implications for the capital markets and for the auditing industry. 
Short-termism is described as ‘the excessive focus of … managers, investors and analysts 
on short-term quarterly earnings and lack of attention to strategy, fundamentals and 
conventional approaches to long term value creation’.112 This section focuses on the main 
drivers behind this trend, such as the enhanced public disclosure of the accounts and 
annual reports of companies and the growing use of equity compensation which induced 
management to focus over the day-to-day share price.113 These had a negative influence 
on the auditing profession, which frequently acquiesced to management pressures to 
allow earnings management, which led to the production of low quality audits. The links 
between short-termism and poor quality audits are then explored further in the subsequent 
sections, which go on to discuss the Enron scandal and the financial crisis. 
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Much concern has been expressed about the short-term perspective of the capital markets, 
investment and corporate managers.114 The reason behind this is that: 
 
obsession with short-term results by investors, asset management firms, and 
corporate managers collectively leads to the unintended consequences of destroying 
long-term value, decreasing market efficiency, reducing investment returns, and 
impeding efforts to strengthen corporate governance.115  
CEOs have been encouraged to pursue short-term objectives instead of long-term 
fundamental value116 and short-termism has become closely associated with agency 
theory and achieving high stock price.117 
There are considerable drawbacks of keeping the share price high. These include 
managerial efforts to manipulate the share price using strategies such as ‘earnings 
management’ both as an offensive and defensive strategy.118 These practices harm not 
only the reputation of, and confidence in, securities markets, but also the long term 
financial stability of corporations. According to Sappideen, short-termism contributes to 
excessive risk taking and that risk is being shifted from managers to shareholders, then to 
debt holders and then in turn from subordinated to senior debt holders.119 The financial 
crisis in 2008 has shown that excessive risk taking can lead to systemic failure of many 
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institutions, and can also a have negative impact on corporations, markets and society in 
general.  
As a consequence of this, the share price has become a surrogate for corporate 
performance and in this sense corporate governance has undergone a paradigm shift.120 
Instead of having boards at the top and managers carrying out their directives with the 
shareholders assessing the response of the marketplace and determining share price, it has 
become the share price driving the agenda of the board, managers and shareholders. 
Instead of the board deciding what is good for the company in the long run, based on 
accounting notions of earnings and provisions for the future, the focus has been shifted to 
share prices based on cash-flow estimates, with a permanent drive to increase them.121 
One of the main drivers of short-termism has been the increasing demand on listed 
companies for information.122 More information, transparency and disclosure have been 
an instinctive response to a wide range of corporate governance problems.123 Some 
commentators explain the need for increased disclosure on efficiency grounds, claiming 
that disclosure is helping market participants to determine stock prices that accurately 
reflect all available information.124 Others base their explanation for mandatory 
disclosure in the agency cost theory, which will be discussed in chapter two, contending 
that the principal purpose of disclosure is to address agency problems that arise between 
managers and shareholders. Disclosure can help reduce the cost of monitoring managers’ 
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use of corporate assets for self-interested aims.125 The agency cost theory also proposes 
that information asymmetry can be overcome if markets are provided with frequent, 
widely available, consistent and comparable information. This view has contributed 
significantly to a market emphasis on quarterly disclosure.126  
According to the Kay Review, however, much of the information provided is simply ‘a 
noise’ and is insignificant in assessing the financial condition of the companies.127 For 
companies with long-term investment plans, such as those in the oil, mining, utilities or 
pharmaceutical industry, profitability can only be measured over a period of many years. 
Construction enterprises can only be assessed over a complete economic cycle and, as the 
recent financial crisis revealed, the same is true of the financial sector.  For these types of 
businesses, interim assessments are important, but they should be delivered in qualitative 
and subjective form. Quarterly earnings in their current shape are unreliable, as they are 
dominated by random fluctuations and frequently managed.128  
The fact that ‘quarterly capitalism’ leads to short-termism has been widely recognised.129 
In order to minimize the negative effects of short-termism, some US companies, such as 
AT&T, Coke, and MacDonalds, have decided not to disclose their quarterly results.130 
Changes made to the EU Transparency Directive131 in November 2013 abolished the 
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requirement for companies with shares admitted to trading on a regulated market in the 
EU to publish quarterly interim management statements (IMS), although issuers may 
continue to publish this information if they so choose. The European Commission, while 
amending the Transparency Directive, described the obligation to prepare IMSs as a 
‘burden for many small and medium-sized issuers… without being necessary for investor 
protection’.132 This approach was welcomed by the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills, which observed that quarterly reporting requirements produce an excessive 
focus on short-term results. Also the Kay Review recommended the removal of quarterly 
reporting obligation and suggested a move towards non-financial, narrative reporting, 
which can ‘put the financial results in the context, highlight important factors and 
communicate strategy and risks to investors in an understandable, engaging and concise 
format’.133  
Short-termism has also been exacerbated by the increasing use of equity compensation. 
The rationale behind the use of equity incentive is to make changes to executive wealth 
directly dependant on the changes in stock price, hence giving executives incentives to 
maximize shareholder wealth. No incentives would be necessary if shareholders could 
constantly watch the firm’s opportunities and executives’ actions, in order to make sure 
that executives always serve shareholders’ interests.134 As the shareholders cannot always 
see all the opportunities, they must delegate the decision-making to the executives, who 
should have superior knowledge regarding these decisions. In order to keep the executives 
motivated to act in the best interest of the shareholders, their compensation would usually 
be linked to the firm’s performance. This is a direct effect of the agency problem. Jensen, 
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in his analysis of the agency theory and its corollary executive compensation, observed 
that what mattered was not how much executives are paid, but how they are paid.135   
The 1990s was a decade when executive compensation shifted from being primarily cash-
based to being mostly stock-based.136 At the start of the 1990s in the US, equity-based 
compensation for chief executives of the US public companies amounted to 
approximately 5 per cent of their total annual compensation; however, by 1999 this 
amount had risen to 60 per cent.137 Alongside this change, management became 
increasingly focused on the performance of the company’s stock over the short-term. The 
use of equity compensation was facilitated by legal changes. Before 1991, an executive 
of a public company exercising a stock option was required to hold an underlying security 
for six months in order to comply with the holding requirements stemming from Section 
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In 1991, the SEC revised this rule and 
deregulated it. As a result of this, executives could tack the holding period of the stock 
option to the holding period of the underlying shares. Hence, as Coffee explains: 
if the stock option had already been held for six months or longer, the underlying 
shares could be sold immediately on exercise of the option. Because qualified stock 
options usually must be held several years before they become exercisable, this 
revision meant that most senior executives were free to sell the underlying stock on 
the same day they exercised the option.138 
Even though it was not the intention of this regulation, it became a regular pattern for the 
executives with vested options to exercise them and to sell in a single day. 
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Also in the UK, the rate of option grants grew dramatically from the mid-1980s to the 
early 1990s. According to Murphy, only 10 per cent of companies offered options to their 
senior executives in 1978. This number rose to 30 per cent by 1983 and by 1986 almost 
100 per cent of companies offered options.139 In the mid-1990s, however, this trend was 
reversed and the use of share options fell substantially as a result of corporate governance 
reforms. In 1997 only 68 per cent of companies offered options to their executives.140 
While CEO cash compensation was growing at the same pace in both of the countries, 
share options use in the UK began to decline.141  There are various political and economic 
factors that offer potential explanation for these cross-country differences. 
Exercising options in the UK became controversial in the first half of the 1990s, when 
some executives in newly privatised utilities exercised options worth millions of 
pounds.142  This caused a widespread concern about remuneration accountability, not only 
in the privatised industries, but also in other listed companies, particularly as members of 
the public were encouraged to invest in these companies through taxation incentives.143 
In 1995, building on the Cadbury recommendations, the Greenbury Report was published 
with a remit to identify good practice in determining directors’ remuneration.144 Despite 
its failure to curb the overall increase in the executive compensation in the following 
years, the Greenbury Report was influential, as it encouraged companies to use Long 
Term Incentive Schemes (LTIS) rather than option plans.145 As a response to the 
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Greenbury Report and the controversy surrounding option grants, the government 
reduced the amount that could be awarded to only £30, 000.146 Also the non-statutory 
instruments, such as the codes of conduct of institutional investors and their 
representatives, played a role in restricting the option grants. Even though not legally 
binding, policy guidelines from the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and other 
investor groups were very influential. The ABI guidelines, for instance, effectively 
restricted the issuing of share options to four times cash compensation.147 
Murphy also tries to attribute the divergence as to the share options practices with 
reference to the cultural differences between the countries.148 The United States, as a 
society, is considered to be more tolerant of income inequality than the UK, in particular 
if this inequality is caused by differences in talent, effort or risk taking. This phenomenon 
is not limited only to top executives, but extends to other professions such as lawyers, 
doctors, athletes, engineers etc.149  
Compensation is an important way of dealing with the principal-agent problem. The 
agency theory compensation strategy assumes that equity-based compensation 
discourages shirking and induces effort and risk taking, whilst fixed compensation makes 
managers more conservative and risk averse. Studies show that managerial willingness to 
take up risky projects, such as acquisitions and divestitures, increases with the levels of 
CEO stock option holdings and not with their stock ownership.150 Equity based 
compensation has also been identified as a strong proxy for predicting aggressive 
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accounting behaviour and the leading factor in manipulating the accruals in order to 
inflate reported earnings.151  
Managers, whose stock and stock option based remuneration has a direct bearing on their 
total remuneration package, play a significant role in shaping share price through target 
based budgeting and corporate earnings management. Under target based budgeting 
systems, managers are remunerated for meeting agreed-upon targets. These targets do not 
need to be relative to the actions of their competitors and so managers usually have 
incentives to set targets that can be easily satisfied.152 Earnings management is undertaken 
in the form of ‘managing accounting earnings (i.e. accruals management through the 
selective interpretation of accounting regulations), as well as real earnings (i.e. 
management operating decisions made to achieve desired accounting numbers)’.153 
Research shows that companies are much more likely to report earnings that precisely 
match analysts’ predictions than report earnings that undershoot or overshoot them.154 
According to Jensen and Murphy: 
Just as managers’ compensation suffers if they miss their internal targets, CEOs and 
CFOs know that the capital markets will punish the entire firm if they miss analysts’ 
forecasts by so much as a penny. Generally, the only way for the managers to meet 
those expectations year in and year out is to cook their numbers to mask the inherent 
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uncertainty in their businesses. And that cannot be done without sacrificing value... 
and once on a treadmill, there is no going back…155 
This pressure by investors on managers to meet targets, budgets, market position 
profitability, and deliver high stock price is then translated into pressure that management 
exerts on auditors. The US Public Oversight Board’s Panel on Audit Effectiveness 
described the situation as follows: 
The growth in equity values over the past decade has introduced extreme pressures 
on management to achieve earnings, revenue, or other targets. These pressures are 
exacerbated by the unforgiving nature of the equity markets as securities valuations 
are drastically adjusted downward whenever companies fail to meet ‘street’ 
expectations’. Pressures are further magnified because management’s 
compensation often is based in large part on achieving earnings or other financial 
goals or stock price increases. These pressures on management, in turn, translate 
into pressures on how auditors conduct audits and in their relationship with audit 
clients.156 
Auditors in the 1990s were put under a lot of pressure, as management insisted on 
favourable interpretations of accounting rules in order to inflate their earnings. In this 
business-dominated climate the big audit firms did not want to lose their main source of 
income – consulting, so they found it increasingly hard to resist these pressures. As a 
result of that, accounting scandals rose exponentially. It was estimated that more than half 
of the accounting lawsuits involved ‘premature revenue recognition’.157 
A link between the managers’ compensation and the share price created an obvious and 
potentially perverse incentive for the managers to engage in short-term stock price 
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maximisation through premature revenue recognition or other earnings management 
techniques. Given these incentives, it became usual practice for management to use 
lucrative consulting contracts to induce auditors to engage in conduct which assisted their 
short-term market manipulations.158 A key advantage of this approach was that the 
company could suspend the flow of consulting income to an audit firm whenever auditors 
refused to acquiesce to dubious accounting treatments. 
The empirical evidence shows that the provision of consulting services can enhance the 
auditor’s economic bond with a client, thereby increasing the auditor’s incentive to 
acquiesce to client pressure, including pressure to allow earnings management.159 Imhoff 
claims that the pressure on auditors providing consulting services to appease management 
is high. He argues that when ambiguous accounting treatment that might be used to 
manage performance or mask failure is discovered, auditors seem pressured to accept it, 
unless it clearly violates GAAP.160 Frankel finds that firms purchasing non-audit services 
manage earnings to a greater extent than other firms and so the stronger the economic 
bond between the audit-consulting firm and its client, the poorer the quality of reported 
earnings.161  
On the contrary, the provision of consulting services can also increase the auditor’s 
investment in reputational capital, which the auditor is not likely to jeopardize to satisfy 
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the demands of any one client.162 The theory of reputation, however, assumes that there 
is a significant probability that wrongful behaviour will be discovered and that this 
discovery will be communicated to the market. As long as this is not the case in practice, 
the effectiveness of reputation as a deterrent factor will be undermined.163 As DeAngelo 
points out, if the probability of being caught is zero, there are no reputation costs to 
compromising independence.164 The issue of reputation capital is further discussed in 
chapter three. 
According to Coffee’s ‘increased managerial pressure hypothesis’ rapid changes in 
executive compensation made managers far more interested in maximising their 
companies’ short-term share price and seducing their auditors into acquiescence in risky 
accounting treatments. This, coupled with the decline in regulatory and market deterrents, 
such as decrease in litigation or disciplinary sanctions, provided the auditors with the 
incentives to acquiesce in managerial efforts to inflate their corporation’s reported results 
and compromise their independence.165  
Short-termism, caused by the increased disclosure requirements and the rise of equity 
compensation had a negative impact on the quality of audits and the auditing profession. 
It was argued in this section that rigid quarterly requirements promoted an excessive focus 
on short-term results by company management and investors. Moreover, management, 
whose compensation was significantly dependent on the performance of the company’s 
stock over the short-term, put auditors under pressure to acquiesce to dubious accounting 
treatments aimed at keeping the share price high. As auditors did not want to lose their 
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clients, they frequently engaged in earnings management, which decreased audit quality 
and led to numerous accounting scandals. Two of them, Enron and WorldCom – the two 
largest bankruptcies in the US history166 - were complex financial frauds in which the 
primary goal was to maximize the company’s stock price through various means, such as 
fabricating earnings, deferring expenses, hiding liabilities and engaging in off-balance 
sheet transactions.167 These frauds would not have taken place if it was not for the 
acquiescence and assistance of the auditors.  
The next section provides an examination of the Enron scandal as a case study on the link 
between short-termism and audit failure. The analysis of the Enron debacle is important 
for this thesis, as it shows the crisis of the auditing profession, particularly the erosion of 
auditors’ independence and the profession’s excessive reliance on consulting income. 
Lack of auditors’ independence is then considered in chapter four as one of the biggest 
issues facing the auditing profession. The thesis also argues that the reforms introduced 
in the aftermath of the Enron failure did not go far enough to improve the quality of audits 
and convert auditors into the trusty allies against rogue management that shareholders 
needed.  
1.6.  ENRON 
This section offers an analysis of the Enron scandal. Enron is a prominent example of a 
complex financial fraud in which the primary goal was the short-term maximisation of 
the company’s stock price. It also illustrates an aggressive approach to accounting and an 
acquiescence of the auditors to the demands of management.  The demise of Enron had 
major implications not only for its auditor, Arthur Andersen, but for the accounting 
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profession as a whole. It revealed numerous deficiencies in the current audit model, which 
remain unfixed despite the regulatory changes adopted in its aftermath. 
Enron collapsed after its management disclosed that the company had incurred a $1.01 
billion charge and a $1.2 billion reduction in its shareholder equity resulting from the off-
balance-sheet dealings. 168 At the time of its collapse in December 2001, Enron ranked as 
the seventh largest company in the US with 20,000 employees and $100 billion in gross 
revenues.169 For six consecutive years it was voted the ‘Most Innovative’ corporation in 
America on the Fortune’s list of ‘Most Admired’ corporations and second in ‘quality of 
management’ among all the US corporations.170 
Enron started as a gas pipeline company and shifted its activities to energy trading, which 
was facilitated due to the deregulation of energy markets. As an online energy trading 
company, it began to offer long-term fixed price contracts for natural gas to utilities 
companies and other large customers. It subsequently protected itself by hedging the risk 
using financial derivatives, mainly swaps contracts. Additionally, in order to have a less 
leveraged balance sheet and the ability to borrow more money, Enron had to get rid of 
the high cost, low return fixed assets. These assets, such as pipelines or production 
facilities, however, were either overhauled or otherwise not interesting for key buyers. 
Enron’s solution to this problem was to sell these assets to itself or, more precisely, to its 
controlled affiliates. This was possible due to an obscure accounting convention that 
allowed the transfer of these assets off the balance sheet by selling them to the 
‘unconsolidated affiliates’, known as the Special Purpose Entities (SPE)171. The only 
                                                 
168 Peter Muchlinski, 'Enron and Beyond: Multinational Corporate Groups and the Internationalization of 
Governance and Disclosure Regimes' (2005) 37(3) Connecticut Law Review 725,  p. 726. 
169 Coffee (n 51) p. 18. 
170 Scott Sherman, 'Enron: Uncovering the Uncovered Story' (2002) March-April Columbia Journalism 
Review 22, p. 22. 
171 Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (1st edn, Times 
Books, New York 2003), p. 310. 
 59 
condition was that independent financial buyers were to hold a minimum stake of 3 per 
cent of the affiliate’s total debt and equity. This essentially meant that Enron could hold 
97 per cent of the ownership in unconsolidated affiliates.172 
By transferring a production facility or pipeline to an SPE, Enron took an expensive asset 
off its balance sheet, alongside the equally expensive debt that had financed its 
acquisition. This allowed Enron to maintain its ‘investment grade’ credit rating for a 
considerable period of time. By transferring an asset to an SPE, Enron could nominally 
keep a slimmed down balance sheet, which allowed it to borrow more at a potentially 
lower interest rate. It also had informational advantages about the trading circumstances 
in the relevant market that came from its de facto control of the SPE.173 In reality, SPEs 
had become instruments to hide Enron’s losses alongside the source of personal 
enrichment of Enron’s senior managers.174 When these dubious accounting practices were 
finally discovered, in October 2001, Enron was forced to disclose that it had overstated 
its earnings by approximately $613 million for the period 1996 – 2000. It was also 
required to restate its 31st December 2000 balance sheet, increasing at the same time its 
liabilities by $628 million.175   
Both Enron’s outside auditors and its audit committee were familiar, at least broadly, with 
the dubious ‘structured finance’ transactions taking place within the company, but neither 
appears to have expressed any serious concerns before Enron’s fall. In order to address 
the question as to why Arthur Andersen failed to be sufficiently sceptical and detected so 
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little, it is important to notice its transformation from a professional accounting firm to a 
business-oriented consulting multinational. 
At first, Arthur Andersen, under the leadership of its founder and then his successor 
Leonard Spacek, had a reputation of high integrity. Things began to change when 
Andersen entered the consulting realm in the mid-1950s with the computerisation of the 
General Electric plant payroll. By 1984 the revenue from consulting had exceeded the 
audit revenue. Alongside this development, audit firms, and Arthur Andersen in 
particular, restructured their business strategies, by making audit the portal of entry into 
the large clients, through which the firms could market their more lucrative consulting 
services. The audit partners became salesmen rather than independent auditors, 
incentivized through compensation schemes that paid just as much for cross-selling as for 
skill and knowledge at auditing. By 1994 consulting income represented two-thirds of 
Andersen’s revenues.176 
In 2000 Andersen earned $25 million in audit fees and $27 million in consulting fees from 
Enron. This apparent conflict of interest made it impossible for Arthur Andersen to 
produce a ‘truly objective analysis of Enron’s accounts’.177 Enron was simply too a big 
client for Andersen’s Houston office to lose, and survive. This clearly must have 
contributed to the fact that Andersen condoned Enron’s use of questionable accounting 
and disclosure treatments. 
Partial blame for the collapse of Enron should also be placed on its audit committee, 
which essentially failed to perform its task. The charter of the Enron audit committee 
‘explicitly require[d] the Committee to ensure the independence of the company’s 
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auditors, assess Enron’s internal controls and the quality of its financial reporting, and 
review Enron’s financial statements.’178 In the proceedings of the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs it has been shown that the Enron audit committee repeatedly 
ignored Andersen’s warnings that the accounting practices used were very innovative and 
that the committee frequently relied on a subjective judgement of management.179 
Additionally, the audit committee did not question the independence of Andersen’s 
auditors, despite being fully aware of the amount of consulting services provided by 
Andersen to Enron. Furthermore, some of the members of the audit committee had low 
visibility conflicts of interest.180 It is now clear that the audit committee failed to see the 
red flags and respond appropriately to the aforementioned problems. 
 Additionally, Andersen’s monitoring failure was puzzling. Their main competence was 
to anticipate internal agency problems and to find a solution to minimize the consequent 
risks through internal monitoring systems. They not only failed to control the internal 
controlling mechanisms of Enron, but also their own ones. According to Gordon, Arthur 
Andersen 
failed to realize its evolution from a partnership of accounting professionals - 
certified public accountants, constrained by a strong sense of professional ethics, to 
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a profit maximising business organization using high powered incentive 
compensation schemes.181  
The internal monitoring systems, which were good enough for partnership structure, 
could no longer fulfil their function in the business organisation: pursuing consulting 
services and maximising partner incomes. Andersen went through a cultural change in 
the profession, but its internal monitoring system did not undergo a matching change.182  
The excessive focus on financial disclosure and a shift from cash based to equity based 
executive compensation in the 1990s led to the short-term focus on maximization of the 
stock price. This gave management a reason to pressure their auditors to acquiesce to 
risky accounting practices aimed at inflating the stock price. The 1990s were also the 
decade in which the major accounting firms learned how to use their auditing role to 
cross-sell consulting services, which had a negative impact on the perception of auditors’ 
independence. Audit firms also knew that audit revenues would continue to be relatively 
flat, while consulting revenues in other fields could grow exponentially. This led to the 
overall change of the audit firms’ business model. Audit firms’ priorities shifted away 
from providing an objective, professional opinion on the financial statements and towards 
becoming business-oriented consulting multinationals with the main focus on 
profitability. These changes are detailed more fully in chapter three, but the relevant point 
here is that the evidence suggests that an excessive focus on the short-term stock price 
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contributed to a general erosion in the quality of financial reporting during the 1990s, 
which culminated in the Enron scandal and the subsequent demise of Arthur Andersen.183 
The collapse of Enron and Arthur Andersen prompted significant regulatory reforms, 
such as the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US and the establishment of the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), the appointment of the independent review of the 
role and effectiveness of non-executive directors carried out by Derek Higgs in the UK, 
and the issuing of the Smith Report on audit committees.184 This thesis argues that these 
reforms proved to be ineffective in improving the quality of audits, as they failed to 
address the problems of perverse incentives of corporate executives focused on short-
term increases in stock price, and their auditors acquiescing in risky accounting 
treatments. This was particularly noticeable at the time of the financial crisis in 2008. The 
majority of banks and corporations that collapsed during the crisis e.g. Lehman Brothers, 
Northern Rock, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac etc., had been issued with the auditors’ clean 
bills of health. Even though auditors do not guarantee the survival of a company, at a time 
of crisis they failed to notice any warning signs. The following section discusses the 
auditors’ involvement in the financial crisis of 2008, which provides another example of 
the link between short-termism and poor quality audits.  
1.7.  AUDITORS’ ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
This section examines the role that auditors played in the financial crisis of 2008.  It shows 
that auditors’ performance at the time of the crisis was below the expected level of 
diligence required to satisfy the public interest role that audit is meant to fulfil. It also 
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argues that auditors failed to provide adequate assurance about the financial statements 
of the key financial institutions and lacked professional scepticism during performance 
of the audits. This finding is crucial for this thesis, as it goes some way towards showing 
that the post-Enron regulatory changes in the auditing arrangements did not go far 
enough, and given the recurrence of audit deficiencies, the current audit model remains 
inadequate to serve the needs of various stakeholders relying on it.  
The financial crisis has shown that business incentives have shifted to a shorter-term 
focus, as increasing weight has been attached to mark-to-market accounting, quarterly 
returns and short-term incentive bonuses. Performance metrics of CEOs remain based on 
share prices, which encourages a focus on short-term stock prices rather than long-term 
value creation. On one hand, the typical question in the aftermath of the bank failures, as 
to where were the auditors has been less prevalent than before.185 Unlike in the Enron 
scandal, auditors work was not a primary cause of the crisis. Blame and criticism has been 
aimed at specific banking institutions, their management and business models, incentives 
and remuneration structures. It is clear that auditors should not be made responsible for 
the board’s poor business decisions, such as bad lending or the board’s lack of 
understanding of risks or flaws in the credit-rating system. On the other hand, however, 
auditors do have a duty to exercise care and skill and exercise professional scepticism 
while expressing an objective opinion on the financial health of the companies they audit. 
A number of commentators claim that this duty was not exercised properly in the period 
leading to the financial crisis and many of the financial institutions ran into serious 
financial difficulties soon after receiving unqualified audit reports.186  
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One of the most prominent examples of a financial institution receiving a clean bill of 
health a few months before its collapse was Lehman Brothers. Its auditor E&Y produced 
an unqualified audit report on Lehman’s annual accounts on 28 January 2008 for the year 
to 30 November 2007, followed by clean bills of health on its subsequent quarterly 
accounts on 10 July 2008. By early August Lehman was experiencing severe financial 
problems and filed for bankruptcy on 14 September 2008. 187 
In 2013 Ernst & Young agreed to pay $99 million to settle class-action litigation from 
Lehman investors over a practice known as ‘Repo 105’, which allowed Lehman Brothers 
to make temporary sales of their securities and to use money to pay off its debts just before 
the submission of quarterly reports to its investors. This accounting technique, sanctioned 
by E&Y, allowed the bank to place $50 billion of debts into off-balance sheet vehicles. 
188 In April 2015 E&Y also agreed to pay a further $10 million to settle claims from the 
New York attorney general’s office over the same ‘Repo 105’ practice.189 The case was 
also investigated in the UK, where the disciplinary body of the Financial Reporting 
Council had concluded that no action should be taken against E&Y or any individual in 
connection with the auditing of Lehman Brothers before it collapsed in 2008.190 The 
Executive Counsel has decided that ‘there is no realistic prospect that a Tribunal would 
make an adverse finding against E&Y in the UK or Members within that firm’ and so the 
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investigation was closed and no further action was taken.191 As the auditors complied 
with the existing auditing standards, there was no ground to find them negligent, which 
seems striking taking into account the losses incurred by the Lehman Brothers and how 
quickly they were placed into administration.  
There are numerous other examples of the companies that collapsed shortly after 
receiving an unqualified audit opinion. Bearn Sterns, America’ fifth largest investment 
bank, received its clean bill of health on 28 January 2008. However, by 10 March its 
financial problems were made public and it was bought out by JP Morgan Chase only 
four days later. Carlyle Capital Corporation received an unqualified audit opinion on 27 
February 2008 and was placed into liquidation two weeks later. Thornburg Mortgage, 
America’s second largest independent mortgage provider received a clean audit on 27 
February. Two weeks later the company received a letter from KPMG LLP, its 
independent auditor, stating that their audit report should no longer be relied on.192 Similar 
examples can be found in the UK, where Bradford & Bingley received a clean bill of 
health from auditors KPMG in 2007 and a year later became partly nationalised. The 
distressed HBOS was taken over by Lloyds TSB in 2009, despite an unqualified audit 
opinion of its accounts in 2007. The Royal Bank of Scotland was bailed out by the 
government after posting the biggest annual loss in UK corporate history a few months 
after receiving a clean bill of health from Deloitte.193 
The fact that auditors failed to spot the incoming failures of the major financial 
institutions brings up numerous questions as to their role and degree of involvement in 
the crisis. Were the auditors deceived by the managers who provided them with the edited 
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financial statements? Were they negligent while performing their duties, or were they 
complicit in the cover up of frauds? Apart from individual investigations into collapsed 
financial institutions there were only a few official inquiries that aimed clarify the role of 
auditors in the financial crisis. The final report of the National Commission on the Causes 
of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the US does not say a lot about the external 
auditors’ role in the crisis, though a minority dissenting report criticized this omission.194 
In the UK, the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee inquiry has called for a broad 
investigation of the limited competition in the UK audit market and posed questions about 
whether traditional statutory audit is capable of meeting contemporary needs.195 The 
inquiry also focused on the effects of the adoption of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and on how bank audits were conducted before and during the financial 
crisis.196  
The criticism of the committee was mainly aimed at PwC, Deloitte and KPMG, as EY 
does not audit UK banks.197 Its report stated that: 
…complacency of bank auditors was a significant contributory factor to the 
financial crisis. Either they were culpably unaware of the mounting dangers, or, if 
they were aware of them, they equally culpably failed to alert the supervisory 
authority of their concerns… We do not accept the defence that bank auditors did 
all that was required of them. In the light of what we now know, that defence 
appears disconcertingly complacent. It may that the Big Four carried out their duties 
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properly in the strictly legal sense, but we have to conclude that, in the wider sense, 
they did not do so.198 
The committee also accused bank auditors of a ‘dereliction of duty’ by not sharing 
sufficient information with regulators informally before the crisis.199 The report made 
some specific criticism of PwC for not being able to flag up the riskiness of the business 
model adopted by the Northern Rock, which subsequently had to be bailed out by the UK 
government.200 The House of Lord also criticised the use of IFRS, which tend to be more 
rule-based than the UK GAAP and encourage the ‘box-ticking phenomenon’ that does 
not necessarily reflect the true financial position of a company. 201 
The auditing profession responded to the criticism by pointing out that all of the audits of 
companies that failed during the crisis complied with the extant auditing standards.202 A 
spokesman for E&Y said:  
Lehman’s bankruptcy was the result of a series of unprecedented adverse events in 
the financial markets. Our opinion indicated that Lehman’s financial statements for 
that year were fairly presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP), and we remain of that view.203 
That said, it is worth noting that the standards of financial reporting, increased volatility 
in accounting numbers, and the ever-increasing complexity of the financial system can 
contribute to the difficulties in providing good quality audits. This can further be 
illustrated by the debate over fair value and valuation methods. Many of the assets, such 
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as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations, held by the banks at 
the time of the financial crisis were highly illiquid and volatile, causing problems with 
their appropriate valuation.204 This refers in particular to ‘Level 3’ assets, where prices 
are marked to model and the assumptions used as inputs are unobservable and necessitate 
the use of internal information supplied by the preparer. This category allows ‘for 
situations in which there is little if any market activity for the asset or liability at the 
measurement date’205 and so the reporting entity makes its own assumptions about 
assumptions that market participants would use. Model-based valuations may be very 
prone to changes in the underlying assumptions and very subjective in nature, which 
makes them difficult to audit. 
The use of fair value in situations where markets are volatile leads to further difficulties 
for auditors regarding the issuing of a going concern opinion.206 The going concern 
judgement, which is a forward looking element of the audit opinion, covers a time frame 
of twelve months, which in the context of volatile and illiquid markets is a long time.207 
Regardless of the precise statutory responsibilities of auditors, this raises a question as to 
whether audit can be an effective early warning about the potential financial distress of a 
company or even its collapse, and whether a twelve month valuation period for the going 
concern judgement is just too long.208 Furthermore, there is also a related issue regarding 
the auditors’ ability to stand up to dominant managers who want to present the accounts 
of a company in unduly favourable terms. The threat of a going concern qualification is 
powerful enough for the managers to seek a new and more compliant auditor. It seems 
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that audit works well in good times but fails in bad times when companies are under 
pressure to deliver favourable results.209  
As has been observed, even though auditors’ actions were not a primary cause of the 
financial crisis, they failed to perform their basic watchdog function. Auditors of the 
collapsed or bailed-out banks were either culpably unaware of the imminent collapses of 
their auditees or were at fault for not sharing their concerns with their supervisors.210 
Auditors themselves claim that they carried out their duties properly and adhered to all 
the auditing standards. This in turn suggests that if auditors did all that was required of 
them and performed their duties in the strictly legal sense, there must be a problem with 
the system. According to Lynn Stout, ‘we have to take this as a very serious red flag that 
there really may be something that has changed in the audit industry’.211  
If audits were conducted according to these standards and auditors failed to anticipate the 
crisis and perform their watchdog function, then questions should be raised about the 
validity of the current model. First of all, managers driven by the price of shares, have 
incentives to submit financial statements that do not truthfully mirror the financial 
condition of the companies. Audit is just an opinion and it can be wrong, especially if 
managers stay motivated to cover up fraud. Moreover, there are some strong grounds for 
suggesting that auditors were not sufficiently independent while conducting their audits. 
There has been an inherent conflict of interest in the current model, as auditors are hired 
and remunerated by the very companies they are supposed to audit. Their independence 
was potentially further compromised by the provision of the more lucrative consulting 
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services. Auditors hoping to receive more income were in danger of acquiescing with 
management and losing their objectivity and professional scepticism.212  
It seems that post Enron reforms did not go far enough to fix the fundamental problems 
of the audit practice and therefore basic audit model remains faulty. The disturbing silence 
of auditors’ during the recent financial crisis is another indication of a pressing need for 
reform to reassert prudence and significance of the audit practice to the processes of 
corporate governance, which are currently in decline. This thesis argues, in chapter six, 
that audit of the biggest companies, and financial institutions in particular, should be 
conducted in the public interest by an external, public body. 
The auditing profession’s involvement in the financial crisis also raised questions 
regarding the structure of the audit market. Over the years, the accounting profession has 
become dangerously consolidated. This inclined the House of Lords economic affairs 
committee to recommend an inquiry into the dominance of the Big Four in the audit 
market.213 The committee believed that the industry’s concentration restricted choice and 
competition and it could have potentially become worse if one of the audit firms collapsed 
in a similar manner to Andersen, leaving the banking audit market with only two audit 
firms.214 The House of Lords also criticized very long tenures of auditors at large 
companies and suggested that second-tier accounting firms such as Grant Thornton and 
BDO should participate in audit tenders, promoting at the same time competition and 
improving the quality of audit.215 The following section provides an examination of the 
main mergers between the accounting firms and their impact on the availability of choice 
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and quality of audit. This issue is further discussed in chapter four, where it is argued that 
excessive concentration is one of the biggest problems of the current audit model. 
1.8.  MERGERS AND DECREASE IN COMPETITION 
This section discusses mergers between the accounting firms and the impact of industry’s 
consolidation on the competition in the audit market. The industry is currently dominated 
by four multinational accounting firms, known as the ‘Big Four’, i.e. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, EY, KPMG and Deloitte. All of them came into existence as a 
result of numerous mergers, internal growth and diversification. The aim of this section 
is to present a background for chapter four, where it is argued that the continuing 
concentration of audit firms in the market for large public companies limits these 
companies’ choice of auditor. This in turn can strengthen an audit firm’s position, 
potentially affecting auditors’ objectivity and the quality of the audit. The proposal of 
reform is then suggested in chapter six.   
Over the years, accounting firms have used mergers not only to grow in size, but also to 
specialize and diversify. Mergers have enabled firms to acquire new offices in different 
geographical areas and allowed them to increase the variety of services they offer. This, 
in turn, enabled them to become professional services providers, delivering services 
beyond the traditional audit and tax.   
Accounting mergers are often considered to be a phenomenon of the past two decades. 
Most of the big accounting firms, however, came to existence as a result of hundreds of 
local, national and international mergers. One of the earliest international mergers took 
place over a hundred years ago. S.L. Price, William Holyland and Edwin Waterhouse, 
who established the Price Waterhouse & Co partnership in London in 1849, opened 
offices in New York and Chicago only twenty-five years later. In 1894, all of the Price 
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Waterhouse branches were combined and established as firm of Jones, Ceaser & Co. In 
1899 in the US, Price Waterhouse created a firm under its own name, which became the 
most popular auditor among US corporations. This resulted in the dissolution of Jones, 
Ceaser & Co into Price Waterhouse & Co two decades later.216 
A further example of an early international merger was between Marwick, Mitchell & Co 
and W.B. Peat & Co. Firstly, James Marwick – a Scottish accountant - formed a 
partnership with a New York City accountant R. Roger Mitchell, which quickly expanded 
into nine branches. In 1911 Marwick agreed to merge his firm with that of another 
Scottish accountant William Barclay Peat, forming an American firm of Marwick, 
Mitchell, Peat & Co. In 1923 its name was changed to Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.217 
As the clientele grew in size and became more national in scope over the first decades of 
the twentieth century, the accounting firms found it easier and cheaper to merge with 
smaller, local accounting partnerships rather than to open new branches. This allowed the 
accounting firms not only to gain new offices, but also to retain access to the local firm’s 
clients, eliminating at the same time the costly soliciting process of attracting clients to 
new offices.218 
After World War One, accounting firms’ clients in the US had begun their international 
expansion. According to Haskins & Sells, ‘the practice of serving American clients in 
connection with their manufacturing and distribution centres abroad was expanded by the 
influx of American capital in Europe, especially in Germany.’219 A number of accounting 
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firms responded by merging with overseas firms and establishing new branches. For 
instance, Haskins & Sells merged with a Shanghai accounting firm, Stevenson & Carson. 
In the course of the following six years, it also opened branches in Havana, Paris and 
Berlin. In 1924 it established a joint firm with Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co, called 
Deloitte, Plender, Haskins & Sells, in order to handle engagements in Mexico, Cuba and 
Canada. 220 
Merger activity slowed down in the 1930s and remained at a low level for about twenty 
years. During World War Two, most accounting firms suffered from personnel shortages, 
increased demand for accounting services and greater responsibilities to their clients. 
They had no time or resources to focus on complicated merger procedures. Their 
expansion was limited to opening branches in cities, where their clients had their 
presence. This was the case with Arthur Anderson & Co, which by 1930 had a number of 
clients, such as American Telephone & Telegraph or Colgate – Palmolive, with a presence 
in Europe. In order to serve these clients, Arthur Andersen engaged the London firm of 
McAuliffe, Davis & Hope to represent its interests in Europe. Both firms began merger 
activities only after World War Two.221 
The 1950s witnessed another wave of merger activism similar to that of the 1920s.  The 
size of accounting firms began to play an important role for a number of factors. Firstly, 
greater size was needed to serve an increasingly expanding clientele. Sheer growth was 
particularly important to Peat Marwick, which domestic and international mergers 
totalled fifty-three during the 1950s and mid-1960s.222 Secondly, it was important for the 
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accounting firms to obtain a leadership role and be considered as equal among other firms. 
Arthur Andersen in particular had ambitions to become the leading accounting firm of its 
times. Leonard Spacek – the managing partner of Arthur Andersen - was to say that ‘… 
if it is bigness that it takes to have any say in the accounting profession… We’ll get big… 
we had to do only one thing – growth, service and expansion.’223  
The 1950s was the time, when even firms that had previously focused solely on internal 
growth, began recognising the value of mergers as a way to expand and diversify.  For 
instance, before 1950 Arthur Young & Co had not participated in any merger. The 
completion of two mergers within that year proved to be a success both for the acquirer 
and the acquired.224  
As the accounting firms’ clients grew in size audits became more complex and costly. 
Also due to the increase in the provision of consulting services, audit firms had fewer 
people available to conduct audits. As a result of these changes accountants faced a 
number of problems. First of all, there was a pressing need for more offices both 
nationwide and internationally. Furthermore, firms were in need of more staff. Finally, 
there was a need for greater volume over which to assign increased costs. Mergers were 
a brilliant solution to all these problems. They allowed accounting firms to acquire more 
offices with qualified staff who were familiar with local practices. They were also a way 
to gain local and international exposure. 225 
An additional reason for the continued use of mergers throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
was the attempt to achieve the economies of scale. According to Chandler, mergers 
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through the economies of scale, which are based on carefully scheduled high-volume 
flows, are capable of providing a more certain source of profit and market power.226 For 
instance, Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart, despite its growth in the 1950s, realised that in 
order to keep up with competition it had to grow on a much faster rate, due to the increase 
in spending on research and training. In order to gain a greater base over which to allocate 
these costs, it merged with over fifty US firms in the period of ten years, simultaneously 
achieving international expansion through formal associations with firms in more than 
seventy five countries.227 Continuous growth through mergers became a logical choice 
for the accounting firms seeking to expand nationwide and internationally.  
At the beginning of the 1970s, the US market was dominated by the twenty largest 
accounting firms, which continued merger activities utlimately creating the ‘Big Eight’ 
accounting partnerships.228 In the late 1980s, six of the ‘Big Eight’ participated in 
mergers. The KMG Main Hurdman – Peat Marwick merger in 1986 became a precursor 
for other mergers among the largest firms. It proved that a merger between two large 
international firms was possible. It enabled the firms to have access to a greater number 
of clients that each alone did not have. Combined firms also created economies of scale 
becoming serious competitors for other firms. This was important, as the accounting 
profession was becoming very competitive, particularly in the audit area and hence could 
not afford to raise audit prices. Mergers allowed for the reduction of administrative costs, 
enabled the firms to achieve more specialisation and spread production and financial risks 
over a larger volume of activity.229 Over the three years following the merger, KPMG 
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Peat Marwick’s revenues increased 44 per cent, while the overall number of offices 
decreased by 127 with 510 fewer partners.230 
In 1989, Ernst & Whinney merged with Arthur Young to create Ernst & Young.231 Soon 
after that Deloitte Haskins & Sells merged with Touche & Ross forming Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu. In the past, both firms had concentrated most of their marketing efforts on 
audit practice while consulting engagements contributed little to the firms’ revenues. It 
was only due to the merger that Deloitte managed to significantly expand its consulting 
services. In 1998 Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers & Lybrand becoming the 
second largest firm – Pricewaterhouse Coopers. Finally, in 2002 Arthur Andersen 
dissolved in the wake of the Enron scandal, leaving the accounting profession 
dangerously consolidated with only the ‘Big Four’ international accounting firms.232 
The surviving ‘Big Four’s’ combined market share is formidable. They audit over 78 per 
cent of all US public companies and 99 per cent of all public company revenues.233 In the 
UK, they audit all but one of the FTSE 100 companies.234 Even though under the 
Companies Act, a company may only engage the auditor for one year, it has become a 
usual practice that companies reappoint the same auditor for a number of consecutive 
years.235 In 2012 the combined revenue of the four firms reached a historic record level 
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of $110 billion, up 6% from 2011.236 The ‘Big Four’ have been characterised as a 
tightening oligopoly and ‘too big to fail’.237 
The consolidation of the industry has been criticised for a number of reasons. Firstly, mid-
tier audit firms, other than the ‘Big Four’, find it very difficult to show that they have 
sufficient experience and reputation in order to audit large public companies. The General 
Accounting Office has found that significant barriers to entry exist for this reason.238 Also 
in the UK, the Competition Commission found that competition in the audit market is 
restricted by factors which prevent companies from switching auditors and by the 
tendency for auditors to focus on management rather than shareholders’ needs.239  
The most common reasons inhibiting competition are the fact that companies find it 
difficult to compare alternatives with their existing auditor, they prefer continuity and 
face significant costs in the selection and education of a new auditor. These features make 
companies reluctant to switch auditors and weaken their bargaining powers outside the 
tender process.240 Also misaligned incentives of the auditors may have adverse effects on 
competition. Auditors are more likely to satisfy management demands, rather than those 
of the shareholders, as boards are the key decision takers on whether to retain auditors’ 
services. The Competition Commission also found that auditors face barriers to the 
provision of information that shareholders demand. This stems from the reluctance of 
management to allow further disclosure.241 These factors cause negative effects on 
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competition as auditors being insufficiently independent from management compete 
within the wrong parameters for statutory audit appointments and fail to respond to the 
demands of shareholders. As a result of this companies are offered higher prices, lower 
quality and less differentiation of offering than it would be the case in the market with 
balanced competition.242  
As a response to the competition problems in the audit market, a variety of remedies is 
being suggested. Among the most common ones are mandatory periodic tendering, 
mandatory rotation of audit firms243, prohibition of ‘Big Four only’ clauses in loan 
documentation, strengthened accountability of the auditor to the audit committee or 
extended reporting requirements.244 Chapter four argues that these reforms are 
minimalistic and will not lead to a significant change in the audit market. Only through a 
radical reorganization of the industry will the structure of the audit market become less 
concentrated. Chapter six suggests establishing an independent public body, charged with 
the appointment of auditors. This would not only decrease concentration and 
independence problems inherent in the current model, but also increase auditors’ 
accountability.  
1.9.  CONCLUSIONS 
It has been well established that audit plays an important role in maintaining public 
confidence in the capital markets by providing an external and independent assessment 
of the financial health of companies. The findings of this chapter, however, suggest that 
the basic auditing model is flawed and that there are numerous problems inherent in the 
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current auditing arrangements which pose a significant threat to the long-term quality of 
audits and to perceptions of the audit firms’ commitment to protecting public interest.245 
To begin with, the analysis showed that the profession’s rapid growth and diversification 
into consulting services transformed the auditors into business-oriented consultants. 
Auditors driven by the prospect of securing lucrative consulting contracts had incentives 
to avoid issuing qualifying audit opinions in order to keep their clients, and to increase 
their income. This created an environment where the auditors could not oppose aggressive 
accounting treatments suggested by the managers driven by the short-term share prices, 
leading to major accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom.246  
To follow, as demonstrated above, the accounting profession had also benefited from a 
decreased exposure to litigation in the second half of the 20th century. This was due to the 
restrictive changes in the liability rules governing third party claims in negligence, 
introduction of the proportionate liability and the limited liability partnership business 
form. These changes coupled with weak disciplinary sanctions for audit firms and 
individual auditors lowered the cost of auditors’ acquiescence to the manager’s demands 
and left the profession undeterred, and with scarce incentives to improve the quality of 
audits.247 
Moreover, the findings of this chapter suggest that the excessive focus on short-termism 
negatively affected the auditing profession. A close link between the managers’ 
compensation and share price created a perverse incentive for managers to engage in 
short-term share price maximisation through various earnings management techniques. 
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In these circumstances, managers used lucrative consulting contracts to induce auditors 
to engage in conduct which assisted their share price manipulations.248 Unwilling to lose 
a significant source of income, auditors frequently engaged in earnings management, 
which led to a decrease in audit quality and accounting scandals. Despite the regulatory 
responses to these scandals, the global financial crisis of 2008 and the auditors’ disturbing 
inaction demonstrated once more that the current auditing model remains flawed. 
This chapter has also showed that the high rate of merger activities between accounting 
firms left the auditing market for public companies dangerously consolidated. This led to 
a strengthening of the already powerful ‘Big Four’ auditing firms and limited the choice 
of auditors for large companies. It also had a significant impact on small and mid-tier 
audit firms, which find it extremely difficult to enter the audit market for public 
companies. 
This thesis argues that issues such as the increasing use of consulting services and its 
impact on auditors’ independence, lack of deterrence caused by the structural and 
regulatory changes affecting the accounting profession and excessive concentration of the 
audit market are some of the most significant problems inherent in the current audit 
model. Despite the numerous regulatory reforms, these issues still remain unresolved and 
have a negative impact on the quality of auditors’ work. Whilst chapter four builds on 
chapter one and provides a further analysis of these problems, chapter six offers a 
proposal for a complex overhaul of the present regulation of audit. 
The objective of the following chapter is to present a theoretical framework that underpins 
the auditing profession. A theory is considered here as a system of ideas and suppositions 
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intended to explain a particular phenomenon. Accordingly, theories on the demand for 
auditing provide a general framework for understanding the rationale of the existence of 
the external audit function. Auditing theories also explain the importance of key concepts 
of auditing and uncover some of the laws that govern the audit process. This is important 
for this thesis, as some of the theories presented in chapter two will be used as a theoretical 
grounding for chapters four and six, which argue that the purpose of audit is to provide 
assurance for a wide group of stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
AUDITING 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis of various theories suggesting an 
explanation for the existence and purpose of audit function. The practice of auditing and 
the public conception of audit have developed without the prior formulation of any 
theory.249 Despite the social importance of auditing and the fact that it comprises a 
significant part of the work of the accountancy profession, there is still very little interest 
in the study of its theoretical underpinnings. There is still no general answer to the 
question of what the purpose of an audit is, or why the procedures and practices that are 
adopted are seen to be adequate in relation to the perceived objective. This chapter plays 
an important role in providing a theoretical underpinning of this thesis, as it goes on to 
use the theories of Limperg250 and Flint251 to argue that audits play an important social 
function and should be conducted in the public interest. 
This chapter consists of five sections. First, agency theory is discussed, according to 
which audit operates as a tool enabling the principal to monitor the agent’s behaviour. 
Second, the ‘Theory of Inspired Confidence’ is analysed. It proposes that audits play an 
important social function of providing confidence in the capital markets. This function is 
derived from society’s need for expert and independent examination of the financial 
statements. Third, this chapter examines Mautz and Sharaf’s ‘Philosophy of Auditing’ 
asserting that auditing is a rational process of examination, observation and evaluation of 
evidence, and that it provides credibility to the financial statements. Fourth, Flint’s social 
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conception of audit is discussed. It focuses on the need to extend auditors’ accountability 
to various stakeholders in order to protect public interest. The final section of this chapter 
states that since audits play such an important role in protecting the capital markets, they 
should be conducted for the benefit of stakeholders with an interest in the financial 
stability of the markets as a whole.  
2.1.  AGENCY THEORY 
This section deals with agency theory, which is a useful economic theory of 
accountability that helps to explain the development and purpose of audit.252 This section 
starts with an explanation of the principal-agent conflict at the heart of the agency 
relationship, where principals lack reasons to trust their agents because of information 
asymmetries and diverging motives. This is important for understanding the usefulness 
and purpose of audit and its development over the centuries.  However, this basic model 
of the audit function, depicted through agency theory, is complicated by other factors 
presented in this section. For example, auditors are also agents of principals, which can 
lead to further concerns about trust, threats to objectivity and independence. Moreover, 
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audit is also important to other stakeholders such as regulators, potential investors, 
creditors or employees. From this perspective, a simple agency view of audit is unlikely 
to provide complete answers as to the purpose of contemporary audit.  
An agency relationship is frequently described as a contract under which one or several 
principals engage another person as their agent in order to perform certain services on 
their behalf. In order to perform this function, the delegation of some decision-making 
authority to the agent is required.253 As both parties aim to derive maximised benefit from 
the arrangement, there is a possibility that an agent will choose his own self-interest over 
the needs of the principal, resulting in the conflict of interest. Agency theory is concerned 
with resolving the problem stemming from the fact that the agent, who is supposed to 
make unbiased decisions that would best serve the principal, is naturally motivated by 
self-interest. In other words, the agent’s own best interests may be different from 
principal’s best interests.254 Agency theory also attempts to explain a resulting loss of 
value and or wealth which occurs whenever one party acts as an agent for another. Such 
is the situation in a typical corporation where shareholders, acting as principal hire a 
manager-agent to operate a firm.  
Agents are likely to have different motives than the principals. They may be influenced 
by factors such as financial rewards, other market opportunities, or relationships with 
other parties that are not directly relevant to the principals. This, in turn, can lead to a 
tendency for the agents to be more optimistic about the economic performance of the 
entity. The principal-agent relationship is also associated with a problem of information 
asymmetry.255 In the theory of the firm context, management acting as an agent, have 
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greater involvement in the company and at the same time greater access to information, 
which may not be available for the principal without cost. The agent has the ability to use 
this information for his own self-interest. 
The core of the principal-agent theory is the balance between the cost of measuring 
behaviour and the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent. Scapens 
argues that a state of efficiency, known as ‘pareto-optimality’, takes place in the 
contracting relationship between the principal and agent when neither party can enhance 
their wealth at the expense of the other.256 In order to ensure the pareto-optimality in the 
process, both parties will incur contracting costs.257  
Fama defines agency costs as the costs of structuring, monitoring and bonding a set of 
contracts among parties with conflicting interests.258 For example, in order to minimize 
the risk of shirking by agents, principals will incur monitoring costs such as the cost of 
external audit. Agents, on the other hand, incur bonding costs such as the cost of internal 
audit, which allows them to prove to the principals that they act responsibly and in 
accordance with their contract of employment.259 These actions also help managers to 
secure their positions in the company and protect their remuneration levels. Indeed, 
Wallace claims that the principal’s expenses for monitoring the agent’s actions are 
reflected in the agent’s salary. It is therefore in the agent’s interest to demand monitoring 
                                                 
Economic Review 460, p. 469.  Due to the fact that some information is private, information asymmetries 
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services, such as internal auditing, in order to reduce the risk of principals making adverse 
adjustments to managerial compensation.260 
It is important to note that a management’s disclosure via financial reports alone does not 
solve the agency problems that arise from information asymmetry. As management are 
responsible for reporting on the financial health of a company, they also have the access 
and authority to adjust figures, particularly if there is a lack of due diligence or oversight 
of their actions by the owners. Consequently, there is always a risk of inaccurate reporting 
present when financial information is submitted to the owners. Auditing plays a crucial 
function in monitoring contracts and reducing information risk. Without an external audit 
the accounting information used for decision-making lacks credibility. Audit, therefore, 
plays an important role of adding credibility to the financial statements generated based 
on the accounting information.261 
External auditors provide the investing public with the assurance that the audited financial 
statements conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The fact that 
share prices are sensitive to earning announcements suggests that overall investors 
consider accounting information credible.262 Studies on audit effectiveness examine 
whether audit qualifications increase value for the investing public and whether auditor’s 
actions are independent of their clients’ interests. Research shows that capital providers 
require companies to hire independent auditors as a condition of financing, even when it 
is not a regulatory requirement.263 For instance, Leftwich highlights that banks and 
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investors require firms to present audited financial information. This extends to private 
companies as well.264 This implies that capital providers perceive auditors as enhancing 
a company’s financial credibility. 
Overall, audit plays important monitoring and information-providing functions. It is also 
used as a means of aligning the interests of the agents with principals and allowing the 
principals to measure and control the behaviour of their agents and reinforce trust in 
agents. According to Brown: 
The origin of auditing goes back to times scarcely less remote than that of 
accounting… Whenever the advance of civilization brought about the necessity of 
one man being entrusted to some extent with the property of another the advisability 
of some kind of check upon the fidelity of the former would become apparent.265 
An audit provides an independent check on the work and information provided by the 
agent, which helps to maintain trust and confidence.  
So far, this section has considered the role of audit as a solution to principal-agent 
conflicts, but this theory is too simplistic to explain current auditing arrangements. There 
are further complexities that need to be considered beyond those of the shareholder-
manager relationship, such as the relationship between auditors and other stakeholders 
that rely on audit. Since both the UK and USA require a disclosure of financial 
information, this generates public interest in the information supplied by audits. Whilst 
auditors who perform statutory audits are accountable to shareholders, there are other 
stakeholders or third parties who believe that audit serves their interests too.266 The simple 
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model of agency theory fails to address the interests and expectations of these third 
parties. This thesis argues, in chapter six, that stakeholders such as creditors, lenders, 
suppliers, or employees should be able to claim an interest in audit, despite the lack of 
contractual relationship between them and the auditors. This thesis suggests a more 
focused financial stakeholder model that addresses the financial aspects of these core 
stakeholders. It recommends extending disclosure and audits so that they include financial 
information relevant to creditors and employees. This could include, among others, a 
general level of debt or the information about the total cost of a workforce employed. 
Another feature of the existing audit arrangement that cannot be addressed by the simple 
agency theory is that the appointment of auditors generates a further agency relationship, 
which in turn impacts on trust and creates new issues relating to auditors’ independence. 
It also prompts questions about who is auditing the auditor. As argued in the previous 
chapter, auditor independence from the board is of paramount importance in delivering 
quality audits. However, an audit requires a close working relationship with the board. 
The fostering of this relationship has led shareholders to question the actual and apparent 
independence of auditors and to demand tougher controls and standards of independence. 
As argued in chapter four, auditors lack independence. To start, they are hired and 
compensated by the very companies they audit, which causes a conflict of interest. They 
are also allowed to provide certain consulting services, which influences their perceived 
independence.  
In order to address the complexities highlighted in this section, there needs to be a clear 
articulation and understanding of the purpose of an audit as well as the alignment of 
interests. These diverging interests have complications for the use of global standards of 
auditing. If audit has no clear objective, or agreed, consistent purpose, then difficulties 
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arise when trying to apply and implement universally accepted auditing standards.267 In 
chapter six, this thesis suggests that establishing an independent agency responsible for 
hiring and remunerating auditors would protect the interests of stakeholders and eliminate 
threats to auditors’ independence. The new model also suggests redefinition of the 
purpose of audit, so that it fulfils a social function and enables stakeholders other than 
shareholders to rely more confidently on audited financial statements.  
To move towards that new model the following section provides an analysis of  Limperg’s 
‘Theory of Inspired Confidence’. This theory is used throughout the thesis to support the 
view that audits play the important social function of providing confidence in capital 
markets and that they should be conducted not only for the benefit of audited companies’ 
shareholders, but also other stakeholders that rely on them. 
2.2. THEORY OF INSPIRED CONFIDENCE 
This section examines the Theory of Inspired Confidence, also known as the theory of 
rational expectations, which was developed in 1926 by Professor Theodore Limperg of 
the University of Amsterdam. The theory’s main assumption is that audit practices need 
to be tested, revised and developed in order to meet the needs and expectations of an ever-
changing and evolving society and market.268 Limperg’s theory is crucial for this thesis 
as it emphasises the importance of audit not only for shareholders, but for society at large. 
This thesis uses Limperg’s theory as a theoretical grounding for a new audit model 
suggested in chapter six, which advocates that audits should be conducted in the public 
interest. 
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The theory of inspired confidence explains how changes in the needs of society and 
changes in auditing methods interact to produce changes in the auditor’s functions. 
Limperg based his theory on the science of business economics and viewed the 
development of the auditing function from an economic perspective.269 He argued that 
audit function has two branches, one internal as a management control, and the other 
external as an instrument of accountability to the community that has an interest in the 
organisation. Importantly, Limperg saw these responsibilities as two branches of the same 
audit function. 
Limperg noticed that the development of the ‘community’ function is caused not only by 
efficiencies in the production process, but also by the need for auditors to become 
confidential agents of the community, or agents of societal confidence.270 As companies 
grow in size, so the relationship between the companies and the community in which they 
serve change as well. The financial structure of the production process becomes 
dependent on society’s participation in its financing, for example in the form of savings 
and loans, which in turn leads to increasing demands for accountability. That 
accountability is formally provided in the form of corporations’ annual reports, in the 
statements of banks, prospectuses and other information given to lenders, banks, etc. 
Limperg’s theory argues that this accountability and the data provided by managers are 
not sufficient and so the community requires an additional scrutiny of the information in 
the form of audit. The Limperg thesis is well stated in the following quotation: 
The auditor – confidential agent, derives his general function in society from the 
need for expert and independent examination and the need for an expert and 
independent opinion based on that examination. The function is rooted in the 
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confidence that society places in the effectiveness of the audit and in the opinion of 
the accountant. This confidence is therefore a condition for the existence of that 
function; if the confidence is betrayed, the function, too, is destroyed, since it 
becomes useless. 
Limperg notes that if the function of the independent auditor is to achieve its objective, 
then no more confidence should be placed in its fulfilment than is justified by the work 
carried out, and by the skills and competence of the auditor. Limperg describes the 
confidence element of his theory as follows: 
 It is true that confidence plays a part in more or less every function in society; 
particularly confidence in the proper fulfilment of the function, in the honesty of 
the holder of the function etc. But in relation to the function of the confidential 
agent, the significance of the confidence is of a very special kind; it is the essence 
of the function itself.  The function of the confidential agent arises, does it not, 
precisely because society has little or no confidence in the communication and the 
opinion of other officials. The confidence in the effectiveness of the audit and in 
the opinion of the accountant thus forms the raison d’etre of his function.271  
Limperg calls auditors ‘independent agents of the community at large’272, as they bring 
independence and impersonal verification of information provided by managers for the 
benefit of the community of savers. According to the theory of inspired confidence, the 
social aspect of auditing, i.e. providing accountability for numerous individual savers is 
the most important function of auditing. It also distinguishes it from the agency theory, 
discussed in detail in the previous section, which focuses predominantly on the 
relationship between shareholders and managers. 
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Yet the same ‘social’ aspect of the theory has been criticised for placing accountants in a 
situation of unreasonably high expectations from the society. Limperg responds to this 
critique in the following way: 
Experience teaches that in general there is no question of unreasonably high 
expectations. I do not deny that, in certain cases, efforts are now and then made to 
unreasonably saddle the accountant with the blame for a disappointment 
experienced; but of ten the disappointed party is then not acting in good faith and 
the ‘expectation’ is construed afterwards. But generally, alas, it is noticeable that 
expectations are placed lower than is necessary, given the level of ability and 
technical possibilities of the accountant. It is the more remarkable that there are 
accountants who systematically try to force down those expectations…But the 
community is intelligent and reasonable; it does not set standards of confidence 
which are higher than the competent and cautiously working accountant is able to 
satisfy. It is that standard which, according to the Theory of Inspired Confidence, 
defines the purport of that confidence. The expectation we are speaking of is 
therefore not – see here the second error that is concealed in the argument – some 
arbitrary standard set by some dumb or irresponsible individual, but a standards of 
confidence evolved by the needs of the community which the sensible layman 
builds into the function of the accountant.273 
The theory postulates that the work carried out by auditors should be governed by the 
expectations of reasonably well-informed audit users, but auditors should not look to raise 
these expectations by any more than could be justified by the work they carry out.  
There are no definite rules regarding the procedure an auditor must perform in a particular 
case, but the general rule is that auditor should perform enough work to meet the 
expectations of society. Hence, the most important factor is society’s needs, which are 
dynamic and evolve over time, just like the auditing methods. In other words, changes in 
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the needs of society and changes in auditing methods result in changes in the auditor’s 
function.274 However, the touchstone of an auditors’ work is the provision of assurance 
that society needs and reasonably expects. This mirrors the trend towards greater 
corporate social responsibility reporting for the benefit of a wider spectrum of 
stakeholders than simply the shareholders.275 This is an important argument that this 
thesis adopts when developing a new auditing model discussed in chapter six.  
Another focus of the theory lies in the independence of auditor, which becomes a 
prerequisite for the effectiveness of his work. In order to serve the community, an auditor 
must produce an independent and objective opinion on the accounts of the stewardship of 
the managers. This cannot be delivered if an auditor is in service of the management or 
‘has to dance to the manager’s tune’.276 The requirement of independence does not apply 
here to the character of the accountant, but to his functional status. Independence is a 
logical condition for obtaining effective relationships in the audit arrangement. 
The topic of auditors’ independence is of paramount importance for this thesis, which 
argues in chapters four and six that the current audit paradigm is flawed as auditors are 
not sufficiently independent. Auditors have a conflict of interest at the heart of their 
business. They are hired and compensated by the very companies they ought to provide 
with independent opinions on financial health. Moreover, an auditors’ independence in 
appearance is impaired whenever they provide consulting and auditing services 
simultaneously. This thesis uses Limperg’s views on auditors’ functional independence, 
while arguing in chapter six that the relationship between auditors and companies, and 
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managers in particular, should be severed and that audits should be conducted by an 
external body, guaranteeing the independence of the audit process. 
The Theory of Inspired Confidence shows that auditing plays an important role in the 
social framework. Unfortunately, the current audit system is failing in its social function, 
which manifests itself in the contemporary problem of the ‘expectation gap’ and the 
tendency towards defensive auditing. This is potentially understandable in the context of 
damaging litigation, but socially unacceptable as it further frustrates the purpose of audit 
and undermines its credibility. This thesis adopts Limperg’s ideas on the social 
importance of audit and argues, in chapter six, that audits should be conducted for the 
benefit of a wider spectrum of stakeholders. The thesis now turns to the analysis of Mautz 
and Sharaf’s philosophy of auditing, which was the first attempt to develop a theory of 
auditing. The following section focuses predominantly on Mautz and Sharaf’s views on 
auditors’ independence, which is important for the development of the arguments in 
chapter four, which criticise the lack of the auditors’ independence in current audit 
arrangements.  
2.3.  MAUTZ AND SHARAF’S PHILOSOPHY OF AUDITING 
This section provides an overview of Mautz and Sharaf’s theory of auditing as presented 
in a monograph entitled ‘The Philosophy of Auditing’ in 1961.277 Due to its innovative 
approach, the study is a seminal work regarding the theoretical foundations of audit. It is 
also one of the first comprehensive attempts to construct a theory of auditing. The 
majority of the main postulates of the Mautz and Sharaf’s theory relate to the substantive 
auditing and hence are of lesser importance for this thesis. That is why this section 
                                                 
277 R.K. Mautz and Hussein A. Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing (American Accounting Association, 
Florida 1961). 
 96 
provides only a general overview of these postulates. The main focus of this section is on 
Mautz and Sharaf’s views on independence, which are then used in chapter four to 
criticize lack of auditors’ independence in the current audit paradigm.  
Mautz and Sharaf based their theory on scientific logic, asserting that the auditing process 
is a rational process of examination, observation and evaluation of evidence.278 According 
to Mautz and Sharaf: 
Auditing is concerned with verification, the examination of financial data for the 
purpose of judging the faithfulness with which they portray events and conditions. 
Financial data are mainly assertions of intangible facts. Their verification requires 
application of the techniques and methods of proof. Proof is a part of the field of 
logic which has been described by some as the ‘science of proof’. Logic is 
concerned with how we establish facts, conclusions, and inferences as valid or 
invalid. As such, logic is basic not only to auditing but to law, which inevitably 
borrows its ideas and theories of proof from logic.279 
Broadly, Mautz and Sharaf adopt a scientific approach to auditing, arguing that auditing 
practice, with its heavy emphasis on probability and scientific approach to evidence, has 
a lot in common with a scientific method. 
Mautz and Sharaf’s theory proposes that in order to obtain a comprehensive view of 
auditing, one should see it as a five-level structure. At the base lies its philosophical 
foundation, which in turn rests on the most fundamental disciplines: the abstract sciences. 
The second layer - the postulates, provide a groundwork for the development of essential 
concepts. Next is the conceptual structure, the main generalisations based on which the 
bulk of the theory is organized. The following layers constitute the precepts, which are 
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directives for the guidance of practitioners. Finally, there is the superstructure of practical 
applications in which the precepts are applied to actual situations. Practice is concerned 
directly with the precepts only, but since the precepts are based on other levels of the 
structure, if practice follows the precepts and if the precepts are appropriately developed, 
practice also rests on a strong foundation of a theory.280 
The core of their theory is based on several ‘postulates’ or factors necessary for audits to 
achieve desired results. First of all, Mautz and Sharaf claim that financial statements and 
financial data are verifiable. This means that financial statements and reports must be 
accepted as being true, until steps are taken to prove otherwise. Verification, however, 
does not imply proof beyond all doubt. It is enough if it is reasonable. Verification can 
also take several forms, ranging from the continuous examination of procedures and data 
performed by an internal auditing staff, to annual examination by an independent auditor 
or investigation by an Internal Revenue Agent.281 
To follow, Mautz and Sharaf argue that there is not necessarily a conflict of interest 
between auditors and management. Managers are concerned with the progress and 
prosperity of the business they direct, whilst auditors perform a service which is intended 
to benefit the various interests in the enterprise by providing a certain degree of assurance 
as to the reliability of the financial data. The interests of auditors and management should 
therefore be substantially mutual. The authors, however, rightly recognise the possibility 
of situations in which managers are in short-term conflict with their auditors e.g. where 
management has a bonus arrangement contingent on the amount of income, but these 
should be treated in an exceptional way. Any underlying assumption that management 
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and auditors are in a permanent conflict would require an extremely extensive and 
detailed scrutiny of management actions, thus making the work of the auditor impossible.  
Furthermore, the authors assert that the existence of a satisfactory system of internal 
controls eliminates the probability of irregularities. It should be noted that the term 
‘probability’ is used instead of ‘possibility’. It is unlikely that the possibility of 
irregularities can ever be eliminated, even though they can be reduced. Irregularities are 
still possible despite the existence of good internal control, but they are no longer 
probable. Conversely, if the internal controls are of substandard quality, then errors and 
irregularities are more than merely possible. Recognition of this postulate helps to 
emphasise the importance of internal controls to the auditor and the nature of his interest 
in it.282 
According to the fourth postulate, consistent application of generally accepted principles 
of accounting result in fair presentation of the financial position and the results of 
operations.283 Despite the fact that auditing and accounting are separate but related fields, 
auditing borrows from the latter’s the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
and uses these as a standard for assessing the propriety of the financial data submitted for 
evaluation. The GAAP provide a benchmark to judge the fairness of financial statement 
presentations, without which an auditors’ opinion would become personal, 
unsubstantiated and with no value to anyone.284 
The fifth postulate asserts that in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, what was 
held true in the past for the enterprise under examination will hold true in the future. This 
constitutes not only the continuity or going concern concept of accounting, but also 
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provides a guide to the auditor in the performance of all his verification work, and is 
therefore a protection against economic and business changes unforeseeable at the time 
of the verification process. For example, if an auditor finds that management consistently 
overstates certain assets and understates others, he is obliged to take it in into account 
while performing an audit. If management acts consistently and in accordance with the 
standards while acquiring plant assets, an auditor can safely assume that it will do so in 
the future. This postulate places significant limits on the extent of an auditor’s 
responsibilities. It provides a starting point for deducing the extent of his obligation to 
forecast the future and having his work judged on the basis of hindsight.285 
According to the next postulate the professional status of the independent auditor imposes 
commensurate professional obligations. Despite the increasing regulation of the 
profession by the state due to the scandals such as Enron, auditors still claim their 
professional status.286  The public recognition of their professional status requires that 
auditors accept that they have a professional responsibility towards society, to their clients 
and to their fellow auditors. This postulate provides a basis for the professional concept 
of due care, which emphasises the importance of providing an objective service above 
self-interest, and adherence to certain standards of professional conduct and efficiency.287 
Finally, Mautz and Sharaf argue that auditors’ independence is one of the cornerstones of 
auditing theory. This part of their theory is particularly important for this thesis, which 
criticises auditors’ lack of independence in the current audit arrangements. The writers 
quote E.B Wilcox according to whom: 
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Independence is an essential auditing standard because the opinion of the 
independent accountant is furnished for the purpose of adding justified credibility 
to financial statements which are primarily the representations of management. If 
the accountant were not independent of the management of his clients, his opinion 
would add nothing. Those who rely on the credibility he furnishes are apt to be 
creditors or investors, or sometimes employees, customers, or government 
agencies. It is for their assurance that the independent expert opinions are provided, 
and the accountant incurs a profoundly professional obligation to this unseen 
audience even though he does not know who they are. He must fulfil this obligation 
even when it means opposing and denying the wishes of those who have employed 
him, and who, he knows, may cease to do so.288 
Carman Blough adds another useful thought in this area: 
Since one’s usefulness as an auditor is impaired by any feeling on the part of third 
parties that he is likely to lack independence, he has the responsibility of not only 
maintaining independence in fact but of avoiding any appearance of lacking 
independence.289 
These authors not only stress the importance of real independence of the individual 
practitioners in the performance of their work, but also emphasises the apparent 
independence of auditors as a professional group. Mautz and Sharaf refer to these as 
‘practitioner-independence’ and ‘profession-independence’ respectively.290  
Practitioner-independence is concerned with the appropriate execution of an auditor’s 
duties, such as the planning of the audit program, the verification of the financial 
statements and the preparation of the report. Carey sees practitioner-independence as the 
self-reliance and a lack of subordination of auditor’s judgements to that of others. He 
claims that auditors should be free of any self-interest that might even subconsciously 
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cloud their judgment regarding the reporting process. Auditors should also be free of any 
relationships with their clients, as they can give rise to subconscious bias. Independence 
in this context means objectivity or lack of bias in forming auditing judgements.291  
Profession-independence on the other hand implies that individual auditors and the 
profession as a whole must avoid any appearance of lacking independence. Mautz and 
Sharaf argue that importance of profession-independence ‘is essential to any substantial 
expansion of auditing as a means of accomplishing public policy’.292 In order to add 
credibility to the financial statements, auditors must not only conduct audits with 
independent minds, but must also be perceived to be independent. This implies that they 
should not engage in any other activities that could raise doubts about their objectivity. 
The authors make an interesting comparison of the auditing profession to the judiciary by 
stating: 
Auditing, unfortunately, does not have any ‘built-in’ characteristics that assure the 
sceptic of its integrity and independence. The structure of the judiciary, for 
example, in which judges are appointed by the state, may be cited in contrast. 
Judges are in no way dependent on ‘clients’ for income or continuance in office, 
and except in their official capacity, have no connection with those whose cases 
come before them. This creates an impression of as nearly complete independence 
as can be obtained. In addition, we have a hierarchy of courts so that the decisions 
of lesser judges may be subjected to the scrutiny of those who, by dint of long 
service, have attained positions surrounded by an aura of such calm, clear justice 
that to question their independence seems almost sacrilegious. Nothing like this 
exists in auditing.293 
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The authors argue that there are numerous features in the current audit model that cast a 
shadow over the auditors’ independence. One of the drawbacks of the model is that the 
profession has a very close relationship with business. Auditors are directly dependent on 
their clients for the greater part of their revenues, which makes it difficult to view the 
profession as sufficiently neutral and independent. Mautz and Sharaf also criticise the 
tendency toward the emergence of a limited number of large firms, which is an even more 
profound problem now, with only four big auditing firms, than at the time when their 
monograph was written. They argue that as a public accounting firm grows larger, its 
overheads increase alongside its responsibility to hold together a substantial staff.  These 
increased costs require a considerable volume of business, which forces the accounting 
profession to be business-like in the way it operates its policies. Even though business-
like procedures are not in any way improper or unprofessional, they might well give the 
appearance of a business operation rather than a professional type of service.294 
Mautz and Sharaf also express their concern with regard to the simultaneous provision of 
audit and managerial services and how this impacts on auditors’ independence. They 
acknowledge that some of the managerial services are well within the province of 
auditors, but there are no standards for judging the performance of the services supplied. 
The provision of consulting services can potentially affect both profession-independence 
and practitioner-independence. This is the reason why the performance of managerial 
services and auditing for the same client by the same accountant is an ‘incompatible 
combination’, which leads to no other solution than the desirability and indeed the 
necessity for a separation of these two types of services.295 Mautz and Sharaf argue that  
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If auditing is to continue to enjoy the respect of numerous stakeholders who rely on 
audit, it must be and must appear to be quite independent. If auditing is to take its 
place as part of the mechanism of social control, it must be accepted as thoroughly 
independent.296 
In order for auditing to be impartial and independent, steps must be taken to separate 
auditing from consulting. This would protect practitioners against unrecognised pressures 
and influences, and would provide some solid assurances of independence for the 
profession. This in turn would create a higher level of trust and acceptance from outsiders 
and enable auditors to reach their full potential for the provision of social service.297 
Mautz and Sharaf arguments related to the issue of independence are particularly 
important for this thesis, which qualifies the lack of auditors’ independence as one of the 
biggest flaws of the current audit model. This is discussed in detail in chapter four. 
Chapter six, in turn, provides an overview of a new audit model, which suggests creating 
a public body in charge of hiring and remunerating auditors, and introduces a ban on the 
provision of consulting services. 
Although the key assumptions of Mautz and Sharaf’s ‘Philosophy of Auditing’ are useful 
in many ways, there are certain issues of fundamental importance that their theory lacks. 
First of all, they fail to analyse the crucial concept of accountability between parties, e.g. 
accountability of the entity to the public or to investors.298 Following on from this, the 
basis of their approach is founded in scientific method, which entails evidence-gathering 
processes, the testing of hypotheses, and probability theory. According to some authors, 
auditing is an expression of an opinion, a judgement and experience, thus something that 
the scientific method does not allow.299 Furthermore, their approach does not provide an 
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examination of the relationships between auditing concepts, failing at the same time to 
develop a general framework of auditing.300 
Mautz and Sharaf, in their work, are primarily concerned with the audit of business 
corporations and not with the concept of audit in a wider sense. They pay very little 
attention to the concept of auditing as a social phenomenon, which according to this thesis 
is of paramount importance. This dimension was developed over twenty years later by 
Professor David Flint, who sets auditing in a social context and stimulates the discussion 
over the wider social objectives of auditing.  The following section looks at Flint’s theory 
of auditing and his rationale for the economic and social benefits of audit. 
2.4.  DAVID FLINT’S PHILOSOPHY AND PRINCIPLES OF 
AUDITING 
This section focuses on David Flint’s audit theory that places audit in the context of the 
institutions of society and the social, political and economic environment.301 Auditing is 
presented as part of the public and private control mechanism of monitoring and securing 
accountability. This section provides a general overview of the main postulates of the 
theory, with particular emphasis on the economic and social benefits of audit. This is 
important for this thesis, which argues that audit should be conducted not only for the 
benefit of shareholders, but also other stakeholders and general public.  
Flint bases his theory of auditing on a number of postulates, which incorporate 
fundamental principles and describe the intrinsic characteristics of audit essential in the 
development of the theoretical structure. Firstly, Flint argues that the primary conditions 
for an audit are the existence of a relationship of accountability and that the subject matter 
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of accountability is of such great importance that the discharge of the duty has to be 
audited.302 He claims that in the early days of business enterprises the conduct and 
performance of directors could be judged by honesty, conformity to the law, and the 
quantum of profits and dividends. In the intervening period of over one hundred years, 
corporate structures and directors’ duties have become more complex, capital markets 
more sophisticated, and the composition of shareholders has not only grown, but has 
changed with the development of investment trusts, finance companies and pension 
funds, meaning that the rights and interests of other stakeholders have become more 
widely recognised. There has been a rapid change in the perception of the responsibilities 
of corporate businesses towards society. As a result, the concept of accountability has 
become more complex and has resulted in an increased expectation of the auditing 
function. This, in turn, has contributed to the ‘expectations gap’, discussed in detail in 
chapter four, which explains the gap between public expectations and needs, and the 
expected accomplishment of auditors.303  
Flint argues that the way in which public and private organisations discharge their duties 
is important not only for their effect on their own constituencies but also for their impact 
on the wider community. The quality of company accounts and the scope of disclosed 
information are important for any judgement on management performance, investment, 
or credit decisions. The accounts are also required for assessment for taxation and wage 
purposes and judging social performance. This type of information is so important that 
its reliability and credibility must be assessed independently and without reservation.304 
The validity of this postulate can be illustrated by the way in which the state has used 
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audit as an instrument of social control in organisations with a certain degree of public 
accountability, such as incorporated companies, banks, regional and district governments, 
or public utilities. It is perhaps curious that the auditing of unincorporated organisations 
is not yet required by law. Flint suggests that all organisations in society need a greater 
degree of accountability and its public manifestation. This is due to the increasing 
complexity and substantial influence that organisations have on society.305 
The independence of an auditors’ status and his freedom from investigatory and reporting 
constraints is another postulate proposed by Flint. In order for an audit to fulfil its social 
purpose it should be fully independent in every sense, from the organisation itself and 
members who represent it. This means that audit judgement should be completely 
objective and free from any limitations on the freedom of investigation and pursuit of 
evidence or restrictions on the freedom of reporting. This proposition is well illustrated 
in practice. The directors have a statutory duty to present accounts which give a true and 
fair view of the financial affairs of a company, and are in breach if they fail to do so. The 
value and authority of auditing is derived entirely from the fact that auditors are 
independent while expressing their opinion. If they were not independent, this opinion 
would be of no value. The concept of audit independence is so central to the meaning of 
the audit concept itself that it forms a separate element in Flint’s theoretical structure.  
According to another postulate, the subject matter of an audit is susceptible to verification 
by evidence and it is a matter of personal skill and judgement of an auditor as to the 
amount and type of evidence necessary to express his opinion. There must be, what Mautz 
and Sharaf call, sufficient ‘competent evidential matter’.306 The theory of audit evidence 
is central to audit theory. Development of a theoretical framework demands identification 
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and analysis of audit evidence and an application of probability theory and statistical 
inference in order to assign value to audit evidence. It is the only possible way to test the 
validity of audit practices and procedures.307  
 
A further postulate of Flint’s theory presupposes the existence of standards of 
accountability, which can be set for those who are accountable. In other words, the actual 
conduct, performance or quality must be measured and compared with these standards by 
reference to a known criteria, and this comparison requires special skills and the exercise 
of judgement. If auditors were to set their own standards on each occasion for each 
organisation, the general utility of audit would be minimal, since there would be no 
uniformity between comparable clients.  Moreover, Flint argues that the meaning, 
significance and intention of financial statements and data subject to audit must be 
sufficiently clear. The purpose of audit is to add value and authority to that information. 
Accordingly, if there is uncertainty or ambiguity about information in the financial 
statements, it will not be possible to audit them. The intention of the information and data 
must be clarified before it can be audited.308 
The final postulate of Flint’s theory implies that audit is a social phenomenon producing 
both economic and social benefit. This thesis uses this argument in chapter six, which 
suggests an alternative audit system. For centuries auditing has been concerned with the 
honest and accurate accounting for money and property in the affairs of the state.309 The 
same rationale was then applied to the audit of corporations. As time has passed the 
concept and scope of accountability has expanded to affect the affairs of more than just 
the managers and shareholders of a corporation. Flint rejects the classic definition of audit 
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suggested by Mautz that the role of auditing in an advanced economic society can be, and 
has been stated in very simple terms – to add credibility to financial statements.310 He 
claims rather that preoccupation of auditors with lending credibility to financial 
statements is by no means a definitive statement as to the scope of auditing, as it fails to 
acknowledge the social function of audit.  
The social concept of audit denotes a special kind of examination. A proper understanding 
of its meaning requires an appreciation of its dynamic function. In a fast-changing society 
the interpretation of the practical implementations of the audit concept must be the result 
of a constant interaction between the relevant groups and auditors. It is crucial that 
auditors remain sensitive to the changing expectations of the relevant groups, while at the 
same time containing these expectations within the constraints of what is possible.311 The 
practices, procedures and specific objectives may change, but the purpose of the 
observations and investigations remain constant. This minimum continuing constant 
element is identified as audit. But a scientific approach requires also the investigation of 
the societal factors – the changing cultural, economic, historical, political influences 
which conditions society’s perception of audit and which make audit a social and dynamic 
phenomenon.312 A failure on the part of auditors or audit policy-makers to recognise the 
dynamic nature of auditing or to respond to legitimate societal pressure leads to frustration 
of the social purpose and the emergence of the expectation gap, which remains one of the 
most contentious issues in the current audit model. The issue of the expectations gap is 
analysed further in chapter four. 
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While it is important to have well-defined lines of responsibility, too stringent a 
perception of the purpose of audit may inhibit progress and development in a changing 
society. In light of increasing risk of litigation, there is an understandable resistance on 
the part of auditors to voluntarily assume new responsibilities. It is necessary, however, 
to create a system whereby relevant groups can secure the reassurance and protection they 
desire without exposing auditors to excessive risks. 
In the private sector, corporations have always had a primary duty of accountability to 
shareholders, and the audit responsibility has been defined by law to monitor that duty. 
As corporations have grown in size, influence and importance, both economically and 
socially, so have social structures and public expectations changed. The duty of 
accountability has expanded in its scope and terms. The state has a stronger than ever 
responsibility to protect public interest; employee groups have an interest in expanding 
employment opportunities, shareholders may no longer be the only effective group to 
exercise the function of owners, and all the while there is a duty of accountability to all 
of these. According to Flint, auditors who perceive the company or its shareholders as 
their only ‘client’, and refuse to recognise other stakeholders as being legitimately entitled 
to be directly addressed, understand neither the nature of the concept of accountability 
nor the social function of the audit.313 
Flint proposes a cost-benefit test as a social justification for auditing. He suggests that 
audit performs a wholly utilitarian function. It only satisfies a social need if the benefit it 
provides is greater than the sacrifice made to receive it. This implies that financial 
statements and other data that are audited must have an added utility which exceeds the 
cost of auditing. The benefit of audit is frequently intangible and difficult to measure. The 
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audit process is not under the control of either party, as this would imply lack of 
independence. Society is therefore dependent on auditors to create a benefit at the 
minimal social cost. The economic cost is observable by society, but the benefit has to be 
assessed subjectively.314 
As far as the audit of financial statements is concerned, obtaining and evaluating evidence 
is a substantial part of the work. Auditors hardly ever achieve certainty about any 
proposition and must form their opinion based on probability, according to the strength 
of evidence. There is, however, a minimum level of confidence that auditors must achieve 
in order to produce an opinion. Flint claims that at a certain stage, the cost of further 
evidence and the resulting increase in confidence which the auditor obtains as a 
consequence, must be measured against the enhanced social benefits this additional 
evidence would produce.315 This is also explained by Mautz and Sharaf: 
… cost and time are important: it would be unreasonable to incur substantial costs 
to ascertain the existence of assets of inconsequential amounts. It might be 
unreasonable to incur substantial costs to prove the existence of assets of even 
significant amounts if other types of evidence are sufficiently persuasive and more 
readily available. The difference between compelling evidence and very persuasive 
evidence may not be sufficiently important to warrant the added cost of obtaining 
the former.316 
Overall, Flint argues that there are numerous interests that need to be taken into account 
in most audits. It is therefore the total social benefit against social cost which has to be 
compared in considering the social justification for audit.   
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2.5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The expanding role of the audit function in contemporary corporations raises numerous 
questions regarding auditors’ responsibilities towards different market participants. Is 
there a potential conflict within the audit function? Are the auditors ultimately responsible 
to the party that pays their fees or to other parties that use their reports? The aim of this 
chapter has been to analyse the theoretical underpinnings of audit in order to understand 
the purpose and role that audit plays in society. This is important for this thesis, which 
argues that audit in the current model is flawed and fails to serve the interests of 
stakeholders such as creditors and employees. 
According to agency theory, audit became necessary because of the separation between 
the directors and other interested parties, such as capital providers, lenders, suppliers, who 
found themselves at risk as a result of the introduction of limited liability.317 Originally 
corporate auditing was concerned with the investigation of improper conduct such as error 
and fraud in accounting. More recent emphasis has been on verifying and lending 
credibility to the information presented in the annual accounts. Mautz and Sharaf seem to 
follow this line of argument suggesting that the main role of auditing in an advanced 
economic society is to add credibility to financial statements.318 
But as corporations have grown in size, importance and influence, and as social structures 
and public expectations have changed, an expectation has emerged that audit is now wider 
in its scope and more varied in its terms. It can no longer be perceived only as a rational 
process of examination, observation and evaluation of financial evidence.319 The current 
concern with the expectations gap between auditors and users, and the public anxiety 
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about the audit of corporate management, which emerged as a result of numerous 
financial scandals, are indicative that the audit function is by no means as narrowly 
conceived as it was previously. The theoretical concept of social audit, suggested by 
Limperg and developed by Flint, implies that audits fulfil a wider function of protecting 
capital markets and at the same time the prosperity of society as a whole, and that ‘lending 
credibility to financial statements is only one manifestation of the social function of 
auditing, although, no doubt, a very important one’.320   
Social accountability of business organisations is not a new idea, but the concept of a 
social audit is a relatively new one.321 This thesis uses Flint’s ideas on social audit as a 
theoretical grounding for chapters four and six and argues that audits should be conducted 
for the benefit of numerous stakeholders, such as creditors, employees, suppliers - all of 
whom rely on audited financial statements. Chapter four also adopts Limperg’s views on 
independence, whilst criticising the current audit model, which allows auditors to not only 
to be hired and paid by their clients, but also to provide their clients with consulting 
services, which impairs the auditors’ independence in appearance.  
The following chapter examines the current regulatory framework for auditing. Firstly, it 
presents various theories on the need for regulation in general, and applies these theories 
in the auditing context. In the second section the long-standing debate on rule- versus 
principle-based regulation is discussed. The third section deals with the parties involved 
in the regulation of audit. These include private and state regulators at national and 
international level. These will provide a basis for a discussion in chapter four, which 
examines the most pervasive problems inherent in the present audit framework.  
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CHAPTER 3. THE REGULATION OF AUDITING 
This chapter examines the regulatory framework for auditing. The literature on the 
regulation of auditing is embedded in financial reporting literature. Although the latter is 
extensive, it focuses predominantly on accounting rather than auditing studies. Moreover, 
the majority of financial reporting studies remain in the sphere of political science or 
business, focusing either on the political dimension of regulation322, or its organisational 
concept.323 Even though events such as Enron’s collapse and the financial crisis of 2008 
encouraged some attention to the regulatory framework of audit, the debate focused 
predominantly on the role of enforcement agencies and the standards-setting process.324 
The regulatory framework of auditing has not received sufficient attention. 
This chapter attempts to fill this gap by considering why, how and by whom audit is 
regulated.325 It is divided into three sections. This will allow for a detailed and 
comprehensive analysis of the regulatory framework. The first section seeks to clarify 
why there is a need for audit regulation. To that end, various general theories of regulation 
are examined and applied in the auditing context. Here, two main schools of regulation 
are analysed. First, the free market approach, according to which no regulation is 
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necessary as the market regulates itself, is examined. Second, the pro-regulation approach 
is presented alongside the analysis of public interest theory, capture theory, economic 
interest group theory and ideology theory. It is submitted that none of the general theories 
of regulation fully explain the reasons for the regulation of audit, which is usually enacted 
as a response to accounting scandals. The second section answers the question as to how 
audit is regulated and provides an analysis of the long-standing debate of rules versus 
principles-based regulation. The third section analyses the players involved in the 
regulation of audit, inclusive of private and public regulators at national and international 
levels. To follow, this section provides an account of the range of global institutions 
which increasingly participate in the audit practice and contribute to audit ideology. 
The analysis of regulation of the auditing framework plays a central role in this thesis, 
which criticises the current auditing arrangements.  The critical analysis in this chapter 
reveals that there is no normative theory justifying audit regulation. This contributes to 
problems with the very definition of audit and raises questions about the addressees and 
purpose of audits. The analysis also shows that the debate as to the prominence of 
principle-based rather than rules-based approach to regulation should refocus on 
improving the quality of audits and enhancing auditors’ accountability. Furthermore, the 
analysis shows that there are numerous parties who, either directly or indirectly, are 
involved in or exert influence on, the regulatory framework of audit. 
The critical analysis is then continued in chapter four, which focuses on the most 
egregious problems of the current audit model, such as lack of auditors’ independence 
and accountability, and excessive concentration of the audit market. These problems 
hinder the production of good quality audits. This thesis argues that it is essential to 
rethink the theoretical grounding of audit and provide a comprehensive overhaul of its 
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regulation. To that end, chapter six suggests an alternative regulatory model that shifts 
the focus of audit away from satisfying the needs of management to providing assurance 
in audited financial statements for the benefit of multiple stakeholders.  
3.1.  WHY DO WE NEED AUDIT REGULATION? 
The need for regulation has been extensively debated for many decades. Those who 
believe that the market will efficiently allocate resources on its own argue that regulation 
is not necessary.  Others, however, claim that markets do not always work in the best 
interests of society and that certain forms of intervention in regulating are essential to 
keeping an order (e.g. road rules for drivers) or protecting societies from undesirable 
activities (e.g. drug smuggling). The following sections look at the arguments for and 
against  the regulation in general, and audit regulation in particular. This analysis will 
reveal that there is no single, comprehensive theory of regulation which would justify the 
regulation of audit. 
3.1.1. THE FREE MARKET PERSPECTIVE 
The basic assumption underlying a free market perspective on the regulation of 
accounting is that accounting information should be treated just like other goods, and the 
forces of demand and supply should produce an optimal amount of information about an 
entity. According to Jensen and Meckling, entities should be able to produce sufficient 
information about their performance through the private economics-based incentives, 
eliminating the need for any regulation.326 
This argument, however, causes some controversy as, in the absence of information about 
an entity’s performance, shareholders might assume that managers are guided by self-
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interest and personal gain. Also potential lenders might expect managers to be 
opportunistic with the funds that lenders supply, and therefore charge a higher price for 
their funds.327 These increase the operating costs of the firm and the cost of capital, 
leaving negative implications for the value of the firm. In order to counteract this, 
managers enter into contracts with lenders and shareholders that aim at preventing them 
from opportunistic behaviour or shirking. These involve agreements with bondholders 
that keep debt levels below a certain percentage of total assets, service contracts including 
bonus schemes, which are tied to the organisation’s profits, and share options.328 These 
contractual arrangements are tied to accounting numbers, hence the ‘free-market’ 
argument is that in the ‘absence of regulation there are some private incentives to produce 
accounting information’.329 Any potential conflicts between investors and managers 
should then be solved through private contracting and associated financial reporting. 
Those who do not produce information will have to bear the higher costs of attracting 
capital.  
According to the assumption that managers tend to act in their own self-interest, it is 
desirable that financial statements are audited by an external party. This increases the 
objectivity of accounting information and decreases potential risks of stakeholders and 
the cost of capital.330 Even though audits are now a regulatory requirement, there is some 
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evidence that many organisations had their statements voluntarily audited before the laws 
on mandatory audits were introduced.331   
Arguments, other than the private contracting view, supporting elimination of regulation 
in the sphere of accounting are based on various market–related incentives. Firstly, the 
‘market for managers’ argument relies on the assumption that in the absence of regulation 
relating to the managers’ behaviour, managers will act in the best interests of the company 
and supply an optimal amount of information, as their compensation either present or 
future is linked to the results of the firm. Hence in the absence of contractual 
arrangements, managers will adopt strategies that aim at maximising the value of their 
corporations, which in turn provide an optimal amount of financial accounting 
information. This argument, however, is based on the assumption that information about 
the past performance of the managers is widely available and that their compensations 
fully reflect their achievements. It also assumes that capital markets are efficient in 
determining the value of the corporation and that the effective strategy of the management 
will always increase the share value. In reality, markets will not always be efficient and 
hence these assumptions will not always materialise.332  
The ‘market for corporate takeovers’ argument, on the other hand, is based on the 
assumption that an underperforming firm will be taken over by another one and new 
management will be appointed. Facing such a threat, managers would be motivated to 
increase firm value and diminish the risk that outsiders take control of the organization. 
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This motivates the management to produce information that minimises the cost of capital 
and increase the value of the firm.333 
There is also an argument that firms should produce information irrespectively of weather 
if it is good or bad. This is often referred to as the Akerlof’s theory of the market for 
lemons, which is used to explain how the quality of goods traded in a market can degrade 
in the presence of information asymmetry between buyers and seller, leaving only low 
quality goods behind.334 In the absence of information the capital markets assume that the 
firm is a ‘lemon’, which implies that the lack of information will be treated in the same 
way as bad information. In the absence of regulation, this can provide an incentive for 
managers to disclose information even though it is bad.  
Kaplan et al. applied Akerlof’s theory of the market for lemons to the market for the audit 
reports in the Enron case.335 Their reasoning was that Andersen repeatedly issued ‘lemon’ 
audit reports (i.e. low quality audit reports). Due to the structure of the audit report market, 
it usually takes some time for buyers to realize the quality of the service they receive. 
Auditing, as a control mechanism, is used to reduce such information asymmetry. 
Drawing upon the ‘market for lemons’ argument, it is necessary to notice that the failure 
to disclose bad news by managers in a timely manner could also cause serious reputational 
loss. According to Skinner, ‘managers who acquire a reputation for failing to disclose bad 
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news are less likely to be followed by analysts and money managers, thus reducing the 
price and/or liquidity of their firms’ stocks.’336 
According to the above arguments, supporting elimination of regulation such as private 
contracting, market for managers, market for takeovers, and market for lemons, 
organizations will still have incentives to make disclosures. Different waves of financial 
scandals discussed in chapter one, however, prove that market forces are often not enough 
to prevent fraud and market manipulation, and that a certain amount of regulation is 
needed to provide efficiency and greater investor protection. The next section discusses 
major classic theories which encourage regulation. These theories are then applied to the 
auditing context. 
3.1.2. THE ‘PRO – REGULATION’ PERSPECTIVE 
There are certain arguments which assume that accounting information should not be 
treated like other goods as it is a ‘public good’ and the market forces of supply and 
demand are not always reliable. As the users of financial information can obtain 
information and pass it on to others at zero cost, they are often referred to as ‘free-
riders’.337 Whenever free-riding occurs, the true demand is understated, as people can 
obtain goods or services from others without paying for it. This leads to a situation where 
the incentives to pay for the goods are very low, as people realise they are able to obtain 
goods for free. This causes a lack of incentive on behalf of the producers of the goods and 
in turn leads to underproduction of information. In order to counteract this 
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underproduction, regulation is introduced to reduce the impacts of market failure. 
According to Cooper and Keim: 
Market failure occurs in the case of a public good because, since other individuals 
(without paying) can receive the good, the price system cannot function. Public 
goods lack the exclusion attribute, i.e. the price system cannot function properly if 
it is not possible to exclude non-purchasers (those who will not pay the asked price) 
from consuming the good in question.338 
There are counter arguments to the idea that the supply of free goods should be regulated. 
According to some economists, the outcome of regulation can lead to the overproduction 
of goods, e.g. the users of information can overstate their need for some information.339 
This example could be applied to investment analysts lobbying for more regulation and 
disclosure. There is a possibility that the cost of production of additional information will 
exceed the benefits stemming from its availability. This could contribute to the problem 
known as ‘accounting standards overload’, causing an extra cost for companies in terms 
of compliance. In the presence of free-riders, however, lack of regulation may imply 
underproduction of important accounting information. 
Another argument justifying regulation in the sphere of financial reporting is the creation 
of a ‘level playing field’, which implies providing access to the same information for all 
market participants in order to prevent insider trading. Greater disclosure regulation has 
the potential for increasing the confidence of stakeholders in believing that they are on 
the same ‘level playing field’. That in turn builds confidence in the capital markets and is 
considered to operate in the ‘public interest’. The question of what is the right, or optimal, 
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amount of information, however, is difficult to answer with any level of certainty.340 The 
following subsections provide the analysis of various theories of regulation and their 
significance to the regulation of financial audit. 
PUBLIC INTEREST THEORY. 
According to public interest theories, regulation is adopted in order to improve economic 
efficiency and to protect social values by correcting market failures.341 The notion of 
public interest can be described here as ‘the best possible allocation of scarce resources 
for individual and collective goods’342 and the main method of achieving efficiency in 
this allocation would be through government regulation. There are typically four areas 
where government regulation is essential (as market forces cannot deal with the efficient 
allocation of resources on their own): natural monopolies, externalities, asymmetric 
information and excess competition. Any of these four forces legitimate regulation.343 
Under the natural monopoly argument, regulation is justified as the monopolist raises his 
tariffs and costs by charging above-marginal-cost prices in order to maximize profits, 
irrespectively of the economic efficiency. The role of regulation is to constrain the natural 
monopolist by securing fair pricing. Examples of companies that are considered natural 
monopolies are gas and oil pipelines, railways and telecommunication networks.  They 
are usually put under the control of the state or are indeed highly regulated in order to bar 
entry to the market and enforce the price rules that would promote efficient allocation.344 
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The natural monopoly reasoning is unlikely to explain the regulation of accounting 
standards since it is difficult to enforce their above-marginal-cost pricing. According to 
Sunder, the cost of excluding non-payers from utilizing already developed accounting 
standards is destined to be high.345 Furthermore, it would not be beneficial for standard-
setters to exclude potential users by charging monopoly prices, since standards become 
more valuable as more users adopt them.346 
Moreover, according to the natural monopoly reasoning, in the event of lack of regulation 
a private accounting setter will emerge and charge monopoly prices for its accounting 
standards. In the US, there is no evidence of a private standard-setting body before the 
emergence of the SEC and in the UK numerous accounting bodies of the first half of the 
twentieth century did not charge monopoly prices for the use of their accounting 
recommendations. 
According to the externalities argument for regulation, the price of a product does not 
reflect its real cost. This is either because in order to produce a product a manufacturer 
has to use public resources or because the product is ‘non-excludable’.347 If a product uses 
public resources, e.g. it contributes to air pollution, and the producer does not include in 
his calculations the costs of elimination of these socially detrimental effects, market will 
need some sort of regulation to introduce efficiency.348 It is implausible that the 
production of accounting standards depletes public resources, making the externalities 
argument an unlikely justification for regulating accounting. 
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Markets are also characterised by hidden information, or asymmetric distribution of 
information, in relation to prices, quality and quantities of goods.349 This can lead to a 
situation where parties misuse their information advantage, which in turn can lead to a 
moral hazard. Primary examples would be lawyers who give unfounded advice or auditors 
who fail to give an objective opinion on financial statements. The problems of asymmetric 
information and moral hazard may explain the existence of various licenses, certificates 
and other regulations for professional groups, such as building contractors, lawyers and 
auditors. These regulations set out minimum standards of the professional skills and 
knowledge leading to the decline in the transaction costs and information problems.350 At 
times, when it is difficult to set the minimum standards and the risk of moral hazard is 
high, professionals tend to be able to self–regulate.351  
Furthermore, the information asymmetry argument is based on the assumption that the 
buyers demand a discount on a quality product from sellers. The sellers of high quality 
products decide to exit the market, as the discount is so big that it makes the production 
of their products unprofitable. In the absence of high quality products, buyers expect more 
discounts at the same time as driving more sellers out of the market. The process 
continues until there are no buyers and sellers. The role of regulation is to fix this market 
failure by requiring quality disclosures from the vendors.352 
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Since the information asymmetry argument applies where potential buyers do not have 
sufficient information about the quality of a product, it is difficult to advance it as an 
explanation for the regulation of accounting standards. According to Kothari, it would be 
a self-destructing argument for the regulators to assume that accountants do not possess 
the necessary knowledge to choose among numerous private accounting standards.353 
The excess competition argument for regulation is based on the assumption that in the 
absence of market-entry regulation, sellers can flood the market with their products. This 
overproduction drives down prices and decreases quality and innovation. By regulating 
the number of market participants, the market becomes more stable. Even though the 
excess competition is not extensively discussed in economic studies as it is not a long-
term optimal level, it can have some merit if the adjustment to the optimal level is time-
consuming and costly. This is possible for capital intensive products. Accounting 
standards-setting, however, has relatively low capital intensity354, hence excessive 
competition is unlikely to justify the regulation of standards-setting.  
The public interest theory is most often applied to explain regulation as an answer to 
market failures, or correcting inefficient or inequitable market practices.355 It is also 
considered to explain the efficient management of scarce resources. Public interest theory, 
however, has been widely criticised. First of all, it has been proved that the market itself 
can often compensate for inefficiencies. For example, problems associated with adverse 
selection are often dealt with by the companies themselves with the use of brand names 
or advertising campaigns, or issuing of guarantees.356  Secondly, government regulation 
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is not always effective and it is usually costly.357 Some of the theoretical research 
emphasises that the information available to regulators can at times be flawed. 
Consequently, regulated businesses are often unable to produce to minimal costs as they 
have to adhere to laws drafted and enforced based on inaccurate information.358 This 
occurs frequently in health and safety sectors where regulators apply inefficient safety 
standards, which are based on inaccurate data.359 Thirdly, assuming that regulation is 
introduced in order to achieve economic efficiency, the public interest theory fails to 
explain why, on certain occasions, other objectives, such as fairness or redistribution, 
become the priority at the expense of economic efficiency.360 In the absence of generally 
applicable standards of justice361 and insight into the relationship between justice and 
efficiency, it becomes impossible to conduct empirical testing of the public interest theory 
as an explanatory theory of regulation.362  
According to Posner, the public interest theory is incomplete, as it fails to indicate how a 
given point of view on the public interest translates into legislative actions that maximize 
economic welfare363. It is also based on an assumption that the regulator is an 
incorruptible and infallible entity. It provides no room for lobbying and its potential effect 
on the regulatory processes. This assumption is addressed in the capture theory, discussed 
in the next section.  
CAPTURE THEORY. 
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The public interest theory’s main assumption that governments are benevolent and 
competent is the focus of the capture theory of regulation.364 The capture theory contends 
that organizations, subject to regulation, will ultimately control or ‘capture’ the regulator. 
The regulators act as self-interested agents that seek to maximise their own utility 
functions.365 Even though regulation is often explained in terms of ‘protecting the public’, 
it is difficult for the regulator to remain independent of the industries as the survival of 
the regulatory agency frequently depends on satisfying the industry’s needs.366 
The capture theory explains the connection that exists between regulators and the 
industry. Industry representatives lobby politicians for favourable regulation. Politicians 
provide them with such regulation in return for a certain form of a bribe, 367 and as long 
as it does not affect their re-election chances. Individuals are not able to halt the collusion 
between regulators and producers, because of the free rider problem, which implies that 
the benefit for an individual citizen from stopping the wealth transfer is lower than the 
cost of informing and organizing other citizens to act on the issue.368 
It has been argued that the accounting and auditing standards-setting process has been 
captured by large accounting firms in various jurisdictions. For example, according to 
Walker, the Australian Standards Review Board was captured by the accounting 
profession. Walker establishes that: 
The profession had managed to influence the procedures, the priorities and the 
output of the Board. It was controlling both the regulations and the regulatory 
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agency; it had managed to achieve coordination of its activities and it appears to 
have influenced new appointments so that virtually all members of the Board might 
reasonably be expected to have some community of interests with the professional 
associations.369 
Baxter justifies the capturing process on the grounds that the accounting profession needs 
regulation to insure itself against the risk of producing poor quality accounting 
standards.370 The emergence of the generally accepted accounting standards in the US in 
the 1930s, a period subsequent to the 1920s during which accountants were criticized for 
poor accounting practices, is consistent with this hypothesis.371 
From the accountants’ perspective the costs of producing poor quality standards can be 
twofold: the loss of reputation, and legal liability. If the accounting judgement turns out 
to be erroneous, accountants can lose their credibility as experts and be sued. Legal 
liability is also one of the reasons why accountants prefer to rely on authoritative 
regulation rather than their professional judgement. The increase in accountants’ demands 
for regulation is consistent with the increase in the litigation levels against them. 
The increase in litigation and regulation can also be observed in the aftermath of major 
scandals. The most prominent examples being the establishment of the Securities 
Exchange Commission in 1934, as a response to the Wall Street Crash of 1929; the 
establishment of the UK Accounting Standards Steering Committee in the early 1970s 
following accounting failures of the late 1960s; the creation of the Accounting Standards 
Board in 1990, as a response to major accounting frauds in the late 1980s in the UK and 
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the stringent regulations introduced in many jurisdictions following the accounting 
failures at Enron, WorldCom or Parmalat. Most of the members of these post-crisis 
institutions were recruited from within the accounting profession, which shows that there 
is some merit in the regulatory capture theory. 372 
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUP THEORY OF REGULATION. 
The economic interest group theory is a refinement of the capture theory of regulation 
and suggests that regulation is a mix of policies driven by the forces of supply and 
demand. The government is situated on the supply side while industry is that on demand. 
The theory suggests that regulation is developed and operated primarily for the benefit of 
the industry concerned, without any external mechanisms involved.373  
Stigler contends that the primary benefit of the regulation of a branch of industry is the 
industry’s freedom to establish its own rules, which are subsequently enforced by the 
government. For example, the government can grant direct subsidies to an interest group, 
or introduce quotas, or restrict entry to the profession by means of licensing requirement. 
He suggests that every industry, or occupation that has enough political power to utilize 
the state, will seek to control entry.374  Various branches of industry would then be able 
to exploit the political decision-making process for their own benefits for two reasons. 
Firstly, interest groups exercise political influence more easily than individuals. This 
helps save time, energy and money. Also the political influence gained by individuals 
would most likely be negligible.375 Secondly, Stigler assumes that politicians are self-
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interested, and just like business executives or consumers they seek to increase their 
wealth and maximise votes. The regulated branches can supply the resources by campaign 
contributions or employment of party workers. The increase in the number of votes is 
achieved by educating members of the industry. 376 Stigler claims that regulation does not 
aim at remedying market failures, but it sets up income transfers in favour of the industries 
in exchange for political support.377 
As far as accounting standards setting is concerned, numerous industry groups lobby the 
standard setters to enact industry-beneficial accounting arrangements. Deegan gives an 
example of how a small number of aerospace companies successfully influenced the 
enactment of the UK accounting standard on research and development in favour of their 
private interests. The companies argued that in special circumstances they should be 
allowed to ‘treat development expenditure as a form of capital expenditure, and charge it 
as an expense in future years by matching it against the income that it eventually 
generated’.378 This treatment resulted in higher net assets being reported in a balance sheet 
of these companies. 
Watts and Zimmerman analyse the lobbying patterns of the US corporations regarding 
the introduction of general price level accounting, an accounting method leading to a 
reduction in reported profits during the periods of inflation. They show that large 
politically sensitive firms favour this method, even though it leads to reduced profits. 
They suggest that if these firms show abnormally high profits, they are likely to be subject 
to a negative public sentiment, probably in the form of government intervention, 
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consumer boycotts or claims for higher wages. By reporting lower profits, they are 
actually able to avoid negative wealth implications for the organizations.379 
Stigler’s theory of economic regulation is criticized for not being able to explain why in 
many situations regulation significantly favours particular consumer groups. For instance, 
the supply of water to schools or fire services free of charge or below cost; free travel for 
government officials and so on. This phenomenon is known as cross-subsidization and is 
explained by Sam Peltzman.380  
Peltzman claims that politicians tend to choose the policy of regulation in order to 
increase their political support; hence it is not likely that only one particular industry 
branch benefits from regulation. Consumers are also able to organize themselves and 
benefit from it. As the lower prices work to the advantage of consumers and higher prices 
are favoured by industry, the core issue for policy makers is to introduce regulations that 
balances out the needs of both groups and maximises their votes. 381 Efficient regulation 
should set prices on such a level that the gain in votes from the income transfer to the 
industry is balanced out with the loss of votes resulting from the increase in prices. 382 
Not only does this theory explain cross-subsidization, it also enables us to predict which 
branches are going to be regulated. According to the economic interest theory, one can 
expect the most regulation in the competitive branches such as agriculture, independent 
professions and the monopolistic industries, such as telecommunications or rail 
transport.383  
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Another criticism levelled at the Chicago theory of regulation is that it pays no attention 
to the motivation and behaviour of different political constituencies, such as legislators, 
voters, government workers and agencies. It is also considered to be indifferent to the 
interactions between the players in the regulatory process and the mechanism through 
which regulators fulfil the wishes of the organised partial interests. 384 Further critique 
comes from the Virginia School of Public Choice, which challenges the Chicago 
theoreticians’ notions that democracies are efficient and that the cost of redistribution 
does not exceed the normal cost of government.385 The central role is played here by the 
term ‘rent seeking’ coined by Ann Krueger.386 ‘Rent seeking’ is defined as the political 
activity of individuals or groups to earn income by capturing economic rent through 
manipulation or exploitation of the economic or political environment, rather than earning 
profits through economic transactions and the production of added wealth.387 This implies 
that there are significant welfare costs to the activity of the government.  
IDEOLOGY THEORY OF REGULATION. 
The ideology theory of regulation is based on the premise of market failures, much like 
the public interest theory. The model of regulators in the ideology theory, however, is 
neither as benevolent as in the public interest theory, nor as self-serving as suggested in 
the capture theory. Regulation is the result of both political ideologies, which vary across 
many dimensions, and industry lobbyists, who influence the activities of the regulators.388 
It is appealing as it explains the relation between interest-group lobbying and politicians’ 
votes on regulation. The central point that distinguishes this ideology theory from other 
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theories is the fact that it treats lobbying not as a form of bribery, but as a process through 
which politicians are informed about policy issues. Accordingly, industries lobby 
regulators not because of their self-interest, but in order to convey their knowledge on the 
issues subject to regulation.  
 
The ideology theory of regulation attempts to explain the accounting standards setting 
process. Regulators have certain ideologies, such as balance-sheet primacy or fair-value 
basis, but they are open to lobbying from industries with specific knowledge. Since 
politicians are not omniscient or benevolent, the resulting regulation is not always socially 
optimal.389 According to the theory, regulation arises to counteract market failures, but 
the political ideologies and manipulative lobbying can actually lead to the destruction of 
welfare. Thus, the optimality of regulation is a case sensitive assessment. 
According to the ideology theory, the key policy implication is to create a standards-
setting institution that minimizes the effect of conflicting ideologies and industry 
lobbying. One way to achieve this is to encourage competition among standards setters,390 
which in turn can promote competition among ideologies, leading to the survival of the 
most efficient GAAP. Accordingly, competition can also diminish the effects of industry 
lobbying. If a standard setter is seen as being prone to the industry lobbying, it may lose 
its credibility. 
There are some potential drawbacks to competition as a solution to regulating standard 
setting. Firstly, competition can at times induce a ‘race to the bottom’. In this instance, 
instead of competing on quality, standard setters will supply favours to the interest groups, 
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decreasing the efficiency of the GAAP.  Furthermore, in case of the demise of some of 
the standard setters due to the production of poor standards, the remaining standard setters 
might collude. Such collusion might inhibit innovation and encourage the self-interest of 
industry groups.391 
There are, however, certain advantages to the competition between standard setters.  First 
of all, an increasing body of evidence suggests that the nature of accounting standards is 
country-specific and depends on accountants’ and auditors’ training, effectiveness of 
enforcement, rule of law, culture and history.392 It is therefore unlikely that one unified 
set of accounting standards would provide optimal regulation and efficient capital 
allocation decisions. Secondly, there is some evidence of political influence in the setting 
of accounting standards.393 Due to this fact, it is unclear whether the political forces that 
influence the setting of local accounting standards will accept the IASB standards. Thus, 
initially internationally harmonised rules are likely to devolve into standards designed 
according to local political conditions, suggesting that any attempts to converge the 
accounting standards are doomed to failure.394 
CONCLUSION  
                                                 
391 According to Kothari, the current ‘convergence’ towards uniform accounting standards between FASB 
and IASB is consistent with this observation, in Kothari (n 346) p. 75. 
392 Ray Ball, 'Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting Scandals' (2009) 
47(2) Journal of Accounting Research 277, p. 300; Douglas J. Skinner, 'The Rise of Deferred Tax Assets 
in Japan: The Role of Deferred Tax Accounting in the Japanese Banking Crisis' (2008) 46(2-3) Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 218, p. 218; Ray Ball, Ashok Robin, and Joanna Shuang Wu, 'Incentives Versus 
Standards: Properties of Accounting Earnings in Four East Asian Countries' (2003) 36 (1-3) Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 235, pp. 260 - 61. 
393 Watts and Zimmerman (n 379);  Stephen A. Zeff, 'The Evolution of US GAAP: The Political Forces 
Behind Professional Standards' (2005)  75(1) CPA Journal 18, pp. 18 - 27. 
394 At the beginning of the financial crisis, the IASB permitted financial institutions to suspend mark-to-
market accounting and avoid costly impairment. According to Leone, this decision was the outcome of the 
political pressure from the European Union, in Marie Leone, ''Spineless?' UK Pressure Targets Fair Value 
Weakening' available via http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2008/11/spineless-uk-pressure-targets-fair-
value-weakening accessed 14 February 2016.  
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So far this chapter provided an analysis of various theories of regulation and their 
application in the auditing context. It was argued that none of the theories provides a 
comprehensive explanation for the existing regulation of the audit model. Indeed, Watts 
and Zimmermann claim that the market for auditing theory is a ‘market for excuses’ and 
that the concepts in the auditing literature are altered in order to adapt to changes in 
political issues and institutions.395 They argue that auditing theory simply changes in the 
aftermath of government regulation enacted as a response to accounting scandals.396 In 
their view, 
 
Instead of providing an underlying framework for the promulgation of sound 
financial reporting practices by standards setting boards, accounting theory has 
proven a useful tactic to buttress one’s preconceived notions… The predominant 
function of accounting theories is now to supply excuses which satisfy the demand 
created by the political process; consequently accounting theories have become 
increasingly normative.397 
Following Watt and Zimmerman, this thesis agrees that the current regulation of audit 
lacks strong theoretical grounding and is reactionary. This thesis asserts that in order to 
build an effective audit system one needs to start with the coherent theoretical 
underpinning of audit and proceed with building regulation around it. This is elaborated 
in chapter six, where it is argued that since audits play the important public function of 
providing confidence in the capital markets, they should be conducted for the benefit of 
multiple stakeholders that have an interest in the audited financial statements. To that end, 
the scope of audits should be extended to include financial information that is relevant to 
stakeholders such as creditors and employees. Moreover, audits should be moved into the 
                                                 
395 Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman, 'The Demand for and Supply of Accounting Theories: The 
Market for Excuses' (1979) 54(2) Accounting Review 273, p. 289. 
396 Watts and Zimmerman (n 395) pp. 290 - 300. 
397 Watts and Zimmerman (n 395) p. 300. 
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public sector and be supplied by a public agency. This would allow a close relationship 
between management and auditors to be severed and to introduce genuinely independent 
and autonomous auditors with strong incentives to provide good quality audits.  
The following section looks at how the auditing universe is regulated. It focuses on the 
debate around the efficiency of the rule- and principle-based types of regulation of 
standard setting. It concludes that rules and principles should not be seen as alternatives, 
but should instead be applied as supplementary to each other. Accordingly, regulators 
should aim to include both in the optimal regulation of audit.  
 
3.2.  HOW: RULES VERSUS PRINCIPLES 
The previous section presented theories of regulation in general, and their application to 
the regulation of audit in particular. This section focuses on how auditing is regulated, by 
referring to the concepts of rule- and principle-based regulation of auditing standards, 
which has been the subject of an extensive debate since the 1990s.398 The UK’s 
comparative success in avoiding large corporate scandals, such as Enron or WorldCom, 
has prompted scholars and regulators to favour the UK principle-based approach to 
regulation over the US rules-based approach, with detailed and complex rules.399 This 
section is important for this thesis, as it explores the nature of such regulation, arguing 
that it is difficult to favour one approach over another due to the cultural, historical and 
regulatory differences between countries. It also argues that the debate should refocus on 
                                                 
398 David Alexander and Eva Jermakowicz, ‘A True and Fair View of the Principle/Rules Debate’ (2006) 
42(2) Abacus 132; David Satava, Cam Caldwell, and Linda Richards, ‘Ethics and the Auditing Culture: 
Rethinking the Foundation of Accounting and Auditing’ (2006) 64(3) Journal of Business Ethics 271 
399  David Kershaw, ‘Evading Enron: Taking Principles Too Seriously in Accounting Regulation’, (2005) 
68 (4) The Modern Law Review 594, p. 594. 
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delivering real improvements in audit quality and the need to balance the promotion of 
professional judgement with the need for greater auditors’ accountability.400 
According to Black, different types of norms can be categorized as bright-line rules, 
principles, and detailed rules.401 Bright-line rules are usually very clear and their 
application is straightforward, but they can fail to achieve their purpose (e.g. fair 
treatment of customers). This is due to the fact that bright-line rules are usually very 
general and it is easy to manipulate or ‘creatively comply’ with them.402 The principles, 
on the other hand, are focused on the substantive objective. The principle announces a 
broad objective in the expectation that ‘regulatory particulars will derive from law-to-fact 
applications over time.’403 In theory, norms constructed in this way keep regulators in 
closer touch with ultimate regulatory objectives, even though they permit variations in 
the facts of the cases. On the other hand, the rule-based system is tilted toward formalism. 
The specificity of rules can allow a user, such as an auditor, to report a transaction in 
formal compliance with the rules without paying due regard to the spirit or objective 
underlying such rules; the reason why it was introduced in the first place. 404  The table 
below provides the examples of these three types of norms.405  
  
                                                 
400 ICAEW, Audit Quality, Fundamentals - Principles-based Auditing (ICAEW, 2006) available via 
http://www.icaew.com/~/media/corporate/files/technical/ethics/audit%20quality%20fundamentals%20pri
nciples%20based%20auditing%20standards.ashx accessed 14 February 2016. 
401 Black (n 323) p. 437. 
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All statutory auditors and audit firms shall be subject to public 
oversight.406 
Principles 
The overall objective of the auditor is to obtain reasonable assurance 
about whether the financial statements as a whole are free from material 
misstatement.407 
Detailed rules 
Member States shall ensure that the key audit partner(s) responsible for 
carrying out a statutory audit rotate(s) from the audit engagement within 
a maximum period of seven years from the date of appointment and 
is/are allowed to participate in the audit of the audited entity again after 
a period of at least two years.408 
 
Table 1. Levels of regulation and examples.409 
Rules-based regulation is usually detailed and precise and attempts to anticipate all the 
cases. In this respect, such rules provide a high degree of certainty and predictability. 
However, they are also likely to create gaps in application, since it is not possible to 
                                                 
406 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on Statutory 
Audits and Annual Consolidated Accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and 
repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC OJ L 157/87 (Statutory Audit Directive), Article 32(2).  
407 ISA 200, para. 11(a), available via http://www.ifac.org/system/files/downloads/a008-2010-iaasb-
handbook-isa-200.pdf accessed 14 February 2016. 
408 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 406), Article 42(2). 
409 Kandemir (n325) p. 74. 
 138 
elaborate on all the conditions or factors that need to be taken into account while creating 
a rulebook. A new rule is usually required whenever a new circumstance arises. This, in 
turn, may lead to overproduction of new rules and laws.410 Moreover, rules-based 
regulation tends to be more costly than principles-based regulation, due to its high 
formulating costs.411  
Rules are considered to afford better protection against liability and hence the litigation 
risk that may have induced auditors to lobby for ‘rules-oriented’ rather than ‘principles-
based’ accounting and auditing standards.412 Furthermore, detailed rules are also more 
difficult to adjust to changing market circumstances.413 Kershaw argues that detailed rules 
are ‘fashioned in a proximate relationship to existing economic and financial practices’.414 
This is why they are frequently more difficult to apply to innovative financing structures. 
Principles, on the other hand, tend to be more dynamic, they are not fashioned by specific 
practices and are, therefore, more flexible to apply to new financing practices. 
There has been an upward global trend towards principle-based regulation. This has been 
particularly noticeable following several high profile corporate and audit failures in the 
US, such as Enron and WorldCom. The UK’s comparative success in avoiding such large-
scale failure has prompted regulators and scholars to enquire whether this comparative 
                                                 
410 Surendra Arjoon, ‘Striking a Balance between Rules and Principles-Based Approaches for Effective 
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success is the product of the UK principle-based ‘lighter touch’ regulation.415 The claim 
about the superiority of the UK’s principle-based approach has been made repeatedly in 
the post-Enron era both in the UK, and in the US.416 The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) has argued that ‘the United States financial 
reporting model places far more emphasis on extensive rules and regulations. This focus 
on detailed rules can encourage compliance with the letter of the law rather than the 
spirit’.417 The Association of British Insurers in a Memorandum to the Treasury 
Committee on the Financial Regulation of Public Limited Companies, submitted that ‘UK 
practice differs from that of the US in that it is more flexible and less rules-bound’.418 
Similarly, the Chairman of the US SEC - Harvey Pitt, in his testimony to the US House 
of Representative’s Committee on Financial Services, argued that the accounting 
standards ‘encourage auditors to check the boxes to ascertain whether there is technical 
compliance with applicable accounting standards’ and that US GAAP should move 
toward a ‘principles-based set of accounting standards, where mere compliance with 
technical prescriptions is neither sufficient nor the objective’.419 
According to Gray, however, there is no major difference between the UK and US 
accounting standards, and that in fact they are ‘almost identical’.420 Kershaw also argues 
that the UK standards cannot be distinguished in any meaningful way from the US ones 
                                                 
415 The regulatory policy of the FSA was described as ‘light touch’ or ‘principle-based’ regulation. See 
Joanna Gray, ‘Is It Time to Highlight the Limits of Risk-Based Financial Regulation?’ (2009) 4(1) Capital 
Markets Law Journal 50. 
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https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/032002tshlp.htm accessed 15 September 2014. 
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on the basis that the UK has a principles-based, as opposed to rules-based approach. 421 
In the context of Enron, the form of regulation was not a reason for the audit failure. 
Kershaw claims that the regulatory climate in which the benefits of acquiescing to 
management’s accounting demands outweigh the potential costs of such acquiescence 
were the underlying cause of the audit failure.422 The benefits of an auditor compromising 
his independence through the provision of consulting services went up, whilst the costs 
decreased as a result of declining exposure to liability for audit failure.423 Also Bratton 
convincingly argues that the crisis of the auditing profession in the US is ‘not for the most 
part a problem concerning the relative merits of rules and standards in the drafting of 
statutes. It is instead a problem of professional practice in a regulatory system made up 
of both’.424 The combination of sham transactions and lucrative consulting contracts 
created an environment where auditors were no longer independent and could not deliver 
good quality audits.  
To conclude, it is not possible to universally favour one approach over another; rule- or 
principle-based regulation may work better in some countries but not suit others due to 
cultural or regulatory differences. In fact, according to Black, standards combining both 
rules and principles might just be the optimal solution for the regulation of audit (‘tiered 
approach’).425 However, both principles and rules can always be manipulated in favour 
of the presentation that suits management interests, and so no amount of rules and 
principles will be able to counteract fraud if auditors fail to exercise their professional 
judgement and ethical decision-making. It has been argued that auditors should be 
required to stand back and assess whether they have in fact done everything that is 
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necessary to achieve the objectives of audit. 426 This thesis supports a view that the present 
regulatory environment should be amended in order to firstly eliminate the pervasive 
auditors’ incentives to acquiesce to managers’ demands, such as provision of consulting 
services, and secondly to encourage auditors to use their judgement transparently and 
with integrity. This will provide a true independence for auditors and increase the quality 
of audits.  
The next section examines players involved in the regulation of audit. These include the 
auditing profession, national enforcement agencies, international regulators and the 
biggest audit firms. It critically evaluates the role and relations between different 
regulators and emphasises an increasing role of the state in the regulation of audit. The 
aim of the following section is to provide a comprehensive answer as to who regulates 
audit, and what are the weaknesses in the current regulatory arrangements. 
3.3.  WHO REGULATES AUDIT?  
This section examines the numerous parties involved in the regulation of audit. The first 
subsection looks at the governance of the auditing profession and industry self-regulation. 
It argues that as a result of accounting scandals, such as Enron, and the inability of the 
profession to effectively regulate itself, the nation states had to introduce tougher 
measures and increase their oversight. The second subsection examines the role and 
structure of the state enforcement agencies, which complement audit in providing the 
accuracy and reliability of financial reports.427 The following subsection discusses the 
role of international financial institutions and the biggest audit firms in the regulation of 
auditing. This is important due to the increasing role that the latter two play in the 
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interpretation and implementation of audit practices and their powerful position as 
lobbyists.  
3.3.1.  INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION   
Private players, alongside state players, play a role in the regulation of audit. Private 
regulation, or in other words industry self-regulation, co-exists with state regulation. The 
influence of private and state regulators might vary at national, regional and international 
levels with regards to their legislative power and political influence. Industry self-
regulation can have certain advantages, for instance, the profession might be able to 
identify weaknesses in industry where the state regulators may lack sufficient expertise 
and information on the subject matter. On the other hand, private regulators are likely to 
be motivated by gaining financial benefits428 and can eventually disregard public 
interest.429 The following subsections look at the decreasing role of industry regulation in 
the UK and the US.  
The UK followed the model of self-regulation in auditing for many years. At first, audits 
were conducted by accountants registered with one of the chartered accountancy 
associations, which created their own audit regulations. This model was established at the 
end of the 19th century and served the profession for almost a century. In some cases, self-
regulation can be considered as good or even superior to government regulation, due to 
the fact that industry participants benefit from their superior expertise, increased 
efficiency in the rule-making process, and an improved flexibility to adapt rules to 
changing circumstances.430 This is not necessarily in conflict with Stigler and Peltzman’s 
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assumption that industries demand government regulation to help control the costs of 
free-riding and to disguise the self-interested nature of the regulation. Stigler and 
Peltzman’s assumption makes sense when there are strong incentives for  individuals to 
shirk, or when there are ineffective deterrent instruments within the profession. If the 
industry is able to detect and selectively punish shirkers and those who breach 
professional codes of conduct, the cost-benefit equation shifts enough to make the 
industry-controlled rules quite feasible. Hence, where the expected value of cooperation 
is high, professional discipline effective, and transaction costs and commitment problems 
fairly low, self-regulation is not only probable, but also consistent with the theory of 
regulatory capture, and the theory of economic interest.431 The auditing industry’s long 
reign of self-regulation, however, turned out to be unsustainable. 
One of the first changes to the model of a self-regulating accounting profession was 
introduced by the Companies Act 1989. The Act required the DTI to monitor company 
audit work. The regulation coincided with the implementation of the Seventh 
(83/349/EEC)432 and Eighth (84/253/EEC)433 Council Directives into UK law, which 
established the minimum state regulation. Subsequent monitoring was undertaken by 
professional institutes such as the ICAEW or the ICAS. Professional bodies hence acted 
both as professional associations, and as supervisory organisations.  
The regulation of the profession in 1989 led to the creation of the Auditing Practices 
Board (APB) in 1991. The role of the APB was to establish unified standards of auditing. 
The APB was in charge of promulgating Statements of Auditing Standards (SAS) that 
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contained principles and procedures that all the auditors had to comply with. The APB 
consisted of sixteen voting members; half of them were audit practitioners, the other half 
were chosen from among users and preparers of financial reports. There were concerns 
raised that the APB was too closely involved with the profession and hence a new 
remodelled APB was established. The new APB was created in 2001 and was moved 
under the umbrella of the Accountancy Foundation as an independent oversight body. 
The majority of the voting rights were held outside the profession.434 The Board adopted 
the existing framework of International Standards on Auditing (ISA) for the UK in 2004. 
As a response to the accounting scandals that shook the US in the early 2000s, the DTI 
introduced further institutional changes. The Accountancy Foundation became part of the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC).435 Also the Professional Oversight Board for 
Accountancy (POBA) was established to replace the Accountancy Foundation’s Review 
Board.436 Following the enactment of the Companies (Audit, Investigations and 
Community Enterprise) Act, the POBA was given more rights to oversee the activities of 
professional bodies. It was renamed as the Professional Oversight Board (POB), 
becoming at the same time responsible for the actuarial profession. The newly created 
Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) was charged with the monitoring of listed companies’ 
audits.437 
In July 2012 the structure and functions of the Financial Reporting Council changed 
conspicuously again following parliamentary approval of the proposed reform. As a result 
of the reform, the Auditing Practices Board was replaced by the Audit and Assurance 
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Council.438 The FRC has taken over a number of responsibilities that were previously 
delegated to its various operating subsidiaries. Most importantly, the FRC has been 
responsible for issuing and amending UK accounting, auditing and actuarial standards, as 
well as updating the UK Corporate Governance and Stewardship Codes. The FRC is 
supported by three committees: the Codes and Standards Committee (CSC), the Conduct 
Committee and the Executive Committee.439 
Fig.1. provides an overview of the structure of the Financial Reporting Council. 
 
Figure 1. An overview of the structure of the Financial Reporting Council. 440 
When deciding on standards the FRC board is supported by the Codes and Standards 
Committee (CSC). The work of the CSC covers the areas previously covered by the 
Accounting Standards Board, Auditing Practices Board, Board for Actuarial Standards 
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and the Corporate Governance Committee. The CSC advises the FRC board on the steps 
that need to be taken to maintain an effective framework of UK codes and standards. The 
CSC itself is supported by three councils: the Accounting Council, which covers 
accounting and narrative reporting, the Audit and Assurance Council and the Actuarial 
Council. As far as the sphere of auditing standards is concerned, the Audit and Assurance 
Council advises the FRC board and the CSC on draft codes and auditing standards and 
their amendments. It also comments on proposed developments in relation to international 
standards and regulations.441 
Over the years the accounting profession in the UK had lost its self-regulatory powers. A 
shift towards an increased state involvement has been noticeable. The UK has enhanced 
the role of the Financial Reporting Council and incorporated a uniform auditing standard 
created by the IFAC. As chapter one showed, in the past decades the accounting 
profession had undergone many changes which made it unable to self-regulate 
successfully. Auditors had taken the roles of highly paid consultants, neglecting at the 
same time their duty to be independent. The profession had become increasingly 
commercialised and in the wake of Enron and WorldCom scandals, their reputation was 
severely damaged. In order to maintain the credibility of financial reports, nation states 
had to introduce tougher measures and increase state oversight. 
As far as the US is concerned, major changes in the regulation of the auditing profession 
resulted from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2002.442 Before the enactment of the SOX, 
auditors were overseen by the AICPA through the ASB, Ethics Board, the SEC Practice 
Section and a peer-review system. The AICPA was setting standards on auditing, quality 
control, independence and ethics. The audit quality and quality of firms conducting these 
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audits were reviewed by the private POB, which did that under the remit of the SEC. The 
SEC set requirements for quality control and required peer review for audit firms. 
According to Zimmermann: 
as with the development of US GAAP, the federal government used listed firms to 
intervene in the audit governance, and a role model evolved that was eventually 
applied for all firms throughout the country, thus circumventing the states’ powers 
in company law.’443 
The SOX led to major changes in the governance of the auditing profession, effectively 
ending the period of the profession’s self-regulation. While the overall regulatory 
oversight remains the responsibility of the SEC, the organizational responsibilities were 
shifted to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB was 
established by Congress as a non-profit corporation in charge of overseeing the audits of 
public companies. The board of the PCAOB is composed of five members appointed to 
staggered five-year terms by the SEC.444  The Board is funded by accounting support fees 
paid by the issuers.445 Any domestic or foreign public accounting firm, which provides 
audit for US-listed companies, has to register with the PCAOB. Apart from registering 
firms, it sets up and alters current standards regarding auditing, corporate control, 
business ethics and independence. It is also in charge of conducting annual inspections of 
accounting firms and in case of violations it conducts investigations and disciplinary 
proceedings. The PCAOB is under statutory oversight and enforcement authority of the 
SEC. Its rules come into force only after the SEC’s approval.446   
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According to Zimmerman, the function of audit standard setting is very strongly US 
focused. The Standing Advisory Group, which advises the PCAOB on the development 
of auditing and related professional practice standards, is a purely national make-up of 
auditors, investors and public company executives. Out of eight organisations which have 
observer status, only one is denominated as international: the International Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). The other observers are the Auditing Standards 
Board of the AICPA, the Department of Labour, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, the Financial Industry Regulatory Board, the Government Accountability Office, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Federal Financial Institution 
Regulatory Agencies.447 Over the past years, however, the AICPA Auditing Standards 
Board (ASB) has aligned its agenda with the IAASB in the Clarity Project, redrafted the 
standards for clarity and converged the standards with the International Standards on 
Auditing (ISA) issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB).448 The result made GAAS easier to understand and apply for non-public 
companies as well as more consistent across international borders, while avoiding 
unnecessary conflict with auditing standards for public companies issued by the 
PCAOB.449 While the PCAOB has been silent on this issue, Morris believes that the 
globalisation of auditing standards by the ASB might be viewed as a predecessor of the 
same type of project by the PCAOB.450 Even though the auditing profession increasingly 
internationalises its procedures and the US-focused regulation of the auditing standards 
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might be seen as an obstacle in reaping economies of scale, it remains to be seen whether 




Historically, the audit profession governed the majority of the regulation of auditing. 
Recent developments, however, saw important changes in this sphere. Professional 
associations remained largely intact, but some of their competencies were shifted towards 
state oversight agencies as national governments have decided to increase intervention 
and enhance supervisory responsibilities. The US system is built around the PCAOB, 
which is placed under statutory oversight and enforcement authority of the SEC. It relies 
mainly on national solutions and is reluctant regarding transnational arrangements. In the 
UK, recent reform created a more simplified structure of the FRC, enabling it to operate 
as a unified regulatory body with enhanced independence and a more proportionate range 
of sanctions.451 The FRC is responsible for setting the UK’s standards and guidance for 
auditing, as well as monitoring and enforcing the application of these auditing standards.  
Having discussed the governance of the statutory audit in the UK and US, the following 
subsection turns to discuss other actors involved in the regulation of audit, namely the 
enforcement agencies. They play an important role of overseeing the quality of conducted 
audits and independence of auditors. Accordingly, they address society at large by 
furthering the interests of investors, stabilizing market confidence and providing 
consumer protection.  
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3.3.2.     ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
An enforcement agency is defined as a policing arrangement which takes the form of 
institutionalised check-ups of previously audited financial reports.452 These enforcement 
mechanisms are conducted by one or more institutions and serve as an additional 
safeguard in financial reporting. As audits and lawsuits deal with particular financial 
reports, enforcement agencies address the community at large.  
Enforcement agencies in the UK 
In the UK, self-regulation was favoured by the UK government for many decades and 
hence the enforcement area was left to be regulated by the profession itself. Self-
regulation, however, proved to be inefficient in tackling misleading and fraudulent 
statements in the 1980s. An institutional reform was introduced with the enactment of the 
Companies Act 1989, which also transposed the Seventh and Eighth Council Directives 
into UK legislation.453 As a result of that, the Financial Reporting Council was created in 
1990. It was incorporated as an independent company limited by guarantee and funded 
mainly by the DTI, the profession, and the supervised firms. A year later the Financial 
Reporting Review Panel was established as one of the regulatory bodies under the FRC 
umbrella.454 Previously to the establishment of the FRC, there was no systematic policing 
of reports in place. In cases of misstatements, individual auditors would face disciplinary 
proceedings in their accountancy bodies, but there was no institutionalised mechanism to 
correct the financial reports. From an enforcement point of view, the creation of the FRRP 
constituted a significant institutional overhaul.455 
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The FRRP reviewed accounts for compliance with accounting standards and law. It dealt 
with the accounts of public and large private companies and it also reviewed directors’ 
reports. The Panel did not duplicate the role of auditors, it enquired into cases where it 
appeared that rules had not been followed. When a bad accounting practice was found, 
the Chairman appointed a group, normally comprising of five members, to conduct an 
enquiry. The Panel tried to reach an agreement with the company through the exchange 
of correspondence and persuasion. If the Panel was satisfied with the company’s 
explanation, the case was closed. If it was not, than the Panel could, under the threat of 
lawsuit, force a company or auditor to restate the accounts, making a public 
announcement regarding the case. In more serious cases, the Panel could obtain from 
court a legally binding decision regarding restatement.456 The overall sanctioning powers 
of the FRRP relied on cooperation, adverse publicity, or the courts. They were therefore 
minimal, similar to the connection of the Panel with the state sector.457 
As a result of the reforms, the FRRP was succeeded by the Conduct Committee of the 
Financial Reporting Council. In its Corporate Reporting Review work, the Conduct 
Committee aims to ensure that the provision of financial information by public companies 
complies with the relevant reporting requirements. The Conduct Committee reviews the 
director’s reports and accounts of public and large private companies for compliance with 
law. Moreover, it also reviews the interim reports of all listed issuers and the annual 
reports of non-corporate listed entities.  
The Corporate Reporting Review does not duplicate the work of directors and auditors. 
Directors are responsible for preparing accounts, and for their accuracy, while auditors 
audit and report on them. The role of the Conduct Committee is to make an enquiry into 
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cases where it is possible that the requirements have not been followed, particularly where 
it is questionable whether the director’s reports and accounts comply with the Companies 
Act 2006.458 The Conduct Committee can ask directors for an explanation on the potential 
departures from reporting requirements. If the Conduct Committee is not satisfied with 
the directors’ explanations, it can persuade the directors to adopt a more appropriate 
accounting treatment. The directors may then voluntarily revise the accounts. Depending 
on the circumstances, the Conduct Committee may accept another form of remedial action 
such as a correction of the comparative figures in the next set of annual financial 
statements. If the directors fail to revise the accounts voluntarily, the Conduct Committee 
can secure the necessary revision of the accounts through a court order. 
The institution with stronger sanctioning powers in an enforcement area was the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), which exercised statutory powers awarded to it by the 
Financial Services and Market Act 2000.459 The FSA was an independent, non-
governmental body responsible for the supervision of commercial banks, insurance 
companies, stock exchanges, mortgage business, and general insurance intermediaries. 
Even though it fulfilled public functions, it was a non-profit private limited company. It 
was directly responsible to the Treasury, and its budget consisted of fees charged to all 
authorised firms that carried out activities they regulated and recognised investment 
exchanges. It was completely independent financially from the government, which made 
it similar in structure to the SEC. 
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The FSA had various legislative, executive and judicial competences. It could enact rules, 
give guidance and issue codes. It was capable of creating binding regulations to improve 
market confidence, public awareness, protection of consumers, and to reduce financial 
crime. As far as its executive functions were concerned, it authorised and supervised 
capital market issuers and maintained the Official List consisting of all securities traded 
on the UK regulated market, which was a function that had traditionally been performed 
by the LSE. The FSA required publication of audited financial statements as well. It did 
not, however, check the material accuracy of disclosed financial information: the 
prospectus approval, for instance, was only subject to completeness, and the figures were 
not checked by the Authority. The FSA also dealt with all the offences relating to the 
FSMA 2000 and its own rules. It was capable of imposing civil and penal sanctions, such 
as the publishing of a Statement of Misconduct, alteration and suspension of listing, 
imposing financial penalties and even directing the case to the court for injunction. 460  
In April 2013, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA) took over the responsibilities of the Financial Services Authority via 
amendments to the Financial Services Act.461 However, the new Act does not provide for 
any substantial changes regarding the general functions of regulatory bodies. The Act 
determines the objectives of the FCA as stabilising market confidence (the strategic 
objective) and consumer protection (the operational objective). In addition, two new 
objectives of efficiency and choice, and integrity, replaced the reduction of financial 
crime objectives.462 
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Enforcement agencies in the US 
As far as the structure of the US enforcement agency is concerned, the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 served as a legal basis for the establishment 
of the SEC in 1934. The federal government took over competences of the states for listed 
companies and placed them in the hands of a public regulator for the first time.463 The 
SEC is responsible exclusively for securities trade. It is a federal regulatory agency, which 
is controlled by the US Government Accountability Office. It consists of five 
Commissioners appointed by the President on five-year terms. The agency’s 
responsibilities are organized into five divisions and sixteen offices.464  
Figure 2 presents the structure of the SEC. 
 
Figure 2. The organisational structure of the Securities Exchange Commission. 
The Commission has extensive legislative, executive, and judicial competences with 
regards to securities regulation. It issues, interprets, and amends all of the rules in its 
domain, published as the Code of Federal Regulations.465 These legislative competences 
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are accompanied by its executive powers related to overseeing the inspection of securities 
firm, brokers, investment advisors, rating agencies. It is also in charge of overseeing 
private regulatory organisations in the securities, auditing and accounting areas.466 
Finally, among its judicial competences there is an ability to set up an internal tribunal, 
dealing with administrative proceedings that could impose sanctions and financial 
penalties on self-regulatory organizations or its members.467 
The US enforcement system is focused on listed companies, due to its interstate 
commerce clause roots. It fully relies on the SEC. Almost every area of enforcement is 
regulated by the SEC. Its powers of scrutiny extend to both prospectuses and regularly 
filed statements. Even though the accounting standards and listing rules are issued by the 
FASB and stock exchanges, these bodies are nevertheless supervised by the SEC.468 
The modus operandi of the Commission had been unchanged for many decades until 2002 
and the enactment of the SOX. The SOX further strengthened the role of the already 
dominating SEC. In order to police financial reports, the SEC was allowed to introduce 
risk-based assumptions and requirements of a periodical check within every three years. 
The frequency of reviews is based on the firm’s recent restatements of financial reports, 
market capitalisation and stock price volatility.469 The US enforcement model, relying on 
a strong public agency - the SEC, implies a strong influence of the state. This is different 
to the UK system, with its independent private regulator-the FRC, cooperating closely 
with the public sector.  
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None of the enforcement powers was transferred to supranational or transnational bodies. 
Enforcement agencies still remain country specific and are significantly influenced by 
nation states. According to Zimmermann, there are two reasons that make state 
involvement in this area more likely. Firstly, capital markets have become extremely 
important beyond the pure provision of finance, for example in locating funds for 
retirement. A collapse of the markets would have severe consequences on the citizens’ 
economic wealth, for which the nation state is responsible. Secondly, Zimmerman claims 
that regulation has become contagious and regulatory regimes cross–fertilize. For 
example, if one country introduces regulation that aims at preventing crisis, other 
countries will introduce similar regulatory arrangements in order to ensure the citizens 
that all possible safeguards, including those existing elsewhere, have been applied to avert 
the crisis.470    
State intervention in the sphere of audit should not be considered as a negative 
phenomenon though. Interventions are generally introduced in order to strengthen audit 
quality, for instance, through regulation of the auditors’ independence. According to 
Streeck, state intervention is more about ‘market-backing’ rather than ‘market-
braking’.471 Historically, interventions usually took place as a response to accounting 
scandals. The scope and intensity of regulation, however, differed across countries. 
Vieten pictured the sources of regulation on an axis between the state and the 
profession.472 He observed that the British system evolved away from its traditional 
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laissez–faire approach towards the increasing role of the state in the auditing regulation. 
A similar pattern can also be noticed in the US. 473  
A discussion about the nature and the regulatory arrangements governing auditing 
practice would not be complete without the analysis of what is commonly known in the 
field of global governance, as the international financial architecture.474 It is argued that 
audit research should include the analysis of a wide range of global institutions with 
whom ‘the auditing profession interacts and the ways in which such bodies increasingly 
set the boundaries for audit practice and the thought processes that shape this practice’.475 
These institutions, such as the World Bank or large multinational audit firms, remain 
powerful and influential, but there is relatively little known about their modus operandi, 
which can leave scope for abuse and for lack of accountability. This is important for this 
thesis, as it argues that lack of accountability is one of the biggest problems inherent in 
current auditing arrangements. In order to counteract this problem, the thesis suggests that 
audits should be conducted by the public sector agency, and for the benefit of society at 
large. 
3.3.3.  INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 
There are three influential groupings within the context of international financial 
architecture that contribute to auditing developments. These are: the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC); a group of international regulators comprising World 
Bank, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the Basel Committee on 
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Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the European Commission (EC) and large 
multinational audit firms.476 
 
Figure 3 shows the interlocking relationships between International Regulators, IFAC and 
large firms in global audit regulation.477 
 
Figure3. Interlocking relationships in global audit regulation. 
IFAC is an international private organisation that serves public interest by ‘strengthening 
the profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies’.478 
It also contributes to the development of strong professional accountancy organisations 
and accounting firms. IFAC comprises of 175 members and associates, which are 
professional accountancy organisations, from 130 countries and jurisdictions.479 IFAC 
contributes to the development of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
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as a member of the IFRS Advisory Council and comments on strategy, governance, and 
activities of the IASC Foundation and the International Accounting Standards Board.480 
International regulators began their cooperation with IFAC and then the Big Five audit 
firms when the International Forum on Accountancy Development (IFAD) was created 
in 1999. IFAD was established as a result of the criticisms of the accounting profession 
at the onset of the Asian crisis. Its goal was to improve accounting capacity in emerging 
and developing economies. Despite the fact that the IFAD initiative was subsequently 
terminated, it stimulated contact between these organisations and encouraged the use of 
ISAs as the world standards, improving audit quality and enhancing the role of IFAC as 
an entity serving the global public interest. In 2003 the international regulators became 
IFAC’s Monitoring Group. 481  
Other members of the Monitoring Group include IOSCO, which has produced several 
documents regarding auditor independence and audit quality; the BCBS, which regularly 
issues guidelines on the external audits of banks482, and the European Commission which 
has produced Recommendations and Directives in that area. In addition, the US Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which although not in the Monitoring 
Group, also boasts a strong international regulatory influence. The PCAOB, among other 
tasks, is responsible for carrying out inspections of audit work. It has the controversial 
powers of broad extraterritorial reach for foreign auditors of US listed companies.483 
Finally, the last group of the international financial architecture is the large audit firm 
network. The most important being the Big Four firms: EY, Deloitte, KPMG and PwC. 
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As mentioned in chapter one, these are large multinational professional service firms 
which dominate the global market for the auditing of listed companies.484 These firms are 
organised as networks of member bodies, which constitute independent legal entities 
under the global firm e.g. PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited. Even though 
they are legally separate entities, they increasingly act as one, following closely the 
policies of the global firm.485 
It is indisputable that multinational accounting firms play a vital role in regulation. They 
have significant involvement in the standard setting process. Former partners of the big 
four firms frequently sit on the standard setting bodies (e.g the FASB), which is consistent 
with the regulatory capture theory. Their knowledge, attitudes and business connections 
ensure that these big firms have their say both domestically and internationally. 486 These 
accounting firms are also linked to international systems of regulation, promoting flexible 
manufacturing, privatisation and trade liberalisation. Their advice can be powerful and 
influential. According to Neu et al., the advice of the accounting firms has affected 
education reform in several countries, and the way the governments have dealt with 
indigenous peoples.487 There is also evidence that audit firms have close connections with 
international lending agencies, such as the World Bank, which recommend audit and 
consulting services of these firms on development projects.488  
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Audit firms also play a significant role in the interpretation and implementation of 
accounting rules. Overall, there is surprisingly little research on how accounting and audit 
decisions are made. There are, however, studies that show how the implementation of 
‘standardised’ audit procedures by multinational audit firms may vary depending on 
national characteristics, partner ambitions, and specifics of the local unit being audited.  
All rules, no matter how detailed, require interpretation, leaving at the same time scope 
for abuse for the preparer and auditor.489 For this reason, the role of audit firms in 
contributing to the audit process should not be understated. 
Cooper and Robson also emphasise the continuing limited understanding of the 
involvement of multinational audit firms in international regulatory processes. They 
claim that it is impossible to discuss the work of IASB, IFAC, FRC, FASB, IOSCO or 
the EU without considering the complexity of alliances and agreements that exist between 
these agencies and big audit firms.490 They argue that research has neglected to see the 
firms as the significant agents that they really are, claiming that the Big Four are 
‘important sites where accounting practices emerge, become standardized and are 
regulated, where accounting rules and standards are translated into practice, and where 
professional identities are mediated, formed and transformed’.491 
There is also relatively little known about the Big Four firms’ modes of association 
between each other. One of the first ‘associational bodies’ – the European Contact Group 
was created in Europe in the 1990s. It was essentially established to coordinate the 
opinions of the firms, so that they could present a united view to the European 
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Commission on a number of audit regulatory proposals. At the time of the Asian crisis, 
the accounting profession was strongly criticised by organizations such as the World 
Bank for poor quality audits. This prompted the accountants to establish a Global Steering 
Committee (GSC), which aimed to enhance audit quality and strengthen the IFAC as a 
self-regulatory body for the international profession, and as a global standard setter. In 
2002, as a result of the Enron scandal, the GSC was transformed into the new Global 
Public Policy Committee (GPPC), with the six largest accounting firms as its members. 
It comprises of two groups: a regulatory, and a standards working group. Since 2004 the 
GPPC has organised numerous annual meetings under the name of the Global Public 
Policy Symposia (GPPS) and gradually opened up to a larger group of participants 
including not only the profession, but also the world’s top regulators in the field and 
academics.492 
3.4.  CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter is important for this thesis as it has delivered a comprehensive analysis of 
the current regulatory framework of auditing. It provided answers to why audit regulation 
is needed, how audits are regulated, who the main parties are in regulating audits.  The 
first section addressed the question about why there is a need for audit regulation. It 
explored the reasons for regulation in general, and audit regulation in particular. 
According to the theories presented above, audit regulation is needed in order to deal with 
issues such as information asymmetries, expectations gaps, or the protection of public 
interest. It is submitted, however, that none of these theories provide a comprehensive 
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theoretical underpinning to audit regulation and that audit regulation is reactionary and 
changes in the aftermath of auditing scandals.493  
The second section addressed the question of how audits are regulated. It analysed the 
degree of audit regulation by referring to the debate on rules versus principles-based 
regulation. Despite the common argument on the supremacy of the UK principles-based 
regulation494, (as opposed to the US rules-based one), the thesis argued that neither of the 
approaches should be favoured, as both have potential to achieve the same result. Instead, 
the debate should refocus on creating a regulatory environment, where auditors have 
fewer incentives to acquiesce to management’s demands. This issue is further discussed 
in chapter six, which suggests a new regulatory audit model, which would eliminate the 
close relationship between auditors and managers. This is achieved by establishing a 
public agency responsible for appointing and remunerating auditors. 
The third section identified multiple players that have played a role in audit regulation. 
The evidence shows that alongside the general increase in regulation, the role of the state 
has also been transformed. A shift towards an increased state involvement is noticeable 
in the area of audit governance in both countries. The US system is centred on a strong 
public institution – the PCAOB and relies wholly on national solutions with relatively 
small involvement of international accounting organisations. The UK extended the role 
of the FRC and incorporated uniform auditing standards created by the IFAC. As far as 
enforcement agencies are concerned, both countries have different institutional set–ups. 
The US system is based around a strong public agency – the SEC, while in the UK, the 
enforcement powers belong to the FRC.  
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A common position in accounting literature is to examine the financial reporting 
regulation in the context of professional associations, standards setting bodies and 
regulatory agencies of national governments and supra-national regulatory bodies. This 
thesis suggests, however, that while looking at the sites of regulation, in terms of 
production, transmission and enactment, one should also consider other entities within 
the international financial architecture, particularly large audit firms.495 It is indisputable 
that audit firms play a significant role in the interpretation and implementation of 
accounting and audit procedures. They are also powerful lobbyists, capable of exerting 
influence on governments and international financial institutions. If accounting firms are 
so central to the issues of regulation, the public and politicians should be concerned about 
these relatively unaccountable and opaque centres of power. It looks as though the 
boundaries between the regulator and regulated have been changing and this can have 
major effects on the audit quality and auditing model. 496  
This chapter provides a basis for chapter four, which further analyses the regulatory status 
quo, focusing on three specific areas, such as lack of auditors’ independence, 
accountability deficits, and excessive concentration of the audit market. The thesis argues 
that these areas contain some of the most egregious problems in the current audit 
arrangements and that they negatively affect the quality of audits. This in turn prompts 
the discussion upcoming in chapter six, which suggests a new model of audit regulation, 
which aims to provide solutions to these problems. In the proposed model audits are 
conducted by an autonomous agency for the benefit of multiple stakeholders.  
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CHAPTER 4.  INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY 
DEFICITS, AND CONCENTRATION OF THE AUDIT 
MARKET 
So far chapter one presented an account of the existing literature on the structural and 
regulatory changes that occurred within the auditing profession between the 1950s and 
2016. The evidence showed that the increasing use of consulting services transformed 
auditing firms into money-driven businesses which then had a negative impact on the 
profession’s perceived independence. Numerous regulatory concessions decreased the 
deterrent function of litigation leading to the decrease in auditors’ accountability; and the 
frequent use of mergers left the profession dangerously consolidated.497 The thesis also 
argued that the practice of audit developed without any prior theoretical grounding and 
hence audit regulation is usually reactionary and occurs in the aftermath of major 
accounting scandals. The thesis then analysed the regulatory framework of audit and 
considered why, how and by whom audit is regulated. The finding showed that there is 
now an increased state involvement in the area of audit regulation and that the accounting 
profession has lost its regulatory powers. 
In order to expand the analysis of the regulatory status quo of the auditing system, this 
chapter will focus on the three most pervasive problems inherent in the current audit 
arrangement; such as lack of auditors’ independence, accountability deficits and 
excessive concentration of the audit market. This will provide a continuation of the 
analysis contained in chapter one. The first section of this chapter will look at the problem 
of auditors’ independence. It will juxtapose numerous threats to auditors’ independence, 
such as being hired and paid by the clients or providing consulting services; with the 
incentives to remain independent, such as disciplinary sanctions or reputational damage. 
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The evidence will show that in the current system auditors have more incentives to 
acquiesce to managers’ demands than to remain independent. The following section will 
examine the issue of auditors’ lack of accountability, focusing on the legal, professional 
and social spheres of accountability. Section three will describe the problem of increased 
concentration of the audit market, which limits the client’s choice of auditors.  
This chapter is important for the thesis  as it shows fundamental problems in the present 
auditing model. It also argues that despite various regulatory reforms, such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the current audit system remains fundamentally flawed, and 
there is a pressing need to change it in order to make audits more effective. These changes 
are then suggested in chapter six, which proposes a new auditing model based on a public 
agency which hires and remunerates auditors, alleviating problems of  conflict of interest 
and concentration of the audit market. In the suggested model auditors are also banned 
from providing consulting services, which enhances their independence. There, it is also 
recommended that audits should fulfil a public interest role by ensuring integrity and 
public confidence in the market, and protecting the interests of stakeholders. To that end, 
the model suggests that auditors should conduct audits not only for the benefit of the 
companies they audit, but also for other stakeholders who have an interest in the high 
quality accounts.  
4.1.  INDEPENDENCE 
The issue of auditors’ independence and how different conflicts of interest can affect 
auditors’ judgement is a major problem within current audit arrangements. As external 
auditors are hired to provide a company with an independent, outside opinion on its 
financial statements, their independence is of paramount importance. According to some 
authors, it is the sole justification for the existence of audit firms, as otherwise the audit 
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function could have been performed by a company’s internal accountants.498 Allen claims 
that: 
Our capital markets are the envy of the world and are an important component to 
the efficiency of our economy. The capital markets work on information, including 
financial statements audited by independent professionals. We believe that the 
attestation of the competent, independent auditor adds value. There is unanimous 
agreement that the independent judgement of expert auditors and the perception of 
that independence is the condition of the utility of the auditors’ attestation. 499 
Many constituencies such as shareholders, investors, lenders, employees rely on audited 
statements, which should be accurate and free from any bias. Despite its importance, the 
issue of independence still remains an elusive promise, due to the close relationship 
between auditors and management, and auditors’ wishing to develop a ‘constructive 
relationship with their clients’.500  
To begin with, it is necessary to explain the meaning of independence. The concept of 
independence has proved difficult to define precisely but there are a few definitions that 
can be found in the literature: 
• the conditional probability that given a breach has been discovered, the auditor will 
report the breach 501  
• lack of collusion between the auditor and the manager502  
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• an attitude / state of mind503 
• the ability to resist client pressure504 
• an absence of interests that create an unacceptable risk of bias 505 
• lack of independence implies that an auditor’s decisions are not consistent with his 
or her beliefs about a reporting policy506. 
 
One can also find in the literature a distinction between independence in fact and 
independence in appearance. The former is often referred to as independence of mind or 
objectivity and it denotes a state of mind that is ‘free from influences that would 
compromise judgement and which has regard to all the considerations relevant to the task, 
but no other’.507 As it occurs in the internal sphere of mind and decision-making, it is 
difficult to prove it. Independence in appearance implies that an auditor should avoid 
‘circumstances where a reasonable and informed third party would question the auditors’ 
ability to act objectively’.508 This resonates with the Mautz and Sharaf’s distinction on 
practitioner-independence having the same meaning as independence in fact, and 
profession-independence signifying independence in appearance. 
Power stresses the need to distinguish between the operational and organizational senses 
of independence.509 Operational independence has more to do with the audit process itself 
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509 Power (n 15) p. 132. 
 169 
and relates to the question of whether auditors can ever truly be independent. It can be 
further subdivided into informational and epistemic independence. The former refers to 
the problem of asymmetrical information between the regulator and the regulated. The 
auditor will always be dependent on the representations made by senior management and 
other internal sources of information. The auditing process will be epistemically 
independent of the auditee, whenever clear rules of auditee conduct and techniques for 
determining compliance or breach of these rules exist. Despite the fact that the auditor 
might be dependent on some information from the auditee, the process of drawing 
conclusions will be independent. In other words, epistemic independence implies having 
a knowledge base which is independent of the inspected party.510 
Independence in the organisational sense, which is adopted in this thesis, relates to the 
way in which the auditor is appointed, ethical rules which are supposed to ensure his 
impartiality and the controversial problem of providing consulting services. Overall, the 
concept of organisational independence is seen as continuum, rather than an absolute, and 
it is a balancing act between the threats to auditor’s independence and the effectiveness 
of the safeguards available. Threats and incentives to remain independent are subjects of 
the following sections. This is important for the thesis, which argues that the balance 
between incentives to remain independent and threats to auditors’ independence remain 
tilted towards the latter. As independence is of paramount importance for the auditing 
system, this thesis suggests regulatory reforms that would restore the true independence 
of auditors. This involves creating a public agency in charge of appointment and 
remuneration of auditors, which would alleviate the problem of financial conflict of 
                                                 
510 Power (n 15) p. 133. 
 170 
interest stemming from the fact that auditors are hired and paid by their clients; and 
banning auditors from providing consulting services simultaneously with audits.  
 
4.1.1.  THREATS TO AUDITORS’ INDEPENDENCE 
Despite the fact that regulation requires from auditors objectivity and independence, it 
allows them to have financial conflicts of interest that tie them to the company rather than 
investors or the public. The mother of all conflicts is considered to be the fact that an 
auditor is hired and paid by the company he audits.511 Furthermore, the auditor is not 
prohibited from having other ‘business’ relationships with the company.512 By its very 
nature, managers have strong interests in the financial statements. First of all, they want 
to show the positive contribution they have made to the company. Secondly, as was 
mentioned in chapter one, their compensation is usually tied to the company’s 
performance, making them even more keenly interested in the financial reports. As 
companies have freedom to choose their auditors, the likelihood that they choose an 
auditor that would deliver a positive audit opinion is very high.513 Also according to 
Levinthal and Fichman, there is a probability that a client would be willing to switch 
auditors, if there was a chance of receiving a negative audit opinion. It also works the 
other way around; the auditor may hesitate to issue a negative audit opinion, knowing that 
it can lead to the loss of the client.514 This can lead to a cosy relationship between the 
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auditors and managers, and the acquiescence of both parties in risky accounting 
treatments. 
One practice that auditors use to flag up their willingness to acquiesce to a client’s wishes 
is referred to as ‘low-balling’, which is the provision of audit at an understated cost in 
order to develop a relationship with management and to get ‘a foot in a door’ for providing 
non-audit services, or to subsequently increase audit fees.515 Low-balling has been under 
scrutiny for many years and it also became a subject of the Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities in the US, known as the Cohen Commission in 1978, which took a 
negative view of the practice.516 It was stated in the report that ‘low introductory pricing’ 
impairs auditors’ independence and is a signal to the manager that the auditor is ready to 
be pliant.517 
The literature on that subject, however, provides inconclusive results. According to 
DeAngelo, the Cohen Commission failed to establish a causal link between low-balling 
and impaired independence. She claims that this pricing practice is a competitive response 
to the ‘expectation of future quasi-rents to incumbent auditors and that the initial fees 
reductions are sunk in future periods and therefore do not impair auditor 
independence’.518 Lee and Gu, on the other hand, claim that the Cohen Report completely 
ignored the issue of auditors’ liability to shareholders. They remind us that the auditor 
serves as a gatekeeper and watchdog for shareholders in the first place and it is the 
shareholders who possess statutory rights to fire the auditor and sue him for damages, 
even though in practice it happens that auditor is hired by the managers. They show in 
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their model that the combination of low-balling and auditors’ legal liability actually 
preserve the auditor’s independence.519 
Another threat to the auditors’ independence lies with auditors taking jobs with their 
clients.520 There are many advantages of hiring the staff of a public accounting firm, 
especially those who have already worked in the team auditing the company’s financial 
statements. These people are already familiar with the corporation’s financial activities, 
have industry experience and expertise, which are valuable while taking up employment. 
This phenomenon, however, seriously impairs the concept of auditor ‘independence’. 
Thompson, in his study on partisanship and involvement has shown that even the most 
insignificant affiliation with the partisan leads individuals to interpreting ambiguous 
information in accordance with the partisan’s interests.521 This is well illustrated by the 
Enron case, where a number of ex-Andersen staff worked for Enron and the relationship 
between the two became too cosy. Auditors could no longer provide objective opinions 
on Enron’s accounts, which contributed, not only to the fall of Enron, but of Arthur 
Andersen itself. 
As a result of Enron’s failure, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduced a restriction on client 
hiring. According to Section 206 of the Act: 
It shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to perform for an issuer 
any audit service required by this title if a chief executive officer, controller, chief 
financial officer, chief accounting officer, or any person serving in an equivalent 
position for the issuer, was employed by that registered independent public 
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accounting firm and participated in any capacity in the audit of that issuer during 
the one year period preceding the date of the initiation of the audit. 
The Act’s one-year waiting period, however, does not seem to be sufficient to counteract 
cosiness and possible corruption.522 Perhaps the only solution would be a total ban on 
hiring any personnel from a company’s auditing firm, including people who did not 
directly work on the audit team. The restrictions on personnel rotation required by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 206 seem insufficient, taking into account the high frequency 
with which auditors continue taking jobs with audit clients.523   
Another issue that poses a threat to auditors’ independence is the audit partners’ long 
association with the audit engagement. In general, the academic literature favours the 
arguments for mandatory rotation. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW) study reveals that mandatory rotation would improve audit quality by 
avoiding over-familiarity between the client and management, it would provide the 
company with a fresh look on its financial statements and the benefits of competition.524 
Rules governing the rotation of audit partners are very similar in the UK and the US. 
According to section 3.11 of the Revised Ethical Standard audit partner should not be 
engaged with the same client for longer than five years: 
In the case of listed companies, (…), the audit firm shall establish policies and 
procedures to ensure that: 
a) no one shall act as audit engagement partner for more than five years; and 
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b) anyone who has acted as the audit engagement partner for a particular audited 
entity for a period of five years, shall not subsequently participate in the audit 
engagement until a further period of five years has elapsed.525 
 
In special circumstances, when it is necessary to safeguard the quality of audit and an 
audit firm agrees, the audit engagement partner may continue in this position for another 
two years. In such circumstances, special safeguards, like quality control review and 
disclosure to the shareholders must be introduced.526 
As far as the US situation is concerned, Section 203 of the Sarbanes – Oxley Act states: 
It shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to provide audit services 
to an issuer if the lead (or coordinating) audit partner (having primary responsibility 
for the audit), or the audit partner responsible for reviewing the audit, has performed 
audit services for that issuer in each of the 5 previous fiscal years of that issuer. 
These provisions on audit partner rotation leave a lot of scope for abuse. What about the 
other auditors on the audit team for the past four years? What if one of them is promoted 
to partner, would it be possible for him to serve as the ‘lead’ partner for the following five 
years?527 Also five years ‘time out’ period seems to be a long time in the current business 
world. Five years would allow a controversial accounting treatment to potentially evolve 
into disaster. Timely detection of financial irregularities is critical for the prosperity, or 
even survival of companies. Accordingly, some authors claim that rotation periods should 
not exceed two or three years.528  
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Following Imhoff, mandatory rotation of accounting firms every three years would be the 
most effective solution to the threats to auditors’ independence. Firstly, the rotation of 
auditors every three years would eliminate the problem of low-balling, as audit firms 
would not be able to under-price audits hoping that the cost would be offset during many 
years of engagement. Secondly, frequent changes of auditors would increase the quality 
of audit, as auditors would be careful not to overlook weaknesses and errors in clients’ 
books which could then later be discovered by the following audit. Failure to report 
omissions or errors could be very costly in terms of loss of reputation and potential 
litigation. Thirdly, as a response to the argument that the rotation of auditors increases the 
cost of audit, as the new audit team lacks familiarity with the client’s business, Imhoff 
suggests that higher costs lead to the increase in amount and quality of audit work. These 
costs in turn are passed on to the shareholders, who surely do not mind paying more for 
an independent, high quality opinion on financial statements.529 
It is worth noting that in 2014, legislation regarding the reform of the audit market within 
the EU was published.530 It requires all EU public interest entities to rotate their statutory 
auditors after a maximum period of tenure. The maximum period was set at twenty years 
in the UK, with a mandatory tender at the ten year midpoint. The process of implementing 
the EU regulation in the UK was concluded in July 2016. 
Auditors’ independence is also considered to be threatened by providing consulting 
services, but again this issue seems to be far from clear-cut.531 The increasing use of non-
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audit services can lead to an audit firm becoming economically dependent on the audit 
client. An audit firm, providing both audit and MAS, and receiving considerate income 
from the latter, would not want to lose that client. This can result in a lack of willingness 
on behalf of auditors to challenge the client’s financial practices, leading to lower 
financial reporting quality.532 Also, according to the Metcalf Committee Staff Study, 
when an audit company, for example, installs a management information system and 
subsequently audits the reliability and accuracy of its own work, it inevitably leads to a 
conflict of interest. In this case, an accounting firm acting as both auditor and consultant 
may be willing not to report consulting deficiencies noticed during the audit, in order not 
to erode its ‘brand name’. Generally, any situation which contributes to the fact that an 
auditor does not truthfully report the results of audit can be considered as posing a threat 
to independence.533 Also, Frankel et al. find that auditor independence is compromised 
when clients pay high consulting fees in relation to total fees. Their research provides 
evidence that ‘non audit fees are positively associated with small earnings surprises and 
the magnitude of discretionary accruals, while audit fees are negatively associated with 
these earnings management indicators’.534 
An opposing view of possible threats to the auditors’ independence was taken by the 
Cohen Commission, where it was stated that ‘no significant relationship between the 
provision of management services and substandard audits can be found’.535 The 
Commission also mentioned that there might be some advantages associated with 
providing both services. For instance, when consulting services can be purchased from 
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the auditor, the costs of searching for a good consultant would be reduced.536 Moreover, 
the aforementioned Panel on Audit Effectiveness 2000, and some academics, claimed that 
providing consulting services can actually improve audit effectiveness through a 
‘knowledge spill-over’.537 An auditor with knowledge of a client’s computer systems or 
tax accounting can then use this knowledge in order to produce a better quality audit. 538 
Moreover, according to Dopuch et al. providing consulting services to high quality clients 
(those for whom material misstatement risk is small) can actually increase the audit firm’s 
reputational capital.  Reputation capital, in turn, should increase incentives to conduct 
audit in a diligent and thorough manner, thereby increasing audit quality.539 The high 
quality registrants would purchase more consulting services in order to improve the 
quality of reporting or to lower costs.540  
Overall, the academic literature provides inconclusive evidence as to whether providing 
consulting services impairs auditors’ independence. According to Beattie and Fearnley, 
this is for two reasons. Firstly, independence in fact is not possible to be observed and 
hence there is no valid measure that might be applied in order to determine it. Secondly, 
there is no publicly available data that would be relevant to the study. Even if the amount 
of consulting services is disclosed, there is no information on the split across the services. 
Also, firms fail to disclose sufficient information with regards to different lines of 
business.541  In general, there is little evidence to support the view that providing 
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consulting services impairs independence in fact.542 It can, however, negatively affect 
perceptions – the appearance of auditor independence.543 
 
In order to counteract the independence problems, regulation aims at providing limitation 
of the likelihood that auditors would succumb to the pressure from managers. One of the 
steps in this direction was the provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of prohibiting 
accounting firms from providing certain non-audit services to companies they audit, and 
approval of the audit committee of the services that are not on a prohibited list.544 The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in Section 201, lists non-audit services, which companies are not 
allowed to undertake simultaneously with audit. This seems to be a step in the right 
direction; however, it does not go far enough. The Act enables the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board to exempt any accounting firm from this prohibition, leaving 
the independence provision in danger of being overridden.545  
It seems that it would be more reasonable to introduce a total ban on the provision of 
consulting services by accounting firms. These services can be easily obtained from 
various sorts of non-accounting firms, while audit can only be delivered by accounting 
firms. Following this approach, it would not be necessary for the audit committee to 
approve of non-audit services and for the PCAOB to exempt accounting firms from the 
ban on certain consulting services.546 
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The regulatory framework of the provision of the non-audit services in the UK could be 
characterized by the following features. First of all,  companies must disclose in their 
financial statements the amount of consulting fees paid to their auditors.547 Secondly, the 
UK Corporate Governance Code places the burden of developing and implementing a 
company’s non-audit services policy on audit committees. For years the auditor’s 
decision as to whether to engage in providing consulting services remained the auditor’s 
self-assessment.548 The standard remained focused on the theme that it was the nature and 
the surrounding circumstances of the consulting services provision rather than the 
financial benefits that had the ability to compromise independence. 549 
The probability of losing an audit relationship as a result of failure to acquiesce is small, 
but that does not guarantee retaining the lucrative non-audit fees. According to Coffee, 
non-audit services provide managers with a ‘low-visibility’ sanction.550 The decision to 
enter into a non-audit contract is a discretionary decision of the management, so if 
auditors do not comply with the managers’ demands, they might not be granted these 
contracts. Management would easily be able to explain the choice of different consulting 
service providers. Accordingly, management can hold auditors to ransom by not giving 
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them the opportunity to earn high fees from consulting. This threat of cutting down 
auditors’ consulting income remains very credible.551 
According to Beattie and Fearnley, the aim of the auditors’ independence regulation is to 
ensure that threats to independence are balanced against the effectiveness of the 
safeguards available.552 The evidence above suggests that the balance has not been 
achieved either in the UK or the US. 553 Auditors are still capable of providing non-audit 
services to their audit clients and the revenue from these services remain high.554 Also, 
changes in managerial compensation, discussed in chapter one, increase the probability 
that managers will continue exerting pressure on auditors to adopt managers’ accounting 
preferences. On the other hand, disincentives for auditors to acquiesce have diminished. 
The litigation risk that auditors face has diminished due to a combination of judicial and 
legislative developments, which will be examined further on in the accountability deficits 
sections of this chapter. It would seem logical that litigation deterrence shortfall should 
be compensated by the market for reputation, and by self-regulatory sanctions 
administered by professional bodies, but these mechanisms, as the next section shows, 
remain highly underdeveloped and ineffective.555 
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4.1.2.  INCENTIVES TO REMAIN INDEPENDENT  
Following Kershaw, the aim of auditor independence regulation is to ensure that the 
threats to independence are outweighed by the incentives to remain independent. If there 
are more incentives for the auditors to acquiesce to the management pressure, the 
likelihood of audit failure increases.556 In the UK and the US, the revenue of the 
accounting firms has been increasing over the past twenty years, making audit firms more 
dependent on their clients and their relations with management increasingly cosy. On the 
other hand, neither regulatory nor market deterrents such as litigation, reputation costs or 
disciplinary sanctions do not counterbalance the benefits of acquiescence. The issue of 
litigation will be analysed in the following section, in the context of auditors’ 
accountability deficits. This thesis will now discuss the disciplinary sanctions, which 
should prevent auditors from acquiescing to managers’ demands.557  
As far as the US professional discipline is concerned, before the enactment of the SOX, 
any of the three following bodies could sanction an individual CPA who engaged in audit 
misconduct: the AICPA, the SEC, or a state board of accountancy in a jurisdiction where 
the CPA was licensed. Even though the AICPA would seem the most appropriate body 
to bring disciplinary actions, in reality it hardly ever disciplined, or censored its members. 
558 According to one survey, over the period of eleven years, the AICPA disciplined less 
than 20 per cent of accountants that had already been sanctioned by the SEC.559 The 
AICPA explained its laxity by referring to a lack of resources to investigate members’ 
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misconducts and that it would have been subject to counter lawsuits, if it acted without 
due process or good cause.560 
According to Coffee, state boards of accountancy turned out to be even less helpful in 
holding the accountants to account. They have shown limited interest in cases of 
professional misconduct, even when alerted by a formal SEC investigation.561 The SEC 
in turn took actions against individual accountants, but the overall number of cases was 
relatively small in relation to the size of the profession or the number of audits criticized 
by the SEC. 
Also, the peer review system left much to be desired. According to the AICPA rules, each 
audit firm was supposed to have its quality control system reviewed by a peer firm every 
three years. The peer reviewer issued a report, to which a subject firm responded, and 
both documents were sent to the Peer Review Committee of the SEC Practice Section of 
the AICPA. In theory, the Peer Review Committee could require corrections of the quality 
control deficiencies. In practice, however, the Panel on Audit Effectiveness in its 2000 
report discovered that the process was ‘toothless’, with no meaningful sanctions being 
imposed on subject firms. Audit firms conducting peer reviews were lenient and mindful 
that they might have been examined in a similar fashion. Today, peer review is defunct 
and was replaced by the PCAOB.562 
Currently, rules that govern the performance of professional services by members of the 
AICPA and state CPA societies participating in the Joint Ethics Enforcement Program 
can be found in the Code of Professional Conduct. It consists of two parts: the Principles 
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and the Rules. It was adopted to provide guidelines to all members in the performance of 
their professional responsibilities. Compliance with the code depends predominantly on 
members’ understanding and voluntary actions, secondarily on public opinion, and thirdly 
on reinforcement by peers. Disciplinary proceedings, conducted by the Professional 
Ethics Division, against members who fail to comply with the rules are used as a method 
of last resort.563 Sanctions that could be administered when the respondent is found guilty 
of charges brought by the ethics committee are: expulsion or suspension from the AICPA 
or state society, admonishment or fulfilling of an additional requirement (such as 
completion by a respondent of professional educational courses), requirement to submit 
by a respondent a work product for review or a ban on performing peer reviews for a 
specified period of time.564  
According to the recent statistical report of the disciplinary activity of the AICPA, out of 
819 cases at the beginning of 2012 only 88 accountants were expelled or suspended, 161 
were admonished, 244 required corrective action and in 182 cases no action was required. 
Dismissal happened in 36 cases and subsequent monitoring was completed satisfactorily 
in 32 cases. 565 
 
Another mechanism that can deter an auditor from acquiescing to a managers’ demands 
and inform the market about an auditor’s compromised reputation is financial statement 
and audit review, conducted by the regulatory bodies in charge of supervising financial 
statement and audit quality. In this area, investigative and disciplinary powers are vested 
                                                 
563 AICPA website, available at 
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in the SEC and the PCAOB. The SEC conducts auditors’ investigations into possible 
violations of the federal securities laws and prosecutes the SEC’s civil suits in the federal 
courts, and in administrative proceedings. The PCAOB investigates auditors for possible 
violations of any provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, any professional standards, any 
rule of the PCAOB or the SEC, or any provisions of the US securities laws relating to the 
preparations and issuance of audit reports. Section 105 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
gives the PCAOB broad investigative and disciplinary authority over registered firms and 
their associated persons.566 Sanctions imposed by the PCAOB may include suspension or 
revocation of a firm’s registration, suspension or bar of an individual from associating 
with a registered public accounting firm, and civil money penalties. The Board may also 
require improvements in a firm’s quality control, training, independent monitoring of the 
audit work of a firm or individual, or other remedial measures.567  
The PCAOB seems motivated to behave in a more activist fashion. It has extensive 
powers, discussed in the previous chapter, one of them is the ability to supersede any 
AICPA rule. There is no doubt, however, that the accounting profession will aim at 
marginalizing the PCAOB’s role in standards-setting and policing rogue accountants. 
There is already a lot of scepticism among public accountants over the ability of the board 
to understand the technical, practical and political realities of accounting at the global 
firms, as none of the board members can have any simultaneous connection to any 
accounting firm.568 The aggressiveness and tenacity of the PCAOB in disciplining 
accountants remains to be seen. 
                                                 
566  Available via 
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As far as the UK is concerned, many parties who make business and investment decisions 
based on the audited financial statements of the company have no legal claim against 
auditors. They can, however, make a complaint to the relevant professional body about 
an auditor’s conduct.569 Responsibility for conduct and discipline is split between the 
professional conduct branch of the applicable professional association such as the 
ICAEW, 570 and the Financial Reporting Council. 
The professional Code of Ethics sets out fundamental principles, which guide members’ 
behaviour. In the event of a complaint, the case is assessed and, if compliance with the 
fundamental principles is compromised, it is referred to the Investigation Committee (IC). 
The IC may either: take no further action, issue a non-publicized caution, agree the terms 
of the sanction with the member through a consent order, or refer the complaint to the 
Disciplinary Committee.571 
If a case involves a significant public interest, it is dealt with by the FRC’s Conduct 
Committee as opposed to an individual accountancy body.572 The Conduct Committee is 
supported by two subcommittees: the Monitoring Committee, which ensures the 
consistency and quality of the FRC’s monitoring work, and the Case Management 
Committee, which advises on the handling of disciplinary cases. 
The FRC’s predecessor, the Joint Disciplinary Scheme (JDS), also investigated the matter 
only if it raised the issue of ‘public concern’.573 Consequently, only the highest profile 
corporate failures and frauds such as Maxwell Group, BCCI and Polly Peck were subject 
                                                 
569 Kershaw (n 163) p. 413. 
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to JDS investigations. It can be expected that the ‘public interest’ test will result in similar 
referrals to the FRC. Currently, the FRC is investigating only 20 high-profile cases, such 
as Presbyterian Mutual Society, and Tesco PLC.574 It seems logical that since the FRC 
investigates only the most egregious cases, it will not be a reliable source of information 
about the auditor acquiescence and lack of independence.575 
Theoretically, severe sanctions could act as a deterrent factor. In both jurisdictions, 
sanctions are similar and potentially burdensome. The most serious ones are an unlimited 
fine on the accounting firm, the prohibition from using the term ‘Chartered Accountant’ 
or withdrawal of a licence. In practice, however, sanctions imposed are very low, when 
one compares them with the earning capabilities of the audit firms. For example, a Touche 
Ross partner was fined only £115,000 and reprimanded for his part in the Barlow Clowes 
accounting scandal. Coopers & Lybrand were fined £1.2 million and £2.1 million in costs 
for the audit of the Maxwell Group. This fine constituted only a small percentage of the 
£25 million that Coopers & Lybrand received from Maxwell Group in audit fees in the 
period under investigation.576 As sanctions imposed on both audit firms and individual 
auditors are lenient, it is hard to imagine that they can potentially act as a meaningful 
deterrent to an auditor who is willing to acquiesce in earnings management and 
compromise his independence.  
Criminal liability could potentially act as another source of deterrence. The extent of 
deterrence, however, would differ in the UK and the US. The Companies Act 2006 
introduces criminal liability for auditors who knowingly or recklessly provide an audit 
                                                 
574 Financial Reporting Council, available via https://frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Conduct/Professional-
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opinion that is misleading, false or deceptive. The Act, however, provides only for an 
unlimited fine on conviction on indictment; this means that the sanction once again is not 
sufficiently severe to deter an acquiescent auditor. 577 In the US, on the other hand, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the Title ‘Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability’ 
introduces severe penalty of fine and imprisonment of up to 20 years for those who 
destroy, alter, and falsify audit records. This regulation has the real potential of deterring 
auditors, due to severity of the sanctions.  
According to Kershaw, however, criminal liability of auditors is not an effective deterrent, 
mainly due to the fact that the risk of the discovery of irregularities, and the risk of being 
caught, are low. Furthermore, as auditors apply certain accounting standards while 
conducting audits, it would be extremely difficult to prove that they knew, or were 
reckless to the fact, that the standard was incorrectly applied. Also, the burden of proof 
in criminal proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt, hence only the most egregious 
activities would fall under this provision.578 
Finally, the cost of reputational damage does not seem a plausible threat either.579 The 
theory of reputational capital states that rational auditors would never risk their reputation 
by compromising their independence for financial gain. This would lead to the loss of 
existing and future clients and this loss would outweigh any potential gains from one 
client for compromised independence.580 This theory, however, is based on two 
assumptions. Firstly, it is very probable that the wrongful behaviour of auditors will be 
discovered, and secondly this discovery will be communicated to the market. As this is 
not always the case, the primary example of which were the Enron and Arthur Andersen 
                                                 
577 Companies Act 2006, Section 507. 
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scandals, the effectiveness of a reputation for independence as a disincentive for the 
auditors to acquiesce can be easily undermined.581  
Moreover, according to Coffee, potential reputational penalties, which could possibly 
deter the whole audit firm, do not necessarily work well in the case of individual 
partners.582 He claims that it is the firm that has a reputational capital not an individual 
and hence a partner cannot really suffer any significant reputational loss. The partner that 
gets his firm involved in the scandal is likely to be fired. But he is also likely to be fired 
if he refuses to acquiesce and the client decides to switch to a different auditor. In the 
absence of harsh disciplinary sanctions for acquiescent individual partners in audit firms 
(the withdrawal of licence hardly ever takes place), it is hard to imagine that the potential 
reputational loss would motivate, discipline, and deter them from participating in risky 
accounting practices.583 
Despite regulations enacted as a response to the Enron scandal, independence of auditors 
still remains a controversial issue. The evidence above shows that auditors in the UK are 
allowed to provide consulting services, with the only restriction being the self-assessment 
test. 584 In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides the PCAOB with the ability to exempt 
audit firms from the restriction of providing non-audit services. True auditor 
independence requires, as a start, complete separation of audit and non-audit services. But 
even then, a fundamental problem persists, as the auditors are hired, paid and fired by the 
companies they audit, leaving them in a position of ‘possibly casting negative judgements 
on those who hired them – and who cut them loose’.585 Consequently, the sole elimination 
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of consulting will not suffice. Based on the evidence above, this thesis argues that there 
is a need to design a new model, which would provide true independence for the auditing 
profession. This is suggested in chapter six, which advocates delegating the appointment 
and remuneration of auditors to an external body, severing, at the same time, a close 
relationship between auditors and management. This thesis also suggests a statutory ban 
on the provision of consulting, which can damage auditors’ actual and perceived 
independence. The rationale behind these changes is to restore auditors’ independence, 
which is the sole reason for the existence of external audit.586 Apart from the 
independence problem, the auditing profession is frequently criticised for its lack of 
accountability.587 The market for external audit is created and guaranteed by the state, but 
the supply is created by the private sector. In the absence of effective accountability 
mechanisms, it rarely encourages reflections on poor practice. The focus of the following 
section is on the issue of auditors’ accountability deficits inherent in the present audit 
architecture.  
4.2.  ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICITS 
The following subsections examine the issues of auditors’ accountability in the current 
audit model. Firstly, the origins and definitions of accountability are reviewed. The 
discussion then proceeds to analyse accountability in the legal, professional and social 
spheres. It shows that auditors suffer from significant accountability deficits in these 
areas, which can negatively impact the quality of audits. This thesis argues that 
accountability deficits remain one of the most egregious problems inherent in the current 
audit system. The analysis of this chapter provides a basis for chapter six, which suggests 
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reforms to strengthen accountability, and to enable the accounting profession to escape 
the cycle of institutionalised failures. 
4.2.1.  THE CONCEPT OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Historically, the origins of accountability can be traced to the reign of William I, who 
required that all property holders in his realm render an account of what they possessed.588 
These possessions were then valuated and listed in the ‘Domesday Books’, which became 
the foundation of the royal governance. In the twelfth century this evolved into ‘a highly 
centralized administrative kingship that was ruled through centralized auditing and semi-
annual account giving’.589 
Nowadays, accountability has progressed beyond its bookkeeping and accounting origins 
and has become a symbol of good governance. The origins of the concept of 
accountability are different in the US and the UK. In the US, its origins can be found in 
the discourse between Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer over the extent to which public 
servants should either rely on their professionalism and morality or simply follow the 
instructions from their superiors. Friedrich used the term ‘accountability’ in order to 
describe the internal responsibility, the inward sense of obligation of public servants to 
their professional standards and values. Finer, on the other hand, defined accountability 
as the ‘responsibility toward external political direction’.590 
As far as the UK is concerned, the issue of accountability has been analysed in terms of 
ministers’ answerability to Parliament for the actions of their departments. It was often 
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referred to as ‘ministerial responsibility’ and had a broad meaning of holding the ministers 
responsible for all departmental behaviour.591 Today, however, ‘ministerial 
responsibility’ constitutes a technical, constitutional term and ‘accountability’ extends to 
include the whole range of activities and processes covered by responsibility.592 
Sometimes ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’ are used as synonyms, but adopting a 
half-way position with separate meanings of the above terms seems to be more 
reasonable. Responsibility, then, would deal with the internal functions of ‘personal 
culpability, morality and professional ethics’, whilst accountability would refer to the 
‘external sphere of scrutiny, such as calling to account, justifications and imposing 
sanctions.’593 This division enables ‘accountability’ to exist independently from 
‘responsibility’, sticking to its original, most intuitive sense. 
‘Account-ability’ denotes an ‘ability’ to be called ‘to account’ to some authority for one’s 
actions.594 It denotes the exchange of reasons for conduct. To give an account means to 
provide reasons, explanation and justification for one’s behaviour.595 According to 
Mulgan, it has the following characteristics: it is external, meaning a person or body being 
held accountable gives account to some other person or body; it consists of interaction 
and exchange, in that one side seeks answers and rectification and the other responds and 
accepts sanctions; it involves rights of authority, in that one side has the superior authority 
and control to demand answers and impose sanctions.596 Some academics also emphasise 
the importance of information, as an essential feature of the definition of accountability. 
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According to Jackson, for example, accountability constitutes ‘explaining or justifying 
what has been done, what is currently being done and what is planned … (and) …  
involves therefore, the giving of information’.597  Gray defines the concept of 
accountability as ‘the onus, requirement or responsibility to provide an account (by no 
means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of the actions for which one is held 
responsible’.598 
The concept of accountability has been recently inappropriately extended to include 
various concepts not necessarily in line with the classic understanding of this term. For 
example, accountability is often wrongly associated with institutional checks and 
balances by which democratic institutions, such as courts, competitive markets, interest 
groups, or the mass media, seek to control the actions of the governments.599 Some of 
these controlling institutions are not able to impose sanctions, and hence they will not be 
able to fulfil the traditional accountability function.600 The meaning of accountability 
should not then be extended to include control. 
Another undue extension of the term ‘accountability’ includes equating it with 
‘responsiveness’, meaning pursuing by governments the wishes or needs of their citizens. 
Whereas ‘control’ would emphasise the ‘coercive role of external pressure’, 
‘responsiveness’ relates to the public servants’ general compliance with popular 
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demands, e.g. public agencies are expected to be responsive to elected politicians aiming 
to control their activities.601  
Finally, accountability as ‘dialogue’ is yet another example of an inappropriate use of this 
term. ‘Dialogue’, denoting public discussion between citizens, involves answering, 
explanations, justifications on behalf of officials and questioning, assessing and 
criticising on behalf of those holding them to account. The basic flaw of this approach is 
that ‘accountability,’ in its core sense, assumes an unequal relationship between the 
superior and subordinate.602 The subordinate gives account for his actions and accepts 
sanctions if his performance is not satisfactory. Equating accountability with a ‘dialogue’ 
assumes that parties in the relationship are equal, and so the issue of imposing and 
accepting sanctions does not exist.603 That is why equating accountability with the 
democratic dialogue of citizens constitutes an inappropriate extension of the concept of 
accountability beyond its traditional context of authority and control.604 The classic 
understanding of accountability, which emphasises holding the powerful to account 
through various means of scrutiny and sanctions, will be used throughout this thesis. In 
the suggested model stakeholders will be superior to the subordinate auditors. 
The traditional accounting model of accountability is rooted in the idea that shareholders, 
as a separate class to managers, expect managers to be accountable to them. This model 
of accountability is based on the agency model discussed in chapter two, which suggests 
that principals will not trust their agents and will try to find a mechanism that will align 
their interests with the interests of the agents. One of these mechanisms that aim for 
reducing information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour is the auditing of financial 
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statements conducted by professional, expert auditors.605 As discussed in chapter two, 
however, this model brings up another problem of auditors being agents of principals with 
similar concerns of trust and objectivity as in the directors-shareholders relationship.606 
The agency relationship between auditors and shareholders also raises questions about 
who is auditing the auditor and to whom the auditor should be accountable. In the current 
model, auditors remain largely unaccountable to anybody apart from the shareholders.607 
This is what stems from company law. In reality, however, auditors are frequently 
influenced by managers and acquiesce to managers’ demands. This thesis argues that 
auditing should be reorganised in order to sever the close relationship between auditors 
and management. It is also suggested that audits should be conducted for the benefit of 
other stakeholders. Chapter six provides details of suggested reforms. 
Having examined a theoretical concept of accountability, the following subsections will 
move on to discuss the legal, professional and social accountability of auditors in the 
current audit system. Theoretical research defines many other types of accountability such 
as political, administrative, or personal.608 This section aims for a typology reflective of 
the current private sector Anglo-American audit model, though inevitably also, the 
author’s perspective and interests. The following analysis is important for this thesis, as 
the findings indicate that auditors in the current regulatory set-up suffer from legal, 
professional, and social accountability deficits.609 This will provide the basis for the 
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discussion in chapter six, which proposes a new audit model, addressing the issue of 
accountability deficits in the current audit arrangements. 
4.2.2.  LEGAL LIABILITY 
Decades of numerous audit failures and associated lawsuits against audit firms highlight 
the magnitude and significance of litigation risk to the audit profession. Some research 
shows that liability costs for international audit firms have increased over the last two 
decades due to the increase in the size of damage awards.610 In response to this, the 
accounting profession has been fighting for the introduction of various regulatory changes 
in order to limit its liability. This subsection argues that in terms of protection the balance 
is tilted towards the auditing sector rather than potential injured parties.611 This in turn 
leaves auditors largely unaccountable, which is undesirable due to the unique role that an 
auditor plays in protecting public interest and providing confidence in capital markets.  
Auditors may potentially be subject to numerous liability rules (i.e. ‘multi-layered’ 
liability of auditors).612 They can be liable for both criminal and civil offences.  The 
discussion in the following sections will consider civil liability rules.613 The following 
section focuses on the auditors’ contractual liability to their clients, tortious liability to 
non-clients, proportionate liability and liability limitations agreements, as well as Limited 
Liability Partnership status.  
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Auditor liability to the Company in the UK 
The relationship between the auditor and the audit client is one of service providing.614 
The auditor is appointed in order to provide an objective opinion on the truth and fairness 
of the financial statements of a client in return for audit fees.615 The contract of the auditor 
with shareholders is evident only upon his appointment and when he provides 
shareholders with an audit report. Otherwise, auditor stays closely connected to the 
company’s management. His primary aim, however, is to look after the interests of the 
shareholders.616 Shareholders, on the other hand expect a diligently prepared audit that 
would shield them from any loss resulting from the audit service, such as payment of 
unlawful dividends or absence of assets in the balance sheet.617 Consequently, if they 
receive a negligently prepared audit they will seek to recover their losses by claiming 
damages from auditors. 
 
In order to ascertain the liability of the auditor to his client, the primary issue that needs 
to be established is whether the auditor had been negligent, and if yes, how much loss 
was caused to the claimant. The standard expected by the auditor is that of reasonable 
care and skill. It is established that the auditor is not a guarantor of the accuracy of 
financial statements, so as to be liable irrespectively of exercising reasonable care and 
skill.618 In Re London and General Bank [1895], Lindley LJ stated that: 
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An auditor… is not an issuer; he does not guarantee that the books do correctly 
show the true position of the company’s affairs; he does not even guarantee that his 
balance sheet is accurate according to the books of the company…’ but auditors 
must exercise ‘reasonable care and skill’ and ‘… he must not certify what he does 
not believe to be true’. 619 
The auditor should not act with suspicion, but with a reasonable caution or with an 
enquiring mind. If something raises his concern, he should examine it thoroughly, making 
sure there is no error.620 He has a broad discretion to rely on information provided by the 
board of directors. In Re Kingston Mill Company [1896], Lopes LJ described the duty of 
auditors by stating that ‘an auditor is not bound to be detective. He is a watchdog, but not 
a bloodhound’.621 Accordingly, an auditor may rely on the certifications of the company 
director in the absence of suspicious circumstances. It is a professional requirement, 
however, for an auditor to have a questioning mind in terms of ‘professional 
scepticism’.622 An auditor must therefore be critical of the accounts and reports provided 
by the company management in order to discharge his duty of care.  
The courts, in determining the standard of care, are also guided by accounting and 
auditing standards. The reasons behind this are twofold: firstly, the standards reflect good 
practice among auditors, as they are concluded with the consensus of all of the 
professional associations of accountants, and secondly, it is the requirement of every 
auditor to be registered with one of the professional bodies which adopt auditing 
standards.623 Despite the fact that standards do not have a binding force, if an auditor 
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abides by them, it proves that he acted in a reasonable manner. Consequently, as long as 
an auditor follows the standards, he is acting in a reasonable way and hence he does not 
breach the duty of care towards the client. 
As far as the quantum of liability is concerned, the auditor’s liability extends to the losses 
that the company suffered, due to the decisions in these areas which the directors would 
have taken differently if they had known the full facts. This applies even if the decision 
actually taken was lawful. Moreover, if there was a course of action the directors could 
have taken, which was wholly within their own control, liability would depend on it being 
shown that the step would have been taken. This might be difficult, particularly in the 
case of fraud or mismanagement, when those at fault are directors.624 Even if the claimant 
could establish liability and substantial loss, an auditor could reduce his liability using the 
defences of contributory negligence or limitation of liability by contract. 625 
Overall, it is difficult for a client to sue their auditor in the UK. Litigation would be likely 
to focus on the question of whether the auditor had in fact been negligent and if so 
whether, and how much, loss was caused to the claimant. The standard required here is 
that of reasonable care and skill. Provided the extensive developments by the Accounting 
Standards Board and the Auditing Practices Board of the accounting and auditing 
standards (and their international equivalents), it would be surprising if the courts were 
not guided by those standards in determining the standard of care in common law for 
auditors. Therefore, there is much greater certainty about what the duty of care requires 
of auditors than is the case for some other professionals.626 As long as auditors follow the 
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standards, it is unlikely they will ever be in breach of their duty of care to their clients.627 
The following section looks at auditor liability to the company in the US. 
Auditor Liability to the Company in the US 
The auditor’s duty under US law is to act in accordance with applicable professional 
standards and with agreement between parties. 628 However, even if an auditor is negligent 
in performing his duty, the US law vests in the auditor a powerful defence – in pari delicto, 
which enables an auditor to be shielded from liability. This usually takes place in the 
following scenario. Managers of a corporation fraudulently misstate the corporation’s 
financial statements in order to make the company more attractive to investors. The 
financial statements are then certified by an auditor who fails to follow professional 
standards in performing the audit. When the fraud is uncovered, the stock price decreases 
in value and the corporation becomes insolvent. Creditors and shareholders want to 
recover their losses from the auditor, alleging that the negligent audit allowed the fraud 
to continue for longer than it would have if the auditor had fulfilled his duty.629 This is a 
typical scenario where a defence in pari delicto is used by a negligent auditor.630 
 
According to the Restatement (Third) of Agency, the knowledge of a corporate officer is 
imputed to the corporation and the corporation is deemed to have this knowledge.631 
Accordingly, imputation makes the corporation liable for an officer’s fraud. This officer’s 
fraud becomes, in law, the corporation’s fraud, which makes the corporation a 
                                                 
627 Lloyd Cheyham & Co Ltd v Littlejohn & Co [1987] B.C.L.C. 303. 
628 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health, Educ. & Research Found. v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (AHERF), 989 A.2d 313, 332 (Pa. 2010) 
629 Christine M. Shepard, ‘Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto Defense in Auditor Malpractice 
Cases: A New Approach’ (2012) 69(1) Washington and Lee Law Review 275, p. 277. 
630 The application of the in pari delicto is subject to significant jurisdictional variability.  
631 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 5.03 (2006) (‘Notice of a fact that an agent knows or has reason to 
know is imputed to the principal if knowledge of the fact is material to the agent’s duties to the 
principal…’). 
 200 
wrongdoer.632 The defence of in pari delicto prevents one wrongdoer from seeking redress 
from another potential wrongdoer. As the corporation’s creditors bring their claim on 
behalf of the corporation, they ‘step into the shoes’ of the corporation and any defence 
that can be raised against the corporation can be raised against them.633 These doctrines 
operate in tandem to immunise auditors from liability.634 
The evidence shows that auditors can be immune from liability for negligent work simply 
because they performed their work for a corporation whose directors committed fraud. It 
seems particularly curious, when one considers that an auditor, who was hired for the 
very purpose of monitoring corporate activity, can use the in pari delicto defence to get 
immunity from answering for his own potential wrongdoing. This is important for the 
thesis, which argues that holding an auditor accountable for his work is advisable, because 
his role is unique and has implications beyond its performance under the contract with 
his client. Auditors ‘have duties not just to management, but to the public at large’.635 
They are hired to minimise the risk of managers misusing their powers and committing 
fraud. Limiting auditors’ accountability for the very thing they were hired to do eliminates 
a significant incentive to deliver good quality audits.  At the start of an engagement, an 
auditor is aware that the chances of being held accountable for his work are minimal. The 
following section looks at the auditors’ liability to third parties. 
Auditor Liability to Third Parties in UK law 
As far as auditors’ liability to non-clients is concerned, a significant problem arises out 
of the fact that the accounts and auditors’ reports become public documents. A lot of 
people rely on them while carrying out a wide range of transactions. Unrestricted liability 
                                                 
632 Kirschner v KPMG LP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 951 (N.Y.2010).  
633 11 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 541(a) (2006). 
634 Shepard (n 629) p.278. 
635 AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
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on behalf of auditors toward the third parties could theoretically lead to ‘liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class’.636 This thesis 
argues that over the years, the auditors’ liability to third-party claims has gone through 
many stages and has become excessively restricted.  
 
Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] was one of the first cases on tortious liability 
of the accountants in the UK.637 Here, the Court of Appeal decided that liability for a 
careless statement could only materialize if ‘the maker of the statement had a contractual 
or fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff’.638 Denning L.J. dissented and his view then 
paved the way to the change of law that occurred in Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & 
Partners [1963]639, where the imposition of tortious liability, where no contractual 
relationship existed, was established for the first time. 
Here, the House of Lords ruled that a third party relying on negligently prepared financial 
statements could sue the auditor, as long as there was a ‘special relationship’ between 
them. A special relationship was described as more than just a fiduciary contractual 
relationship. Here the voluntary assumption of responsibility on behalf of the defendant 
and reasonable reliance by the plaintiff was necessary. The court described the ‘special 
relationship’ as: 
All those relationships where it is plain that the party seeking information or advice 
was trusting the other to exercise such a degree of care as the circumstances 
required, where it was reasonable for him to do that, and where the other gave the 
                                                 
636 Ultramares Corp. v Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). 
637 Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co., 2 K.B. 164(1951). In this case, the defendants, the accounting firm, 
negligently prepared the accounts of a company knowing that the accounts would be relied on by the 
plaintiff in deciding whether to invest in the business. As a result of accountants’ negligence the plaintiff 
suffered financial loss. 
638 Paula Giliker and Silas Beckwith, Tort (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008), p. 86. 
639 Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners 2 All ER 575(1963). 
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information or advice when he knew or ought to have known that the inquirer was 
relying on him.640 
In 1978 Lord Wilberforce’s decision in Anns v Merton Borough Council [1978] 
introduced a general foreseeability principle for determining, whether a particular person 
was owed a duty of care.641 The foreseeability principle became a substantial litigation 
deterrent to acquiescent auditing as it ‘held out the possibility of further extensions of 
duties of care to other parties, including existing shareholders or investors, who 
foreseeably rely on audited financial statements’.642 A duty of care, hence, could have 
been owed, even if the auditor was not aware that a given third party had been provided 
with the financial statements. 
This approach was then restricted in Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990], where the court 
examined the existing authorities and reformulated the requirements to establish negligent 
misstatement in a way that was much more favourable to auditors than to third parties. 
The House of Lords stated that auditors owe a duty of care to their clients and as a general 
rule this duty does not extend to potential investors. The House also stated that the 
purpose of audited statements is to fulfil the statutory obligation to shareholders as a body, 
not to individual shareholders or stockholders to enable them to monitor managers.643 It 
was made clear that statements are not provided to give potential and existing investors 
information, based on which they could make an investment decision.644 As a rule, 
auditors owe a duty of care to the company.  
 
                                                 
640 See (n 639). 
641 Anns v Merton Borough Council, A.C. 728 (1978). 
642 Kershaw (n 163) p.403. 
643 Ingrid De Poorter, 'Auditor's Liability Towards Third Parties within the EU: A Comparative Study 
between the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium' (2008) 3(1) Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Technology 68, p. 70. 
644 Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2007), pp. 420-425. 
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The House, however, acknowledged that only in exceptional circumstances will auditors 
owe a duty of care to third parties. In order to establish this duty, a third party has to prove 
the existence of a ‘special relationship’ between himself and an auditor. This, in turn, 
requires a claimant to show that the following factors are present. First of all, the audited 
accounts are required for a purpose, which is made known to the auditor. Furthermore, 
the auditor has knowledge that audited accounts will be communicated to the third party 
either specifically or as part of an ascertainable class. Next, the auditor has knowledge 
that the claimant is likely to act upon the audited accounts. Finally, the claimant acts on 
the audited accounts to his detriment.645 Consequently, the mere foreseeability is 
insufficient to establish the duty of care. There is a need to establish sufficient proximity 
between the claimant and the auditor. In the absence of at least one of the four 
requirements, the relationship between the two will not be sufficiently proximate. The 
House also stated that in every case, it must be must be fair, just, and reasonable to impose 
this duty on one party for the benefit of the other.646  
Even if the claimant manages to establish that the auditor owes him a duty of care, he 
then has to establish that the auditor breached the standard of care. If the auditor acted in 
accordance with the standards issued by his professional association, he will be unlikely 
to have breached his duty. Apart from establishing the breach, the claimant also has to 
prove the factual and legal cause of the loss. The detailed rules of causation further 
increase an already burdensome process of seeking damages for negligently conducted 
audit. 
Such a burdensome process is highly unusual in the area of other products. According to 
Cousins, ‘No one can sell a car, breakfast cereal, packet of potato crisps without owing a 
                                                 
645  Roach (n 110)  p. 139. 
646 Caparo Industries v Dickman and others [1990] 1 All ER 568, AC 605 
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duty of care to current or potential customers. Yet the auditing industry is not subjected 
to the same requirements’.647 The evidence shows that law is rather protective towards 
auditors.648 This may weaken the position and credibility of the audit function in society 
and provide low economic incentives to deliver good quality audits.649 On the other hand, 
however, the law needs to protect auditors from frivolous suits, which can lead to another 
Arthur Andersen style collapse and even further concentration of the audit market. The 
balance is intrinsically difficult to achieve. Perhaps the solution could be found in 
ensuring that auditors retain certain regulatory concessions, but at the same time increase 
their focus on the quality of audits. This could bring down the number of lawsuits for 
negligent audits in a more natural manner. This is further developed in chapter six. 
Auditor Liability to Third Parties in US law 
As far as the US is concerned, the scope of an auditor’s duty to non-clients for negligent 
misstatements is a question of state rather than federal or national law. Each state has an 
authority to decide the legal standard determining which third party has a right to sue for 
negligent misrepresentation. Among the states, four standards have evolved establishing 
which non-clients are owed a duty by auditors: privity, near privity, restatement approach, 
and the reasonable foreseeability standard. 
 
Strict privity approach was first established as a legal standard in Landell v Lybrand 
[1919].650 It requires a direct, contractual relationship between an auditor and a third party 
in order for the latter to sue for negligence. This standard has been applied in a small 
                                                 
647 Jim Cousins, Austin Mitchell, Prem Sikka, Hugh Willmott, 'Auditors: Holding the Public to Ransom' 
(1998) Association for Accountancy & Business Affairs, available at 
http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/ransom.PDF p. 2, accessed 6 September 2015. 
648 Cousins (n 647)  p. 2. 
649 R. W. Perks, Accounting and Society (Chapman & Hall, London 1993), p. 55. 
650 Landell v Lybrand 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919). 
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number of the US cases. It is only followed by two states – Virginia and Pennsylvania. 
651 
The near privity standard was applied for the first time in the Ultramares Corp. v Touche, 
Niven & Co [1931].652 When deciding the case, Judge Cardozo argued against allowing 
injured third parties to recover from harm suffered as a result of reliance on a negligent 
audit.653 He feared that it could ‘expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate 
amount, for an indeterminate time, to an indeterminate class’, placing an extreme burden 
of liability on the accounting profession.654 The court denied the plaintiff’s negligence 
claim, but established an exception to the strict privity rule, known as the ‘primary benefit 
rule’. In order to make use of the exception, the plaintiff had to be an intended third party 
beneficiary of the contract between the auditor and the client. The Credit Alliance v 
Arthur Anderson [1985]655 case clarified this approach by setting a three element legal 
test which had to be satisfied by a third party to be within the scope of the auditor’s duty 
for negligent misrepresentation. Firstly, the accountant must have known that financial 
reports were to be used for a particular purpose. Secondly, the known parties were 
intended to rely on these reports. Thirdly, there must have been some conduct linking the 
auditor to the relying party.656 This approach is followed by twelve states.657 
 
                                                 
651 Carl Paccini, Wlliam Hillison, and David Sinason, 'Auditor Liability to Third Parties: An International 
Focus' (2000) 15(8) Managerial Auditing Journal 394, p. 401. 
652 Ultramares Corp. v Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Here, Fred Stern and Co. 
hired Touche to conduct audit of its accounts. Stern was already insolvent at the time of the audit, but it 
used fictitious assets in its statements to conceal its poor financial situation. The careless audit conducted 
by Touche failed to discover the company’s condition. In the meantime, Ultramares Corporation provided 
Stern with a number of loans. When Stern ultimately declared bankruptcy, Ultramares sued Touche for the 
unpaid balance, claiming that Touche’s negligent audit on which it relied caused losses to third parties such 
as Ultramares.  
653 Siciliano (n 87) p. 342. 
654 Ultramares Corp. v Touche, Niven & Co (n 652). 
655 Credit Alliance v Arthur Andersen, 483 N.E.2d 100 N.Y( 1985). 
656 Paccini (n 651)  p. 402. 
657 Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, 
Utah, Wyoming.  
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By the mid-1970s and 1980s the accounting profession faced a litigation crisis. US Courts 
had increasingly adopted expansive liability rules. A broadened notion of responsibility 
was invoked by third parties, who had relied on the negligently prepared statements of 
public accountants. Audit was no longer perceived as a contractual agreement, but rather 
as a product, which if defectively produced, could harm third parties. The most famous 
case involving the audit-as-product analogy was the decision in Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler 
[1983], which established the reasonable foreseeability approach.658 The facts of this case 
are typical of most cases, where injured third parties relying on negligently produced 
audits sue auditors. Here, the public accounting firm had negligently failed to detect 
serious errors in the financial statement of the Giant Stores Corporation. When Giant went 
bankrupt, the third party sued the auditor for losses incurred as a result of reliance on the 
negligent audit. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that while providing the audit, 
the auditor, just like the manufacturer, was ‘impliedly holding out that the product is 
reasonably fit, suitable and safe.’659 It was held that auditors owed their duty to those, 
whom they should reasonably foresee, as receiving and relying on the audited financial 
statements. The duty, however, extended only to those users whose decision was 
influenced by audited statements obtained from the audited entity for a proper business 
purpose. This approach is currently followed only in two states – Mississippi and 
Wisconsin. 
Expanding the liability rule was meant to increase the quality of audits and serve the 
public interest by enhancing audit safety. Public accounting firms, in order to avoid 
financial troubles, could have purchased malpractice insurances passing the cost onto the 
client, and clients’ consumers.660  The predicted effects of the Rosenblum court decision, 
                                                 
658 Rosenblum, Inc. v Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983). 
659 Ibid. 
660 Siciliano (n 87) p. 345.  
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however, failed to materialize. Accountants started withdrawing their services from 
clients in high-risk industries, or businesses in early growth phase, where audit risks were 
usually the highest.661 They also expressly limited in their audit contracts the individuals 
able to rely on their audits.662 As accountants could no longer predict risks in their 
auditing processes the idea of insuring audits, which depends highly on predictability of 
risks, collapsed.663 Instead of managing risks by more careful accounting, public 
accountants avoided risky engagements. Consequently, instead of better quality audits, 
an ‘overly expansive liability rule had the perverse effect of producing less 
information.’664  
This litigation trend was reversed again by the decision of California Supreme Court in 
Bily v Arthur Anderson & Co in [1992].665 The court was unwilling to uphold the broad 
tort liability rule stemming from Rosenblum and expressed doubts that exposing 
accountants to increased liability would actually result in better quality audits. The 
analogy ‘audit-equals-defective product’ was discredited and the court returned in its 
judgement to the approach found in the Restatement of Torts (1977).666 Under the 
Restatement rule, third parties are able to sue a negligent auditor, if they belong to the 
group of foreseen individuals, whom the public accountant would expect to rely on 
audit.667 This test seems to strike the balance between two extreme approaches, the too 
protective privity doctrine adopted in Ultramares and the too open-ended foreseeability 
of harm established in Rosenblum decision.  The Restatement approach ‘…balances the 
                                                 
661 Newton N. Minow, 'Accountants' Liability and the Litigation Explosion' (1984) 158(3) Journal of 
Accountancy 70, p. 80. 
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need to hold public accountants to a standard that accounts for their contemporary role in 
the financial world, with the need to protect them from a liability that unreasonably 
exceeds the bounds of their real undertaking.’668 Most of the states now follow the 
restatement rule.  
Having discussed the auditors’ liability to third parties, this thesis now proceeds to discuss 
further legal limitations of auditors’ liability such as proportionate liability, limited 
liability agreements and introduction of the Limited Liability Partnership form.  This 
thesis argues that these regulatory concessions further reduce the auditors’ accountability. 
At the same time, as was argued at the beginning of this chapter, the incentives to remain 
independent, (such as professional discipline with its lenient sanctions), do not provide a 
sufficient deterrent against auditors’ acquiescing to the managers’ demands. This leaves 
auditors insufficiently incentivised to be objective and to deliver good quality audits. 
Auditor Liability Limitation and Further Issues 
This thesis argues that an auditors’ legal accountability is further diminished by 
introducing proportionate liability and the limited liability agreements. The doctrine of 
joint and several liability led to a significant increase in the tort exposure of auditors. 
Under this doctrine, the injured party could recover the loss from any of the tortfeasors 
liable in respect of the same loss. In a case where misstatements in the company’s 
accounts resulted from the fraud or negligence of someone within the company, and the 
auditors failed to discover wrongdoing, the claimant was then able to recover the whole 
loss from the auditor, rather than from the original wrongdoers. Claimants were then 
encouraged to sue defendants with ‘deep pockets’ for the recovery of the whole loss, even 
                                                 
668 First Florida Bank v Max Mitchel & Co, 558 So.2d 9,15 (1990). 
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though auditors were only partially at fault. This problem was addressed in the US by 
introducing proportionate liability in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995.  
 
In the UK, the Big Four have long argued that proportionate liability should be introduced 
in order to reform the system of joint and several liability in negligence claims against 
them as partnerships. At various stages, the Law Commission, the Government, and the 
Company Law Review Steering Group have all rejected its adoption on the grounds that 
it simply shifted the risk of insolvency from the auditor to the innocent claimant. Audit 
firms, however, were successful in liberalising the prohibition of liability limitation 
agreements, which delimit the audit firm’s contractual and tortious liability to its 
corporate clients.669 
Liability limitation agreements, which permit the auditor and the company to limit the 
amount of a liability arising out of negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust 
in the conduct of audit, were introduced by s.532-538 of the Companies Act 2006. The 
effect of this was to overturn one of the fundamental principles of company law, enshrined 
in legislation for almost eighty years, which precluded the company to relieve the auditor 
from liability for these breaches.670  
The liability limitation agreements are sufficiently open-textured to allow some forms of 
proportionate liability into audit firms and their clients’ contractual relationships. The 
agreements are optional and only limit the liability to the company, not to third parties. It 
is immaterial how Liability Limitation Agreements (LLA) are structured; in particular 
                                                 
669 The campaign of the audit firms to introduce proportionate liability was flawed by the absence of 
convincing empirical evidence on the amount of negligence litigation against the firms. On the contrary, 
there is some evidence, at least in the UK context, that litigation against audit firms remains extremely rare, 
in David Gwilliam, 'Auditor Liability: Law or Myth?' (2004) 20(3) Professional Negligence 172, 78-79. 
670 P.E. Morris, 'Contractual Limitations on the Auditors' Liability: An Uneasy Combination of Law and 
Accounting' (2009) 72(4) Modern Law Review 607, p. 607. 
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they are not confined to fixed sums or formulae.671 The amount to which the agreements 
are limited must be fair and reasonable, though there is no guidance as to what is a 
reasonable amount.672 All of the LLA, however, have to be authorized by the 
shareholders. This constitutes a non-negotiable safeguard, which is supposed to reduce 
the risk of abuse of this contractual form. The duration of the LLA is fixed at one financial 
year and requires annual renewal.673 Transparency is achieved through the requirement 
of attaching the LLA principal terms to the company’s annual accounts or the director’s 
report.  
On one hand, the LLA are sensitive to parties’ contractual autonomy and avoid the 
arbitrary nature of their principal alternative – a fixed statutory cap, which exists in five 
EU member states674 and two Australian states675, as a solution to this increasingly 
perceived international problem. The LLA provisions place the UK in conformity with 
the European Commission Recommendation on the civil liability of statutory auditors.676 
It has been argued that given the insufficient capacity of insurance coverage, liability 
limitation agreements are necessary to protect the large audit firms from being destroyed 
by a major claim. The agreements allow audit firms to face lower risk of liability and 
                                                 
671 Companies Act 2006, s. 535(4).   
672 It would be difficult for the UK government to set monetary thresholds, as risks of conducting audits 
vary across the industries, in Michael Paterson, ‘Reform of the Law on Auditors’ Liability: An Assessment’ 
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consequently be less affected by ‘deep pocket syndrome’, since other parties of joint and 
several liability, such as directors, would also become subject of litigation.677 
On the other hand, proportionate liability and the LLA share the common flaw that in 
case of a breach of contract or negligence claim they prevent the claimant’s full recovery. 
According to Morris, it seems unfair, doctrinally in the context of mandatory professional 
service, but also it raises question, as to why precisely the auditing profession, performing 
important corporate regulatory function on behalf of the State, should be the beneficiary 
of such immunities.678 The auditing profession continues its lobbying on liability reform, 
despite the fact that their claims regarding litigation risks are exaggerated. Also since in 
most cases the duty of care is owed to the company, with its scope shaped by contractual 
definitions of assumed risks, recovery of losses could be effectively prescribed by careful 
drafting of the audit contract. If this can delimit the risks for which audit firms are 
responsible, and the losses are purely economic, it is difficult to see the necessity for the 
LLA.679 
There is also a danger that, if the business relationship between the audit firm and the 
company is too cosy, the LLA could become abusive in the sense of granting audit firms 
excessive liability contracts in return for smaller audit fees or lower quality audits. Even 
though the Big Four have a diversified practice portfolio, statutory audit still generates a 
significant profit.680 Despite various regulatory measures and official commitments to 
quality, the commercial dimension, with its preservation of profits remains particularly 
influential. Reduced audit fees in return for tight LLAs will most definitely decrease audit 
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680 Roach (n 110) p. 142. 
 212 
quality and its value as a form of assurance to key stakeholders and the capital markets.681 
This in turn can lead to the damage of economic and reputational interests of the 
profession. This thesis argues that auditing is not a casual contractual relationship 
between the audit firm and its client. It is an essential ingredient of effective corporate 
governance and performs a public policy function by enhancing investor confidence and 
effective functioning of capital markets.  
Good audits and auditors’ legal accountability is considered to have been further 
endangered through the adoption of the Limited Liability Partnership legal form by the 
biggest accounting firms. This legal structure introduced limited liability for 
professionals, excluded their vicarious liability, and enabled firms to enjoy tax 
concessions associated with partnerships.682 This, in turn, could have contributed to a 
decline in the monitoring function, and maintenance of robust systems of corporate 
governance, alongside the fall in perceived litigation risk. 
As far as the US is concerned, the LLP form was introduced as a result of a lobby on 
behalf of lawyers and accountants, who, during the saving and loan crisis in the 1980s, 
saw for the first time, significant personal risks associated with their business practices.683 
The first LLP legislation was introduced in Texas. By 1995 all other states had enacted 
similar legislation.684 In the UK, the Limited Liability Partnership Act was passed in 2000 
and came into force in 2001. It was enacted as a response to particularly intensive 
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lobbying by Ernst & Young and Price Waterhouse, who were working on similar LLP 
legislation for Channel Islands.685 
 
Even though, in traditional partnerships, there was no explicit duty to monitor one’s peers, 
the fact that partners were vicariously liable for each other’s professional conduct created 
incentives to monitor one another and actively participate in the firm’s affairs and 
management.686 Partners with unlimited liability were eager to sacrifice their time and 
resources to monitoring and risk management, reducing at the same time their potential 
personal liability exposure.687  
The introduction of the LLP eliminated vicarious liability. Accordingly, professionals in 
traditional partnerships providing advice and supervision could resist doing it in an LLP 
in order to avoid potential liability. According to Macey, the conversion from general 
partnership to the LLP created disincentives to monitor.688 Most LLP Acts impose 
personal liability on partners involved in the supervision of others and this eliminates the 
incentive to supervise one’s peers. Why would LLP partner get involved in the firm’s 
affairs and supervision if those actions could expose his personal assets? Is the willingness 
to protect the firm’s reputation and assets sufficient to risk personal liability exposure? 
As the LLP status eliminates vicarious liability and focuses liability on individual 
tortfeasors and supervisors, it seems more likely that senior auditors would be more 
inclined to shirk supervisory responsibilities.689 Vicarious liability is costly for 
professionals as it transfers risks to them and away from clients and investors. In an 
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attempt to minimize these risks, professionals may be inclined to give very careful and 
conservative advice, or even completely refuse it for clients in highly regulated or risky 
industries. This, in turn, can deny access to capital markets to those with new, potentially 
good, but untested ideas.690 
 
The LLP form can also create other problems such as asset insufficiency. This occurs 
when the assets of a firm and tortfeasors are not sufficient to cover the amount necessary 
to satisfy creditors’ claims. Following a large judgement, like in the case of Arthur 
Andersen, partners who are not personally liable can actually seek to dissolve the firm 
and relocate.691 This can also cause a significant injustice to tort victims. If the firm goes 
bankrupt, secured creditors are given priority over tort victims. This leaves tort victims 
with a case against the bankrupt firm and individual tortfeasors, making it virtually 
impossible for them to receive any compensation.692  
Conclusion 
This thesis argues that the combination of legal and organisational changes has led to 
significant legal accountability deficits and the decline of audit quality.693 As a result of 
numerous reforms, it is now very difficult for clients and non-clients to sue auditors for 
negligent audits. Moreover, due to the introduction of proportionate liability in the US 
and limitation liability agreements in the UK, auditors can now decrease the amount of 
compensation that can be owed to those harmed by negligent audits. The introduction of 
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691 Fortney (n 687).  
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the Limited Liability Partnership,694 and the elimination of vicarious liability reduced 
partners’ personal liability and created disincentives to monitor the conduct of other 
partners. This thesis maintains that this apparent success in legislative and political 
spheres has made auditors undeterred and unaccountable and could contribute to poor 
quality audits and irreparable damage to the core economic interests of the accountancy 
profession.  
 
The following sections argue that lack of professional discipline and disregard for the 
public function that audit plays in society cause further accountability deficits. The thesis 
argues that audits should fulfil a public interest role by ensuring integrity and public 
confidence in the market, and by protecting stakeholders from corporate fraud.  
4.2.3.  PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
The effective functioning of capital markets is heavily dependent upon the integrity and 
competence of professional accountants. In theory, professional discipline could act as a 
substitute for private or public enforcement in order to maintain high professional 
standards.695 Its aim is to ensure that auditors are appropriately supervised and qualified, 
and that they fulfil their duties properly. In practice, however, auditors in the current audit 
model are considered to suffer from professional accountability deficits. This issue has 
already been considered earlier in this chapter in the context of deterrents against auditors’ 
acquiescence to managers’ demands, where the procedure and competent bodies 
responsible for disciplining auditors were examined. 
                                                 
694 Alan Dignam, Hicks and Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law (7th edn, OUP 2011), p. 534 
695 Coffee (n 51) p. 156. 
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4.2.4.  SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
This section focuses on auditors’ social accountability, which evolves along two issues, 
namely the subject and the audience of audit reports. As far as the subject of 
accountability is concerned, auditors believe their only responsibility is to provide an 
opinion on whether the financial statements provide a true and fair view of the companies’ 
financial status. Studies on the perception of financial report users on auditors’ 
responsibilities in fraud prevention and detection, however, have found that many 
financial users believe that fraud detection should be the primary audit objective and that 
auditors have a responsibility to detect all irregularities.696 This is frequently described as 
the expectation gap.697 It is a problematic issue in the current auditing model, as it can 
lower auditors’ credibility, earning potential, and reputation. It is also an important issue 
for the public, investors and politicians, as it blurs the issue of auditors’ accountability.698 
As far as the intended audience for auditors’ report is concerned, the Companies Act in 
the UK and securities regulation in the US require that auditors owe their duties to their 
clients – the companies they audit. Auditors, however, are frequently perceived as 
guardians of public interest 699 and agents of social change. 700 Moreover, society expects 
auditors to protect public interest by providing diligent, good quality audits that will help 
preserve the stability of financial markets and prevent future scandals.701 This raises a 
                                                 
696 Gary Monroe and David Woodliff, 'An Empirical Investigation of the Audit Expectation Gap: Australian 
Evidence' (1994) 34(1) Accounting and Finance 47; Marc Epstein and Marshall Geiger, 'Investors Views 
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697 Marianne Ojo, ‘Eliminating the Audit Expectations Gap: Myth or Reality?’ (2006), available at 
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698 Sikka (n 8) pp. 299-300. 
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38, p. 38. 
700 A. J. Berry, T Capps, D. Cooper, P. Fergusson, T. Hopper and E.A. Lowe,' Management Control in an 
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question as to whether the auditors’ sole responsibility should be to their clients, or 
whether they should be accountable to other persons, stakeholders, or even to society at 
large. 
As far as the subject of audit reports is concerned, corporate auditing, in its origins, was 
concerned with investigating improper conduct such as error and fraud in accounting. 
More recently the focus has been on verifying the information contained in annual 
accounts.702 The need for further investigation of the issue of an expectation gap is clear 
from the growing evidence of uncertainty and dissatisfaction about the purpose and 
objective of current auditing practice. 
In the US, concern about the expectation gap is well documented by both professional 
and government enquiries. The Cohen Commission established the existence of the 
expectation gap.703 The Metcalf Committee (1978) concluded that ‘the pattern of conduct 
followed by independent auditors and the scope of services they offer must be re-
examined to determine whether they are compatible with public expectations’.704 In 1986 
the Anderson Committee established, in a section entitled ‘Public Expectation Gap’, that 
‘although significant changes have been made in auditing standards since the issuance of 
the report [the Cohen Commission] to state the auditor’s responsibility in this area more 
positively, public expectations are not fully satisfied by the level of responsibility 
assumed’.705 The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act is an even stronger indication that the 
social usefulness of auditing, as interpreted by practicing auditors, was being called into 
serious question by society. The Act removed from auditors the ability to exclusively 
                                                 
702 Roy Chandler, John Richard Edwards, and Malcolm Anderson, 'Changing Perceptions of the Role of 
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interpret their role in society. This task is currently in the hands of the PCAOB. The Board 
requires the profession to be responsive to the public perception of the assurance that 
society needs and requires from auditing. It remains to be seen whether the Board will be 
effective in this role.706 It is suggested that, so far, the PCAOB has not put sufficient 
emphasis on this task. 
In the UK, the expectation gap problem found expression in press comments and the 
reports of the DTI. In reporting on the investigation into the affairs of Peachey Property 
Corporation Ltd in 1979, the DTI stated, in relation to the functions of auditors: ‘it seems 
to us that many of the criticisms which we have encountered stem from an imperfect 
understanding of the functions of auditors both as laid down by statute and as understood 
by the auditing profession’.707 As a result of the collapse of the Johnson Matthey Bank, a 
working party of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) 
was brought into being in 1985, in order to address the issue of auditors’ responsibilities 
regarding fraud. It resisted, however, any extension of the auditors’ duties, mainly on the 
grounds of cost and practicality. Five years later the profession’s self-regulatory body 
issued guidance on the auditors’ responsibility to detect fraud and other irregularities. It 
stressed managerial responsibility to establish adequate systems of internal control, and 
that auditors should plan the audit to provide a ‘reasonable expectation’ of detecting 
material misstatements. The term ‘reasonable expectation’, however, has not been 
defined. Consequently, the detection of management fraud is neither excluded from the 
audit process (as this would lower expectations to the point that audit would lose its 
value), nor explicitly included, as this would put extra cost for conducting audits.708  
                                                 
706 Carmichael (n 269) p.131. 
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One of the greatest difficulties with the issue of the expectations gap is the problem with 
the very definition of audit. What exactly is it that audits produce?709 According to Power, 
audit is an opinion, which adds credibility and assurance to the financial statements and 
it is usually expressed in statutory terms of a ‘fair and true’ view.710 But this is only an 
opinion and two different auditors presented with the same data could actually produce 
different results. Power claims that the problem with the ‘expectation gap’ lies in the 
obscurity of audit.711 If one was able to give an objective and precise definition of what 
audit is rather than referring to his judgement, the problem of the expectations gap would 
probably not exist. Due to the lack of definition, the whole auditing process requires lots 
of procedural rules, professional codes of ethics, rules on independence, and trust that 
practitioners really do their best.712 According to Power, the existence of the expectation 
gap is advantageous to auditors and significantly contributes to their economic success. 
If there was no expectation gap, the market for audit services would be ‘scrutable’, both 
in terms of its objectives and the production of assurance relating to these objectives.713 
Elimination of the expectation gap is difficult to achieve, not only because of the fact that 
auditors refuse to adopt fraud detection as the primary aim of their practice. It is also 
problematic and opaque as it is difficult to define what audit really is. It is neither an 
assurance nor certification. It remains just an opinion and society has no other option but 
to rely on the judgments of individual auditors. This leaves auditors largely unaccountable 
to the public.  
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Describing the auditor’s function as expressing an opinion on, or lending credibility to 
financial statements, does not, however, identify the social function of auditors or the 
underlying purpose of an audit. Following Flint, the preoccupation of auditors with 
lending credibility to financial statements, and the current emphasis on this function in 
professional statements, is only part of the scope of auditing. It is the ‘conceptual quality 
of the social function which must be understood if the social expectation is to be 
interpreted effectively by audit policy-makers and auditors. The general concept of audit 
and interpretation of its social function do not limit the scope of auditing to accounting 
data and accountability for financial affairs’.714 
This thesis argues that the accounting frauds of the past, such as Enron, and the financial 
crisis of 2008, call for the greater accountability of auditors, and a greater effort in 
preventing accounting failures that have already been put forward by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
and EU legislation. Audit plays an important function in the capital markets and in society 
and it is desirable for auditors to take into account the interests of a wider group of 
stakeholders, such as employees, investors, creditors, or even society at large. A large 
number of people invest in the capital markets through pension funds, hence the role of 
socially responsible investment of corporations is of paramount importance. Auditors 
should operate as an effective monitor of companies’ financial statements because the 
public is entitled to expect diligent audits and effectively operating financial markets, 
where its money is invested.  
The following section focuses on another major problem inherent in the current audit 
arrangement, namely excessive concentration of the audit market. It discusses the impact 
of a highly concentrated audit market on the competition, audit quality, and price. The 
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findings indicate that a high concentration of the audit market can significantly limit the 
number of auditor choices for the large public companies, and can have even more severe 
consequences if one of the Big Four audit firms withdraws from the market. 
4.3.  CONCENTRATION OF THE AUDIT MARKET 
The effect of market structure on the conduct and performance of audit firms has been 
debated for many years.715 Multiple mergers among the leading accounting firms in the 
1990s have led to the Big Five audit firms dominating the large client audit market. 
Concerns have been raised that concentration could reduce competition, leading to an 
increase in the price of audits, and facilitate the possibility of successful collusion 
between the top firms which could then have a negative effect on the companies’ auditor 
choices. Another shock to the financial reporting system arose when Enron failed in 2001. 
This, alongside other scandals, such as WorldCom, led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002, which aimed at restoring confidence in corporate governance. Due to 
the global nature of the capital markets, and similar scandals in Europe716, there have been 
attempts to introduce similar reforms in Europe and elsewhere.717   
As a result of the Enron scandal, Andersen, one of the top five audit firms lost its auditing 
license in the US and ceased business, reducing the number of large audit firms from five 
to four. Most of its former clients switched to other accounting firms. In the UK, Andersen 
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was acquired by Deloitte & Touche. This event further sparked the ongoing debate 
regarding competition, concentration, audit quality, and barriers to entry, which will be 
analysed below.718  This section is important for this thesis, as it argues that excessive 
concentration of the audit market and significant barriers to market entry for mid-tier 
audit firms are one of the most dominant problems intrinsic in the existing auditing 
arrangements.719 The thesis argues that in order to encourage competition and improve 
the quality of audits in the biggest companies, a public regulatory body should be 
responsible for the appointment of auditors. Such a body could assign audits, not only to 
the auditors of its in-house practice, but also to the existing first-tier and mid-tier audit 
firms, which would increase the choice of auditors for public companies.  
The purpose of measuring the concentration level of the market is to determine whether 
a merged company has an excessive market power, and to predict the extent of the 
departure of price from the competitive level. 720 Excessive concentration, not only is 
undesirable on competitive grounds, it could also allow a merged firm to exercise an 
excessive degree of influence over the standards and practices of the entire accounting 
profession.721  
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Notwithstanding numerous sampling differences, most academic and professional studies 
on the concentration of the audit market show that the general trend over time is one of 
increasing concentration among the largest accounting firms.722 The overall audit market, 
both in the UK and the US, represents a tight oligopoly723, which is a concentrated market 
in which a small number of firms have significant market share and can potentially use 
their market power, either unilaterally or through collusion, to influence price or business 
practices to their advantage.724 For example, firms with significant market power can 
potentially reduce the quality of their products or decrease the amount of services they 
provide as lack of competitive alternatives could limit their clients to obtain these services 
elsewhere. Additionally, dominant firms may experience less pressure to introduce 
innovative products and services. They can also engage in coordinated actions harming 
their clients, for instance by influencing the development of standards that would raise 
costs for the clients. The presence of a high concentration, however, does not necessarily 
mean that the anticompetitive behaviour will take place. Oligopoly might well be 
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characterized by intense competition, competitive prices, good quality and innovative 
products.725 
Concentrated markets can at times be beneficial, and can form for natural reasons. There 
were many factors which contributed to the increasing concentration of the audit market 
in the 1980s and 1990s. The global expansion of the US corporations necessitated the 
increased global reach of accounting firms. As public companies developed more 
complex operations and financial transactions, such as the use of derivatives and other 
financial instruments, accounting firms were compelled to extend industry specific and 
technical expertise. They also modernised their operations, increased staff numbers, and 
spread risks over a bigger capital base.726 This enabled them to work globally, and to meet 
the demands of their multinational clients.727 
Increased market concentration also does not necessarily decrease competition.728 The 
US GAO recent studies found no empirical evidence to support the statement that 
competition in the US audit market has been impaired729, similar to the earlier studies of 
Dopuch and Simunic730 and Eichenseher and Danos731. According to these studies, 
current levels of concentration are not significantly affecting audit prices and audit 
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quality. Although audit fees have generally increased over the years, other factors such 
as changes in regulation and accounting rules, appear to explain recent fee increases. 
Also, the UK Competition Commission report found that both the average and median 
total audit fees increased over the period 2001 to 2010, by 23 and 52 per cent 
respectively.732 The Commission, however, was not able to reach conclusions as to 
whether prices of audits were above the competitive level. The Report was also 
inconclusive with regards to the impact of concentration on audit quality, due to the 
difficulty in identifying an objective metric which would allow meaningful comparisons 
between  audits.733 
Despite the fact that continuing concentration in the market for large public companies 
does not appear to have significantly affected audit fees, it does limit these companies’ 
auditor choices.734 Most of the large public companies are not likely to use a midsize or 
small audit firm. In explaining their position, they usually cite the Big Four’s ability to 
handle big and complex client operations, their technical capability with accounting 
principles and auditing standards and industry specialisation and expertise.735 The need 
to comply with auditor independence standards, and other factors, can further limit the 
auditor choices available to large public companies. As required by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act public companies are prohibited from obtaining audits from firms that simultaneously 
provide them with certain non-audit services, such as bookkeeping, valuation services, or 
internal audit outsourcing services.736 If a large public company uses one of the Big Four 
audit firms for non-audit services, this can potentially further reduce the number of its 
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auditor choices.737 Also, companies are sometimes not willing to use their competitor’s 
auditor, which restricts their auditor choice as well. Finally, in certain sectors such as 
banking and insurance, concentration is even higher, and choice even more limited. In the 
UK, only three out of the Big Four firms have any significant presence in these FTSE 350 
sectors.738 The dominance of one or two Big Four auditors in a significant number of 
sectors may be troublesome for companies requiring an industry-specialist auditor. It is 
suggested that these companies’ choice would be significantly restricted, especially if 
they did not want to engage the auditor of a competitor.739 
Even though larger companies have more technical and complex requirements for 
auditing, it does not necessarily mean that mid-tier firms would not be able to satisfy these 
demands. According to the OXERA survey, numerous public companies considered that 
a mid-tier firm would be technically capable of providing their company’s audits. Also 
mid-tier firms responded that they should be considered as capable of auditing many 
FTSE 250 and FTSE 100 companies.740 Accordingly, the high and stable market share of 
the Big Four is not derived mainly from their ability to provide the technical audit product, 
but from the existence of barriers to entry to the large company audit market. 
Many mid-tier and smaller firms have introduced certain changes in order to expand their 
share in the audit market. Some of them extended their practices into niches that enabled 
them to use their expertise rather than branch out into new industries. This, in turn, 
enabled them to build their reputations in specialised areas and to grow incrementally. 
Others expanded, through a series of mergers and acquisitions, building on new industry 
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expertise and extending their geographic reach. While these practices have helped smaller 
firms to extend and improve their operations, some of the barriers are likely to remain, 
especially in the market for large companies’ audits, as small and mid-tier firms are still 
much smaller and have less expertise than their larger competitors.  
Several proposals have been offered to reduce the risk of further concentration, and 
address the expansion challenges faced by mid-tier and smaller accounting firms. The 
proposals included, among others, mandatory audit firm rotation, audit firm financial 
statement disclosure, and dividing up the largest accounting firms. 
As far as mandatory audit firm rotation is concerned, some sources have suggested that 
by periodically bringing in a new auditor, it would enhance auditors’ independence, and 
reduce concentration, as it would provide more opportunities for mid-tier and small 
accounting firms to compete to provide audit to public companies.741 This option was 
criticised on the basis that it would not increase the number of viable competitors and 
large companies would likely just rotate to another one of the largest audit firms. It was 
also considered to be a costly option, due to the higher marketing and support costs for 
assisting a new accountancy firm in understanding a company’s operations, auditing 
practices, and systems.742 
Another option that has been suggested would require auditors to provide financial 
information, such as their revenues and profits that, could be used to assess the 
competitiveness of audit fee levels. The idea behind this is to increase transparency and 
help regulators ascertain whether firms are charging prices above the competitive level. 
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It is unclear, however, whether this approach would bring desired effects. In some 
jurisdictions, e.g. the UK, audit firms are required to file information on fees charged for 
audits, and other services, in a consolidated form. This is of limited usefulness in 
assessing the economics of the firm’s audit services. Furthermore, regulators already have 
the authority to request appropriate financial information from accounting firms, if 
necessary. Therefore, this proposal is unlikely to have any direct effect on market 
competition.743 
Finally, another suggestion to decrease concentration is based on the idea of dividing up 
the largest firms into smaller ones. If one or more of the Big Four accounting firms could 
spin off a large portion of their operations and create additional firms, this could at least 
temporarily decrease concentration and mitigate the potential negative consequences of 
one of the big firms’ failure. Numerous market participants, however, expressed concerns 
about this option. Some of them pointed out that division of firms could be very costly 
and could diminish the economies of scale, and depth of expertise of the large accounting 
firms. This, in turn, could lead to higher costs and lower quality of audits performed.744 
It is surprising that despite the fact that the audit market is highly concentrated, and there 
are significant barriers to entry for small and mid-size companies, the US authorities 
found no compelling need to take any action. According to the GAO report, there is 
limited evidence that the current concentration of the audit market has created any adverse 
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impact. Also, the proposals addressing concentration risk and challenges facing smaller 
firms were considered of limited effectiveness, feasibility, and benefit.745  
In the UK, the 2013 report by the Competition Commission has confirmed that 
competition in the audit market is restricted due to factors that inhibit companies from 
switching auditors, and by the incentives that auditors have to focus on satisfying 
management rather than shareholder needs.746 Unfortunately, the suggested solutions that 
the Competition Commission set out in response to these findings do not go far enough 
to fix the audit market. The main measure, proposed by the Competition Commission, is 
the requirement that FTSE 350 companies must put their statutory audit engagement out 
to tender at least every ten years.747 This is in line with the recent EU legislation regarding 
the reform of the audit market, which requires all EU public interest entities to rotate their 
statutory auditors after a maximum period of tenure. The maximum period was set at 
twenty years in the UK, with a mandatory tender at the ten year midpoint.748 This differs 
from the guidance introduced in 2012 by the Financial Reporting Council, which 
encouraged companies to go to tender on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. It is also different 
from the earlier draft recommendation of the Commission that would have forced 
companies to re-tender their audits every five years. Furthermore, the Commission 
recommended that the FRC’s Audit Quality Review should review every FTSE 350 audit 
engagement every five years. The Competition Commission also prohibited the use of the 
‘Big Four only’ clause agreements, though it allowed parties to require that any auditor 
should satisfy objective criteria. It also suggested that an advisory vote should be 
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introduced on the audit committee report, which should further encourage shareholder 
involvement. 
Admittedly, whilst there are costs of going out to tender more frequently, they do not 
outweigh the benefits of the more competitive market in which shareholders can have 
increased trust. It is also difficult to see how the ten year tendering periods will ensure 
that companies make regular and well informed assessments of whether their auditor is 
competitive, or how it will open up more opportunities for other firms to compete. The 
proposal to empower shareholders to control audits also leaves much to be desired. At 
major banks, such as Barclays, shareholders provide less than 5 per cent of the capital and 
hence they are not the main owners or risk-bearers. The average duration of their 
shareholding is approximately three months. It is therefore impossible to talk about their 
long-term interest in supervising auditors and exerting pressures for improving audit 
quality.749 The actions taken by the Competition Commission are disappointing and 
constitute a missed opportunity to give the largest listed companies in the audit market 
the shake-up they badly need.750 
In the UK and the US, the largest companies are required by law to have their financial 
statement audited by independent auditors. The demand for audit assurance services is 
therefore inelastic, but the supply of audit firms is restricted due to significant barriers to 
entry.751 In market economies, competition, consumer pressure and threats of liability are 
the usual drivers for improvement of standards, but they are very weak in the audit market. 
The high concentration ratio in the audit of large companies can have severe implications 
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if one of the Big Four firms withdraws from the market. The authorities in the UK and 
the US, however, decided that very little action was needed to deal with the concentration 
issue. This thesis recommends that the public regulatory body should be directly involved 
in the appointment of auditors, which would help alleviate the concentration problem. 
The proposal is discussed further in chapter six.  
4.4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The previous chapter provided an analysis of a regulatory framework for auditing. It 
answered the following questions of why, how and by whom audit is regulated. This 
chapter built on the discussion and provided a further analysis of the regulatory status quo 
by focusing on some of the most egregious issues that the auditing profession is faced 
with, such as independence and accountability deficits, and excessive concentration of 
the audit market. It argued that despite numerous regulatory reforms in the sphere of audit, 
enacted particularly in response to the Enron scandal, the auditing model remains 
fundamentally flawed and unfit for purpose.  
As far as auditors’ independence is concerned, the evidence shows that auditors have very 
strong incentives to acquiesce to management demands and compromise their 
independence. Auditors have conflict of interest at the heart of their business – they are 
hired and paid by the companies they are supposed to assess objectively. This ties them 
to these companies and pushes them away from protecting investors, and the public. 
Auditors are also allowed to have business relationships with their clients, which can 
further diminish their independence.752 In order to address investors’ concerns, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the PCAOB to regulate and oversee audit firms. It also 
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Goodwork Project Report Series, Number 35, available at http://thegoodproject.org/pdf/35-Compromised-
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introduced a restriction on the scope of non-audit services an auditor can provide to his 
client, the mandatory rotation of audit partners, and a one year cooling-off period between 
acting as an auditor and being hired as an audit client. In the UK the provision of non-
audit services still remains the auditor’s self-assessment.753 This thesis argues that 
regulatory responses to independence issues are insufficient. They do not go far enough 
to secure the dual conception of independence - the independence in fact, and 
independence in appearance. 
This thesis argued that auditors’ lack of accountability in the current model should be 
examined from the legal, professional, and social perspective. Lack of legal 
accountability is the result of numerous regulatory arrangements that make the oversight 
of the audit profession and their work ineffective. The first line of defence against bad 
audits – litigation, which could theoretically act as a deterrent to acquiescent auditing, is 
of little use as clients and non-clients are hardly ever successful in suing auditors for 
negligent audits.  From the mid-1980s, a trend emerged towards a more narrow scope of 
duty to non-clients. This signalled a change in state public policy decisions which 
transferred risk away from accountants and onto financial statement users. The evidence 
shows that law enhances an already comfortable situation for auditors and by not taking 
into account the interests of stakeholders, it endangers the public interest. 
The proportionate liability and Liability Limitation Agreements effectively minimised the 
potential litigation risk and reputation losses, creating at the same time another layer of 
protection for auditors. This, in turn, unveiled the imbalance between the parties’ 
interests, with the strong and secure position of the auditor and a potentially insufficiently 
compensated client. This conclusion is particularly striking, since auditors perform their 
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duties in the public interest, and on behalf of the State and there is no reason why they 
should be the beneficiaries of such immunities. 
The accounting firms’ rush in the 1990s to reorganise themselves into the LLP forms 
diminished their accountability even further. This prompts the following questions – 
would the Andersen collapse have happened if Andersen were a traditional partnership? 
Would Andersen partners have elected to carry higher levels of insurance if they were 
exposed to vicarious liability? Would Andersen partners, facing vicarious liability, have 
questioned Enron accounting techniques instead of taking $52 million in revenue from 
Enron? The evidence suggests that limited liability creates a moral hazard as it increases 
the chances that there will be insufficient assets to pay creditors’ claims, this allows  
partners ‘to reap the benefits of risky activities but do not bear all of the costs’.754 As audit 
partners in LLPs are shielded from personal liability, it is less risky for them to engage in 
the questionable accounting practices of the management. The introduction of the LLP 
form also caused disincentive among audit partners to monitor their peers. All of that 
should spur firms to evaluate carefully the advisability of operating as LLPs. 
As legal incentives are eroding, and market incentives are inadequate to motivate 
gatekeepers, other options, such as a stronger system of self-regulation and disciplinary 
enforcement should work as a supplementary form of deterrence. The evidence shows, 
however, that sanctions administered as a result of disciplinary proceedings to audit firms 
and specific individuals are lenient. Also reputational penalties fail to motivate and 
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discipline auditors.755 With these problems inherent in the audit model, earnings 
management continue to be a pervasive phenomenon.756 
Despite playing an important role in securing integrity and public confidence in the 
market, the accounting profession remains largely unaccountable to society. Over the 
years auditors successfully resisted making the responsibility to detect fraud one of its 
main goals. Even though fraud has increased considerably over recent decades and is 
likely to continue, the auditing profession claims that the responsibility of fraud detection 
rests with management, stressing the need for implementation of internal control systems.  
This chapter also argued that excessive concentration of the audit market is another 
problem intrinsic in the current model. Even though the evidence shows that the 
competition in the auditing markets in the UK and US is not impaired, the findings of the 
chapter point out that excessive concentration limits the choice of auditors for public 
companies. The thesis puts forward several proposals that could reduce the risk of further 
concentration, such as mandatory audit firm rotation, enhanced disclosure of auditors’ 
financial statements, and dividing up the largest accounting firms. None of them, 
however, is guaranteed to address the expansion challenges faced by mid-tier and smaller 
accounting firms. The thesis will argue in chapter six that establishing a state-backed 
autonomous agency responsible for the appointment of auditors could help alleviate the 
problem of excessive concentration and spark competition among the big and mid-tier 
audit firms. 
In conclusion, this chapter argued that the post-Enron and the financial crisis of 2008, 
reforms of the regulatory frameworks of auditing failed to deal effectively with the 
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problems inherent in the current audit arrangement. It seems that a more significant 
overhaul of the auditing system is necessary in order to rectify the flaws present in the 
current model. The next chapter will look at alternative theoretical, practical, and 
international audit models. It will contribute to the debate on possible solutions to the 
contentious issues discussed above, such as lack of auditors’ independence, 
accountability deficits, and excessive concentration of the audit market. This in turn will 




CHAPTER 5. AUDIT MODELS 
So far this thesis has analysed the regulatory and structural changes that affected the 
auditing profession from the 1950s onwards. This was followed by an analysis of the 
theoretical underpinnings of audit in chapter two, where it was argued that the auditing 
practice developed without a comprehensive theoretical grounding. This contributed to 
the fact that the regulation of audit is reactionary and usually takes place in the aftermath 
of a crisis. The thesis then examined the regulatory framework of auditing in chapters 
three and four. There it was argued that there are many flaws associated with the current 
auditing model. The thesis remained focused on the three most egregious problems, such 
as lack of auditors’ independence, accountability deficits, and excessive concentration of 
the audit market. The evidence revealed that despite numerous regulatory changes 
enacted in the aftermath of the Enron scandal and the financial crisis 2008, which 
attempted to fix these problems, the auditing model remains flawed and unfit for purpose. 
The aim of this chapter is to review models for the regulation of audit that have already 
been proposed in auditing literature, and to consider the appropriateness of these models 
to improve the regulation of financial audit in the UK and the US. This chapter is 
important for the thesis as it initiates a discussion on the potential solutions to flaws 
intrinsic in the current audit model. It also provides a grounding for chapter six, which 
presents a proposal for a new audit model. 
This chapter starts with the analysis of the models that favour pro-regulatory approaches, 
which are in turn divided into micro and macro options.757 Micro models presuppose that 
a greater level of monitoring and control of the audit process can be ensured at the level 
of the individual company, hence they assume active involvement of the existing 
                                                 
757 The terms ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ models were used by Hatherly; in  David Hatherly, 'The Case for the 
Shareholder Panel in the UK' (1995) 4(3) The European Accounting Review 535,  p. 540. 
 237 
company’s organs. They attempt to create new legal and institutional relationships that 
would decrease management power and restore it to the shareholders using organs within 
the company. Macro models, on the other hand, assume that the accountability of 
management cannot be effectively restored to the shareholders, and therefore the state 
must be charged with this task.758 These models place audit control in the hands of the 
state through the establishment of the state agency or through broadly based private-sector 
models with statutory backing.759 This chapter then turns to analyse the Financial 
Statement Insurance (FSI) model, which leaves the operation of audit in the hands of the 
market.760  This is followed by a discussion of practical, country-specific models of 
Germany, Italy, Japan, and France. The final section discusses the implications of the 
proposed models for current audit arrangements in the UK and the US. 
5.1.  MICRO OPTIONS 
The aim of micro models is to ensure better monitoring and control of the audit process 
within individual companies. Therefore, the central role is played by one of the existing 
organs within a company. The purpose of this arrangement is to decrease excessive 
managerial power. In micro models, each panel is entrusted with the responsibility to 
appoint auditors to a company. The following part of the thesis describes the examples of 
micro models, such as the audit committee, the shareholder panel, and the stakeholder 
panel models. An audit committee model is centred on the role and responsibilities of the 
audit committee, which decides on the appointment and remuneration of auditors. The 
shareholder panel has been suggested as a more direct way to enhance the accountability 
of auditors to shareholders. The panel would be controlled by shareholders, and apart 
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from deciding on appointment and remuneration of auditors, it could also determine 
issues such as the scope of audit and the provision of consulting services. A stakeholder 
panel is an expansion of a shareholder model, whereby auditors owe a duty of care not 
only to shareholders, but also to stakeholders with a direct economic interest, such as 
creditors and employees and even potential investors and their advisors. This thesis will 
now to discuss an audit committee panel.761 
5.1.1.  AUDIT COMMITTEE PANEL 
Despite their long history, audit committees only recently became an important 
constituency in the governance of companies. Birkett suggests that the SEC 
recommended the establishment of audit committees in 1940, but they only became 
mandatory in 1977 as a result of the New York Stock Exchange’s decision that all listed 
companies were required to institute audit committees.762 In the UK, institutions such as 
Pro Ned were advancing a more important role for non-executive directors in the 1980s. 
According to Spira, Pro Ned’s role was to ‘to sell the virtues of having more and better 
non-executive directors … [and its] second task was to provide an additional source of 
names’.763  It was the 1992 Cadbury Report that encouraged companies to establish audit 
committees. 
The audit committee is one of the committees of the board and is composed of non-
executive directors. It is charged, among other things, with making recommendations to 
the board on the appointment and remuneration of auditors. As a committee of the board, 
it is accountable to the board. It is also responsible for ensuring that the board properly 
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discharges its reporting responsibilities.764 It has been suggested in the literature that audit 
committee’s constitutional position and composition makes it ‘an appropriate body to 
influence the appointment and remuneration of auditors, if the role of the auditor is to 
report to directors.’765 This is, however, not the current statutory role of the external 
auditor. Since the auditor is statutorily accountable to the shareholders, the audit 
committee as a solution to secure auditors’ independence and their accountability to the 
members is ‘both conceptually unsound and practically difficult’.766 
There are several reasons why audit committees are not a good solution to corporate 
governance problems and why they might be ineffective. First of all, the existence of the 
audit committee as a sub-committee of the board does not solve the underlying conflict 
of interest caused by the fact that auditors are hired and paid by the companies for whom 
they are supposed to provide an independent and objective financial assessment of their 
financial statements. The only effective way of solving this problem is to place the 
appointment and remuneration of auditors in the hands of an external body, unrelated to 
the company. 
Secondly, according to Hatherly the concept of an audit committee evolved around the 
idea that non-executives participate in corporate governance by scrutinizing the actions 
of executives. As governance is considered to be a ‘hierarchical’ concept, executive 
directors should be in a more formal accountability relationship with non-executives.767 
Sheridan and Kendall suggest that this works effectively in countries with dual board, 
where the management board is accountable to the supervisory board.768 In the UK and 
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the US, however, executives and non-executives are not in a hierarchical relationship due 
to the unitary board arrangements. 
A further consequence of this is the fact that in the UK and the US non-executives are 
involved in strategic decision-making of the company. Consequently, as far as strategic 
decisions are implicated in financial statements, non-executives cannot be impartial 
towards accounting outcomes. It is possible that an audit committee will not aid the 
independence of auditors from shareholders, even if non-executives act in an effective 
and diligent way. 
Furthermore, numerous non-executive directors fulfil executive functions in other major 
companies. This can equip them with the ‘executive mind set’, and as non-executives they 
should remain independent. Consequently, auditors may become careful not to upset a 
non-executive director holding an executive role elsewhere, as this can diminish an 
auditor’s chances of gaining audit engagements in these companies. This, in turn, can 
deter the auditor from going against the wishes of the audit committee, and therefore 
impact upon his independence.769 These practical problems prove that audit committees 
are not the best means of  auditors’ independence and accountability to shareholders.  
It has been argued that non-executive directors contributed to the financial crisis 2008 by 
failing to challenge the management of numerous top banks.770 They failed to raise 
questions on perverse compensation incentive systems of executives commonly 
associated with the failure of the banks. The reward system in place induced senior 
executives to pursue highly lucrative but equally highly risky financial strategies, which 
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contributed to systemic risks. According to the UK Treasury Committee, the excessive 
use of huge debts frequently disguised as ‘off-balance sheet financing’ was hardly ever 
challenged by external directors.771 Many non-executives also had limited time dedicated 
to their roles and many lacked sufficient knowledge, skills and expertise to challenge the 
use of complex and opaque financial products, which were used by many of the failed 
banks.772 For these reasons an audit committee composed of non-executive directors may 
not be best suited to improve the functioning of audits. The following section looks at the 
shareholder model. 
5.1.2.  SHAREHOLDER PANEL 
The shareholder panel has been suggested as a more direct way in which to increase 
auditors’ accountability to shareholders.773 The panel is an alternative to the audit 
committee and would be fully controlled by shareholders, not directors. The panel’s main 
task would be the appointment and remuneration of auditors. It might also consider 
matters such as the scope of audit, and provision of consulting services. In order to 
maintain independence, panellists could not be directors of the company nor have any 
connections with the auditors. At least one panellist should have audit experience. The 
panel would not adjudicate in board-auditor disputes. It would be the panel’s 
responsibility to ensure that the auditor was in a position to provide an independent audit 
opinion to shareholders. The opinion itself would be the auditors’ opinion, not the 
panellists’, thus its role would be only facilitative.774  
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The advantage of the shareholder panel is that it involves shareholders in the auditing 
framework, increasing representative democracy.775 It would represent shareholders in a 
similar way as the board of directors, but only for the specific purpose of appointing and 
deciding on auditors’ remuneration. This arrangement, however, has several flaws. To 
begin with, it would be difficult to decide how to choose the panellist in order to provide 
equal representation of various shareholders. Considering the dispersed ownership in the 
UK and the US, this could become very problematic in practice. Furthermore, questions 
should be raised as to the right set of skills that shareholders would bring. As the previous 
section argued, it would be desirable for the panellists to have sufficient financial 
expertise and industry-specific experience, especially if they are to decide not only on the 
appointment and remuneration of auditors, but also on the scope of audit. It might be 
difficult to find a number of shareholders who could fulfil these requirements.  
This model also fails to deal with a conflict of interest similar to the one that exists in the 
current auditing arrangements. A shareholder panel would not alleviate the ‘mother of all 
conflicts’, which arises when an audited company choses its own auditor and pays audit 
fees. This could only be achieved by having an independent and external body responsible 
for the appointment and remuneration of auditors, which thesis suggests in chapter six. 
Moreover, a shareholder panel would operate through shareholders, and for the benefit of 
shareholders. It does not envisage any involvement of stakeholders, which also 
contradicts the main argument of this thesis that audits should be conducted for the benefit 
of multiple stakeholders. The following section examines the idea of a stakeholder panel.
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5.1.3.  STAKEHOLDER PANEL 
The stakeholder panel model is an extension of the concept of a shareholder panel, 
providing an opportunity for a wider stakeholder involvement. Under this regime, the 
auditors have a duty not only to shareholders, but also to multiple stakeholders. Here, the 
concept of stakeholders covers those with a direct economic interest in the company such 
as creditors or employees, and the tertiary stakeholders such as potential investors and 
their advisors: brokers, underwriters, lawyers, members of the public.776 The importance 
of including company stakeholders in corporate activities has been extensively discussed. 
Some authors give the examples of Germany and Japan, where close relationships 
between a company and its stakeholders has been the key to corporate success.777  
 
If corporate governance was to shift towards the stakeholder oriented model, it could have 
significant implications for the audit framework. It would no longer be sufficient to check 
for compliance with the codes of conduct. Audit could potentially involve the assessment 
of the quality of relationships between particular stakeholders and the suitability of these 
relationships to the company’s objectives. 
One of the problems associated with this model lies in the identification of the 
stakeholders, as multiple business participants have different importance in different 
business cultures. Following the Japanese example, the most important stakeholders can 
be found among the customers and suppliers who provide the most valuable services to 
the company. In Germany, on the other hand, the core stakeholders are employees. The 
issue of identifying stakeholders raises many questions. For instance, should overseas 
plants, suppliers and outsourced workers who are non-strategic and non-core be treated 
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as stakeholders as well? It would be controversial to establish a definite range of 
stakeholders who could participate on the panel without creating an underprivileged 
class.778 
A stakeholder panel model can also be characterised by the same problems as a potential 
lack of skills and expertise among the members of the panel. It also does not solve the 
conflict of interest arising from the fact that a company chooses and pays an auditor whose 
duty is to provide an independent opinion on a company’s financial health. This conflict 
of interest would not be solved without placing the duty of appointing and remunerating 
auditors in the hands of an external agency. This is suggested in some of the macro 
models, which are discussed in the following section. In macro models, an external 
institution – or regulatory agency, is created in order to provide greater monitoring and 
control of the audit function.  
5.2.  MACRO MODELS 
One of the key assumptions behind the macro models is that the regulation of auditing 
and auditors should be taken away from the accounting profession and placed in the hands 
of the state, either through the establishment of a state-backed agency or through broadly-
based private-sector regulation with statutory backing. The main examples of the macro 
models are the Audit Commission model, Stock Exchange Panel, and Listed Companies 
Audit Board. 
5.2.1.  AUDIT COMMISSION 
Audit Commission, as one of the examples of macro models of audit regulation, is based 
on the former government-appointed Audit Commission for England and Wales, which 
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had an overall responsibility for the audit of local authorities. It has been discussed in the 
literature that a similar body could be established in order to control the appointment and 
remuneration of auditors of listed companies.779 The most significant characteristic of this 
model is that it stresses the need to place corporate audits under public control, as audits 
should be conducted either in the public interest or in the interests of companies’ wide 
group of stakeholders.  
 
The structure of the Audit Commission for England and Wales was that of a government 
body, funded by a national government.780 Ideally, if this structure was to be adopted for 
a new audit model, the Commission would have to be independent from government and 
not funded by it. The principal functions of the Audit Commission, as stated in the 1982 
Act, consist of: 
• the appointment of auditors, who may be employed by the Commission or in private 
practice, 
• the preparation and review of a Code of Audit Practice, 
• the undertaking of studies designed to improve the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of local authority services, 
• reporting on the impact on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the 
statutory provisions and ministerial directions and guidance.781 
Additionally in the proposed model, the Commission could also be in charge of setting 
auditing standards and the regulation of audit, which could potentially include quality 
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monitoring and disciplinary actions.782 Importantly, auditors working for the Audit 
Commission for England and Wales were independent of the Commission, which had no 
authority to intervene into how audits were performed. Nevertheless the Commission had 
certain influence over the audit process, through, for example, monitoring of compliance 
with the Code of Audit Practice or reappointment of auditors. 
Hatherly argues that it is uncontroversial that the public sector audit model is suitable for 
the audit of public sector institutions under public ownership operating in the public 
interest. The element of public interest in the activities of listed companies, however, is 
different. Applying the public sector audit model to listed companies could imply that an 
auditor should nevertheless report on the company’s activities in the public interest. 
According to Hatherly:  
Such a public interest is incongruous and most probably ineffective if there is no 
necessity for directors to be accountable other than to shareholders, and hence there 
is no mechanism for the public interest to influence the directors, other than perhaps 
through the auditors themselves. If an auditor were successful in pressing directors 
on behalf of the public interest the auditor might be implicated in corporate decision 
taking and audit independence compromised. 783  
This thesis suggests that audits should be performed with a view of having public interest 
in mind. Audits play a vital role in serving public interest by reinforcing trust and 
confidence in financial reporting. Audited financial information is widely available and 
it generates public interest. Even though auditors carrying out audits are accountable only 
to the company, there are other stakeholders who believe that an independent audit 
provides some means of ensuring that the company’s responsibilities to them are being 
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met and that in effect it serves their interests as well.784 These stakeholders such as 
employees and creditors expect that auditors should be independent of shareholders. The 
varying expectations of multiple stakeholders impact on varying demands for 
improvements in audit quality. This thesis argues in chapter six that the needs of these 
stakeholders should be met, and that audits should be extended to include core financial 
information important for key stakeholders, such as employees and creditors. This is 
because audit is seen as public goods and stakeholders should be able to make use of it. 
The following section examines a stock exchange panel as another example of a macro-
model.  
5.2.2.  A STOCK EXCHANGE PANEL 
A Stock Exchange Panel might be an alternative to the individual shareholder panels for 
each listed company. This model suggests creating a single panel by the Stock Exchange 
to initiate the appointment and remuneration of auditors for listed companies.785 
According to Hatherly, all listed companies could be regulated by a single panel of the 
Exchange, through incorporation of audit regulation requirements into the listing 
requirements. The panel would consist of those institutional investors, who do not have 
any strong commitments in any particular company. The whole purpose of the panel 
would be to facilitate independent company reporting by auditors on behalf of the market 
as a whole. 786 
The Stock Exchange panel model, however, is not free from controversies. First of all, it 
creates an imbalance in the auditing market place, as a single panel would become a 
monopoly purchaser for listed companies’ audits.787 Furthermore, it assumes that auditors 
                                                 
784 ICAEW (n 36) p. 11. 
785 Dewing (n 758) p. 274. 
786 Hatherly (n 757) pp.543-544.  
787 Hatherly (n 757) pp.543-544.  
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should be accountable to the market as a whole. At present auditors are accountable only 
to the company they audit. Making auditors accountable to the market would require a 
significant change in their duties and the scope of audit.  
5.2.3.  LISTED COMPANIES’ AUDIT BOARD   
The idea of the Listed Companies Audit Board (LCAB) was suggested by Dewing and 
Russell, who argue that there is a strong case for the establishment of an independent 
regulatory body for the audits of listed companies.788 They argue that an independent 
body should be established in order to match the main components of the audit 
expectations gap, namely independence, monitoring, and discipline. The LCAB should, 
therefore, be structured into three panels of responsibility: an Auditor Independence 
Panel, an Audit Quality Panel, and a Disciplinary Panel. The exact constitution of the 
Board, and whether it should be a public or a private body is open to debate. 
The main task of the Independence Panel would be to establish and monitor independence 
standards and guidelines, for instance, by restricting the provision of non-audit services 
in whole or in part. The role of the Audit Quality Panel would be to set up a register of 
auditors recognised by the Panel as capable of conducting audits of listed companies. It 
would also be in charge of monitoring the quality of audit work by investigating all cases 
of listed company failures, and firms involved in litigation connected with the audit of 
listed companies. A Disciplinary Panel would be charged with investigating all the cases 
referred to it by the other two panels.789 
                                                 
788 Ian Dewing and Peter Russell, Stakeholder Perceptions on an Independent Regulatory Body for Listed 
Company Audit in the UK (ICAEW, Centre for Business Performance, London 2001), pp. 95-99. 
789 Ian Dewing and Peter Russell, 'The New Accountancy Foundation: A Credible Form of Regulation for 
UK Listed Company Audit?' (2002) 6(3) International Journal of Auditing 231, p. 239. 
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The LCAB model is an interesting proposal, as it aims at eliminating the expectations 
gap, which is one of the biggest problems inherent in the current audit arrangements. It 
does not, however, provide any solutions to the conflict of interest arising from the fact 
that auditors are paid by the companies they are supposed to assess objectively. It seems 
that unless that changes, there will be no substitute for investors doing their own due 
diligence.  
Having discussed multiple micro and macro models, the following section examines a 
Financial Statements Insurance model, which is an example of a market driven reform of 
the auditing model. 
5.3.  FINANCIAL STATEMENT INSURANCE MODEL 
Financial Statement Insurance (FSI), (as opposed to micro and macro models), is a 
proposition of a market based mechanism that does not involve introduction of any 
regulation. It is a theoretical model, proposed by Joshua Ronen, as a response to the Enron 
scandal. Ronen believes that in the present social arrangement, auditors have to operate 
under a major conflict of interest – they are hired and paid by the companies they audit. 
As it is usually CEOs and CFOs who ultimately decide on their hiring, (with shareholders 
rubber-stamping their decision), auditors become dependent on management for their 
compensation instead of being agents of the shareholders.  The fear of losing future audit 
fees, even without the consulting services, secures the auditors’ compliance with the 
management’s wishes. According to Ronen’s proposition, regulation, enforcement, or 
litigation are incapable of dealing with this inherent conflict of interest. In his model, he 
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suggests severing the agency relations between auditors and managers by creating 
principal-insurance carriers, whose interests would be aligned with those of investors.790  
The financial statements insurance proposal would work in the following way. To begin 
with, companies would approach insurance carriers in order to receive offers of insurance 
coverage against losses caused by omissions and misrepresentations in financial 
statements. The insurance carriers would then turn to an underwriting reviewer who 
would assess the risk of omissions and misrepresentations through the examinations of a 
company’s internal controls, management incentive scheme,  riskiness of business, its 
competition, and other relevant factors. Based on the underwriters’ reports, insurance 
carriers would decide on issuing coverage offers and their conditions. Once the managers 
decide to accept the coverage offer, the coverage and premiums would be made public.791 
Companies would choose an external auditor from a list of approved auditors provided 
by the insurance carrier. The chosen auditor would then be hired and paid by the insurance 
carrier. Audit fees would then be reimbursed by the insured, and publicised. Audit firms 
would be subject to being rated by an independent organisation financed from the fees 
collected from the audit profession.792 
The auditor would owe his duty and loyalty to the FSI carrier for at least two reasons. 
First, the FSI carrier would be a paymaster of the auditor. Second, auditors would be 
providing their audit services to more than just one company, hence a single audit failure 
                                                 
790 Joshua Ronen, 'Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-visited' (2002) 8(1)  
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 39, p. 48. 
791 Ronen (n 18) p. 205.  
792 Ronen (n 18) p. 205.  
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could potentially jeopardise their relationship with the insurance carrier and could lead to 
a loss of other audit engagements.793 
The FSI coverage would come into effect only if the auditor issued an unqualified opinion 
on a financial statement. Otherwise, there would be no coverage, or the policy terms 
would have to be renegotiated and made public. Investors’ claims for the recovery of 
losses caused by omissions and misrepresentations from the companies with effective 
coverage would be settled through a judicial process involving a sui generis institution 
established for this purpose, or some previously confirmed arbitrators. 794 
It is important to note why the insurance coverage has to be publicised. Companies 
announcing higher limits of coverage and smaller premiums would appear to have higher 
quality of financial statements and hence would be more valuable to investors. On the 
other hand, those with smaller and no coverage, or higher premiums would be treated by 
investors as the ones with lower quality financial statements. Consequently, every 
company would aim at getting higher coverage and paying smaller premiums in order to 
be perceived as a valuable company with good quality financial statements. A kind of 
reverse Gresham’s Law would come into operation, resulting in a drive to higher 
quality.795  
As far as consulting services are concerned, the FSI model does not prohibit auditors from 
providing them. Ronen claims that providing audit and consulting services 
simultaneously increases the auditors’ knowledge about the systems and operations of the 
                                                 
793 Joshua Ronen and Arnold Berman, 'Musings on Post-Enron Reforms' (2004) 19(3) Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Finance 331,  p. 340. 
794 Ronen (n 18) p. 205.  
795 Ronen (n 793) p. 340. 
 252 
company and hence enables the auditor to carry out better audits and reduce the FSI 
carrier’s risk.796 
FSI emerged as an interesting proposal to tackle problems with the current audit 
arrangement. It has a number of structural advantages. To begin with, the FSI model is a 
market mechanism that offers changes in the structure and incentives of the auditing 
profession in such a way that their interests are aligned with those of the managers and 
investors. Once an insurer underwrites a financial statement insurance policy, its 
objective is to minimize the cost of claims against this policy, meaning that the insurer’s 
incentives are aligned with those of investors. The insurer will then pay the auditor, so 
that he can produce a high quality audit. The insurer will have to strike a balance between 
charging too high a premium in order to be competitive and too low a premium to avoid 
going bankrupt.797 Auditors hired by insurers would want to build their reputations for 
conducting high quality audits. Their independence, both real and perceived, would be 
enhanced by the fact that they will no longer be hired and paid by  companies in return 
for providing audit.798 
To follow, traditional audit reports comprise of three paragraphs that provide no 
comparative or statistical information about financial statement reliability. With FSI a 
particular company would be charged for a particular level of coverage. That creates a 
transparent financial statement reliability index that gives investors specific, public 
information about a company’s financial reporting.799 
                                                 
796 Ronen (n 793) p. 340. 
797 Ronen (n 18) p. 206. 
798 Ronen (n 18) p. 206. 
799 Lawrence Cunningham, 'Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the 
Industry Before It Unravels' (2006) Boston College Law School Research Paper 108, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=928482, p. 61, accessed 15 February 2016. 
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Furthermore, the FSI risk model is based on specific information, not abstract generalities. 
Instead of using pooled-risk and diversification models, FSI’s risk model is based on 
thorough, specific investigation. The assessment of risk is not based on general actuarial 
tools, but is tailored to an individual audit engagement taking into account risk, premium, 
coverage, and other tailored policy terms. Hence, in the suggested Financial Statement 
Insurance model, certain financial statements can be uninsurable, ‘but not the entire 
auditing industry’.800  
Moreover, FSI may encourage greater competition in theaudit market. Due to the fact that 
FSI is tailored to specific audit risk, it should facilitate smaller firms in entering existing 
insurance markets. The ‘Big Four’ could continue with the existing large audit 
assignments, while FSI insurers could hire smaller audit firms to audit smaller public 
companies. That should increase the number of alternative audit firms available for FSI 
insurers.801    
FSI, however, has a few important imperfections. In this model auditors and insurers have 
incentives to detect and correct discovered irregularities in a particular year’s audit. They 
may be tempted to suppress discoveries made in later years covered by a previously issued 
insurance policy. Another danger is a risk of a race to the bottom by the insurers aiming 
at increasing premium volume by offering lenient audits. The model also allows for the 
simultaneous provision of consulting services, which are considered to damage an 
auditors’ independence. 
The following sections provide examples of the international audit models of Germany, 
Italy, Japan, and France. These countries can be characterised by different corporate 
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governance systems, shaped by various socio-economic, political and historical factors. 
They provide an interesting study of different practical, regulatory approaches to the 
regulation of the auditing function. The analysis of their pros and cons might be useful in 
considering the appropriateness of the elements of these models that could improve the 
regulation of external audits in the UK and the US. 
5.4.  INTERNATIONAL OPTIONS 
Despite the globalisation forces, and a certain degree of harmonisation at the EU level, 
national audit markets still operate separately. One of the arguments explaining a lack of 
harmonisation is the difference in corporate governance systems of various countries. 
Auditing performs a different function in the market-based (outsider) system than in the 
banking-governance (insider) one. In outsider systems, such as the UK and the US, 
external auditing operates as a monitoring mechanism of management and reduces the 
agency cost by mitigating information asymmetry.802 In insider systems, where the equity 
markets are less developed and the banks are the primary source of capital, auditing is 
considered less as a monitoring device and more as a source of information to the minority 
shareholders. This is because the controlling shareholders, whose wealth largely depends 
on firm performance and who usually have a long-term interest in a firm, are more eager 
to monitor management to ensure that it does not exploit the corporate resources.803 In 
these systems, however, minority investors have limited or no access to financial 
information and are likely to be subject to expropriation by the dominant controlling 
shareholders. The audit is one of the mechanisms that mitigate the costs of this kind of 
agency problem by providing minority shareholders with an objective, external opinion 
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on the financial situation of a company.804 The audit is also used to assess whether 
financial statements comply with national regulations. 
Given that national corporate governance systems, regulatory culture, and history may 
affect the auditor’s role, it is worth investigating the main contrasts in audit regulation of 
different jurisdictions. The following part of the chapter looks at country-specific, 
national audit models in Germany, Italy, Japan and France, which provide an interesting 
study of different regulatory approaches to the external audit function. 
5.4.1.  GERMANY 
The auditing arrangements depend on the national corporate financing and governance 
systems.805 The German corporate governance system relies on internal monitoring 
mechanisms. Most of the corporate capital is provided by a small number of banks and 
institutional investors.806 Internal monitoring takes place through the power of banks and 
insurance companies, the formal separation between the management and supervisory 
board and the employees’ involvement in governance structures. Banks have been 
controlling the majority of votes at the annual general meetings by cumulating 
shareholders and debt-holders positions in listed companies. All stock corporations must 
have a separate supervisory board.807 This dual structure preserves the monitoring 
                                                 
804 The existence of independent directors on the boards is another means of protecting the minority 
shareholders. 
805 Geoffrey Whittington, 'Corporate Governance and the Regulation of Financial Reporting' (1993) 
23(91A) Accounting & Business Research 311, p. 311. 
806 Theodor Baums, ‘Takeovers vs Institutions in Corporate Governance in Germany’ Arbeitspapier 1/92, 
available via https://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/43028984/paper1.pdf, accessed 19 February 2016, pp.1-3. 
807 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Schleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership around the 
World’ (1999) 54(2) Journal of Finance 471, p.496 
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function of the supervisory board. Additionally, the Codetermination Act 1976 requires 
that employees’ representatives to fill some of the supervisory seats.808 
The supervisory board examines the annual financial statements, and this examination is 
usually based on the findings of the external auditor. As auditors are engaged by 
supervisory boards, they become primarily the agents of supervisory boards and only 
indirectly of shareholders and other stakeholders. This makes the German model different 
from the theoretical stakeholder model discussed earlier in this chapter, which 
presupposes that auditors should owe their duties to stakeholders. In the German model, 
the auditor merely enhances the monitoring function of the supervisory board and hence 
shareholders are less concerned with the auditors’ independence. Shareholders rely more 
on the monitoring provided by the supervisory board.809 As far as provision of non-audit 
services is concerned, auditors have been allowed to provide consulting services 
simultaneously with auditing services without any major restrictions until recently.810 
Advisory services were not generally considered problematic with respect to auditor 
independence.811  
The German auditing model can also be characterised by other features that are a direct 
result of its specific corporate governance system. Since a small number of large banks 
and pension funds traditionally provide most business capital, the ownership and voting 
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rights in Germany are generally concentrated. As a result of that, there is less demand for 
independent audits and for an advanced, investor-friendly financial reporting system. 
Moreover, the German accounting profession has much less influence on setting the 
accounting standards than in the UK and the US. The standards are generally established 
by commercial laws.812 
In Germany, lenders and institutional investors have direct access to company 
information, which reduces the need for sophisticated financial reports and auditing 
standards designed predominantly to protect widely dispersed shareholders. Thus the sole 
audit objective for many years was to judge whether the accounting records and financial 
statements complied with regulations. It was only in 1987 that a true and fair view concept 
became part of German accounting requirements.813 
Due to the close relationship between managers and external auditors in Germany, some 
of the audit practices differ from those in the UK and the US. One of the most prominent 
ones is the fact that German managers may consider it inappropriate for auditors to 
question management’s oral statements. They are also more unlikely to accept 
responsibility for detecting irregularities than their UK and US counterparts.814  
The structure of the German audit model is a result of national corporate governance 
characteristics. The principal-agent problem is of relatively small concern in the insider 
dominant environment. Bankers often enjoy shareholders’ powers, privileged relations 
                                                 
812 Christian Leuz and Jens Wustemann, ‘The Role of Accounting in the German Accounting System’ 
(2003) No. 2003/16  Center for Financial Studies, available at https://www.ifk-
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with managers and the auditor, and thus exert an effective control over key strategic 
decisions and financial reporting. As a result of the concentrated ownership and close 
relations between management and auditors, the demand for independent, external audits 
by outside stakeholders is much smaller than in the UK and the US. 815 
5.4.2.  ITALY 
For many decades, only listed companies in Italy were required to be audited by external 
auditors, while non-listed companies were audited by the Board of Statutory Auditors 
regulated by the Italian Civil Code. In 1998, the so-called ‘Draghi law’ introduced a 
unified set of rules related to financial intermediaries. With explicit reference to listed 
companies, the financial audit was assigned to auditing firms, leaving the statutory 
committee uninvolved. As a result of that, a separation was instituted between the 
financial and the administrative audit.816 
The financial audit involves all the activities centred on the correctness of bookkeeping 
entries and documents concerning the reporting of management operations. Within the 
framework of the financial audit, auditors are required to verify whether accounts are kept 
correctly and whether financial statements fairly represent the true economic position of 
a company. The administrative audit, on the other hand, involves scrutinising existing 
laws, corporate by-laws, and principles of correct management. It also involves verifying 
organisational, administrative and accounting structures adopted by a company, as well 
as checking on the internal control system.817 
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The ‘Draghi law’ has required the statutory committee members to be selected from an 
official registrar of auditors kept by the Ministry of Justice. The registrar consists of 
professionals who have passed a specific test, managers of complex enterprises with at 
least three years’ experience, and professors of law and economics.  They are entitled to 
an annual fee, which is based on the relevant professional tariffs and varies accordingly 
to the company’s net asset value. The ‘Draghi law’ has also granted the statutory 
committee the power to report to the court any serious irregularities performed by the 
management in breach of their duties.818 
The recent reform of the Italian civil code conducted in 2004 has shifted all financial 
auditing activities to an external auditor for both listed and unlisted companies. A separate 
body has been created in charge of administrative auditing. Its composition and features 
depend on the type of corporate governance model that is adopted by a company. 
According to the Italian civil code, there are three alternative governance models. Firstly, 
the most traditional and most frequently employed by the Italian corporations model 
includes two bodies, both elected by the shareholders: the board of directors (responsible 
for day-to-day management of the company), and a statutory committee, in charge of 
administrative auditing. Secondly, the ‘dualistic’ model, which transfers administrative 
auditing to a supervisory board elected by shareholders.819 The management powers 
remain with the board of directors elected by the supervisory board. Thirdly, the 
‘monistic’ system, which attributes management and administrative powers to a board of 
directors and to an audit committee respectively. The auditing committee members are 
chosen from within the board of directors and must be professional and independent.820 
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819 The structure of a dualistic model is influenced by the German corporate governance structure. 
820 This model is based on the Anglo-Saxon governance model, in Mariani (n 816) p. 27. 
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As far as the most common and traditional model is concerned, the main features of the 
statutory committee depend on the status of a company. In the case of listed companies, 
by-laws must establish that at least one member of the statutory committee must be 
elected by the minority, and at least one must be chosen from among external auditors. In 
non-listed companies the statutory committee must consist of three to five actual members 
and an additional two standby members. While performing their duties, members of the 
statutory committees must exercise due care and take into consideration the real financial 
situation of a company, its size, and structure.  
The supervisory board in the dualistic model is charged with the same auditing duties as 
the statutory committee. In addition to that, it also possesses powers to influence 
shareholders’ meetings. It can, for example, nominate or revoke the board of directors or 
approve the financial statements. It consists of at least three members, who can at the 
same time be shareholders. In the monistic model, the ‘committee for management 
control’ is chosen by the board of directors. The number of its members is established by 
the board of management except when the company is listed. At least one of the members 
must be listed on the national auditors register.821  
The only instance where the general separation between financial and administrative 
models does not have to be upheld relates to the companies which not only have 
traditional corporate governance model, but also do not have diffused shares and which 
do not have to prepare consolidated accounts. In such cases, statutory provisions can 
delegate all financial auditing to the statutory committee, as long as its members are on 
the list of auditors prepared by the Ministry of Justice. 
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Despite the fact that the duties of statutory and external auditors are actually separated, 
the overall control of audit activities should be conducted in a complementary way, with 
the common aim of protecting stakeholders. To this extent, the Italian model resembles 
the theoretical stakeholder panel discussed earlier in this chapter, which presupposes that 
auditors should have a duty to act in the best interests of stakeholders. In the Italian model, 
this creates a need for statutory and external auditors to work closely with each other 
looking for potential synergies and trying to avoid any duplication.822 This is explicitly 
required by article 2409 of the Italian civil code, which stresses the need for co-operation, 
through a timely exchange of information, while performing their duties. The exchange 
of information should not be limited to the extraordinary or critical situations, but should 
be the base of constant communication between the two bodies.823  
5.4.3.  JAPAN 
The extent and type of audit under the Japanese Commercial Code depends upon the type 
and size of the company. The Commercial code classifies companies into three different 
size groups: small, medium and large. There is no requirement for audit of small and 
medium companies. Large companies, however, are required to be audited by both: a 
corporate (statutory) auditor (Kansa yaku) – a member of the corporation, and by an 
independent external auditor (Kaikei kansa nin) – appointed at the annual general 
meeting.824 
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The corporate auditor in Japan is comparable to audit committees in UK companies.825 
The corporate auditor is an employee of a company, and does not have to be a qualified 
accountant. Frequently, large companies establish a board of corporate auditors.826 The 
role of a corporate auditor is to ensure that fraud does not take place, that directors have 
fulfilled their responsibilities, and complied with regulatory requirements and articles of 
association.827 The corporate auditor must examine financial statements prepared by 
directors and if directors violate regulations or articles of association, the auditor must 
state this at the ordinary general meeting of shareholders. A negligent performance on the 
auditor’s behalf may render him jointly liable with the company for damages incurred by 
third parties.828 
In contrast to the corporate audit, the external audit is conducted by a highly qualified 
accountant, whose role is to express an opinion on financial statements. In Japan, all 
individual certified public accountants and audit firms must be members of the Japan 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, which is incorporated under Article 43 of the 
Certified Public Accountants Law.829 External auditors must at all times be free and 
independent. They have to exercise due professional care and proper judgement in 
rendering their services.830 If the external auditor does not qualify the financial statement 
and the statutory auditor concurs with his opinion, then the accounts do not require an 
approval at the annual general meeting. However, if the statutory auditor does not concur 
with the view of the external auditor, then the financial statements must be presented at 
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the annual general meeting for a decision to be made. Also if the external auditor 
discovers some material misconduct the statutory auditor must be informed. This is due 
to the fact that the statutory auditor must express an opinion on the externals auditor’s 
report. This seems somewhat curious, as the statutory auditor does not need to have any 
accounting qualifications.831 
5.4.4.  FRANCE 
One can find the origins of the French auditor in the Industrial Revolution when a 
commisaire de societes was established in 1867.  According to Mikol, auditors at that 
time were variously described as commissaires de surveillance, commisaires des comptes, 
or censeurs.832 The role of auditor and the scope of his duties were developed through a 
series of court decisions from this period up to 1935, when the Decree Act legislated for 
an independent and competent commissaire. Mikol, quoting from Solus’s 1938 study of 
the reform of company law, states: 
The fundamental idea which must have informed the legislator when it was 
necessary to determine the attributes and powers of the auditors is that they are only 
organs of control, and that, in exercising this function, they should in no way 
involve themselves in the management of the company.833 
The French legislature defined the restricted role of the statutory auditor as a reviewer of 
financial statements. This, in turn, laid down the fundamental principles, which shaped 
professional guidance on independence. 
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The French Company Law 1966 recognises solely le Commissaire aux Comptes as being 
eligible to conduct statutory audits. The Ministry of Justice has supervised statutory 
auditing through the professional body that issues standards and guidelines since 1969. 
The fact that auditing is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice implies that in France 
the statutory auditor is regarded as being part of the judicial system, which makes it 
unique in comparison to other theoretical and international models discussed earlier. 
According to corporate law, the auditor’s mission in France is of public order.834 This 
implies that the audit report is not specifically addressed to shareholders, but to any 
interested stakeholder. Civil liability of the auditors cannot be restricted even 
contractually.835 This makes the French audit model similar to the stakeholder panel 
model discussed earlier in this chapter, which assumes that auditors should exercise their 
duties for the benefit of stakeholders. 
The statutory auditor in France is also required to disclose to the public prosecutor any 
audit clients’ criminal acts, of which the auditor becomes aware (Article 233 of the French 
Company Law).836 This requirement has been described as the ‘most stringent’ reporting 
requirement in Europe.837 Sheid and Watson, with regards to the fact that the commisaire, 
additionally, must inform the courts if he comes across any going concern problems, 
describe the auditor as ‘… more than a statutory auditor, he has become the judicial 
scrutineer of the well-being of the business.’838 
Statutory appointment as auditor in France is for a six-years term (Article 224 of the 1966 
Company Law), thereby creating a structure giving the auditor in France greater 
                                                 
834 Alain Mikol and Peter Standish, 'Audit Independence and Nonaudit Services: A Comparative Study in 
Differing British and French Perspectives' (1998) 7(3) European Accounting Review 541, p. 566. 
835 Mikol (n 834) p.549. 
836 Mikol (n 834) p.546 
837 J.C. Sheid and Peter Walton, European Financial Reporting - France (Routledge and ICAEW, London 
1992), p. 101. 
838 Sheid (n 837) p.101. 
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protection from short-term client pressures than in the UK, for example. In the case of 
French companies, which are under duty to publish consolidated accounts, there is a 
requirement of appointment of joint auditors, at least two in number (Article 223 
Company Law) from different audit firms.839 
The French model appears to be different to the German or the UK ones as far as the 
regulation of auditors’ independence and provisions of non-audit services are concerned.  
There is a total ban on the provision of non-audit services to audit clients. The prohibition 
of consulting services, however, is widely contested by large audit firms, which manage 
to conform artificially with the regulation by creating separate legal structures responsible 
for providing only non-audit services. Simultaneously, French regulatory authorities have 
refused to impose strong constraints on major firms, with the result that the practical 
operation of the French audit market may actually be quite similar to the audit market in 
the UK. 840 
5.5.  CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis established in chapters three and four that the present audit model can be 
characterised by significant flaws, such as deficiencies in the auditors’ independence and 
accountability, and excessive concentration of the audit market. This chapter analysed a 
variety of different theoretical and practical audit models, which suggested some 
solutions to the above mentioned problems inherent in the current auditing arrangements 
in the UK and the US. The analysis of this chapter was centred on the theoretical micro 
and macro models, as well as country-specific international options.  
                                                 
839 Mikol (n 834) p. 546. 
840 Mikol (n 834) p. 547. 
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Micro models assume that the monitoring of the auditing process can be established at 
the level of a company, by using some of the existing company organs. There are certain 
practical difficulties associated with micro models. In the context of shareholder panels, 
questions can be raised as to how to choose members of the panel. This could be done, 
for example through selecting representatives of the largest shareholders in a company or 
by means of election within bodies of shareholders. It is, however, unlikely that there 
would be enough people of sufficient standing, skills, and expertise to serve on the panels. 
Another implication is the fact that insider information would be made available only to 
a privileged group of shareholders.841 With regards to a stakeholder panel, it would also 
be difficult to identify the stakeholders with a reasonable right to information. Extending 
the auditor’s duty of care would require significant changes to corporate laws and 
reconsideration of auditors’ liability. It is also unlikely that any of the micro options could 
solve the conflict of interest arising from the fact that auditors are hired and paid by the 
very companies they are supposed to provide with an independent audit. The only way of 
solving this problem is to delegate appointment and remuneration of auditors to an 
external and autonomous body. This is the focus of the macro options. 
The macro model solutions make provisions for external, independent bodies charged 
with the appointment and remuneration of auditors. Despite certain disadvantages of 
macro models, such as the unclear constitutional nature of a state regulatory body, the 
strong dependence of state bodies on national regulatory frameworks, and the dangers of 
considering macro models out of context, there is a public interest in the efficient and 
effective audit of listed companies, which warrants auditors working under the aegis of a 
state-controlled auditing body.842 This avenue is further explored in the next chapter, 
                                                 
841 Dewing (n 828) p. 276. 
842 Hatherly (n 757)  p. 547. 
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which suggests a new regulatory audit model based on the macro model option. It 
proposes a regulatory overhaul of the current auditing arrangements by suggesting the 
establishment of an autonomous agency responsible for the appointment and 
remuneration of auditors of public interest entities. Following the French model, the new 
model introduces a total ban on the provision of consulting services by auditors. The 
rationale behind the appointment of auditors by a public body, and the prohibition of 
delivering consulting services is to restore truly independent and autonomous auditors.  
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CHAPTER 6. NEW AUDIT MODEL 
Up to this point the thesis provided, in chapter one, a literature review of the structural 
and regulatory changes that have occurred in the auditing profession over time. It was 
argued that the excessive reliance on fees for consulting services transformed the auditing 
firms into money-driven businesses and had a negative impact on the profession’s 
perceived independence. Numerous regulatory concessions decreased the deterrent 
function of litigation, leading to the decrease in auditors’ accountability; and the frequent 
use of mergers left the profession dangerously consolidated.843 The thesis also argued that 
the regulation of audit developed without any prior theoretical grounding. The corollary 
of this is that regulatory changes in the sphere of audit are usually enacted ad hoc in the 
aftermath of major accounting scandals and fail to provide material changes to the 
auditing model. Despite the importance of audit for the capital markets there is still no 
definite answer as to what the purpose of audit is. Following Limpberg and Flint’s 
theories, chapter two argued that since audit fulfils an important social function, it should 
be conducted not only for the benefit of shareholders, but also various stakeholders that 
rely on audited financial statements. Chapters three and four provided a detailed overview 
of the regulation of audit in the UK and the US and some of the most egregious problems 
that characterise the existing arrangements, such as independence, accountability deficits, 
and excessive concentration of the audit market. There it was argued that most of the 
reforms, enacted as a reaction to corporate scandals, were unsuccessful in fixing the 
underlying issues. This prompted a discussion in chapter five, which looked at how 
diverse theoretical audit models and other jurisdictions deal with similar problems of 
audit practice. This chapter is important for the thesis, as drawing from the evidence 
                                                 
843 See chapter one. 
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presented in previous chapters; it proposes a free-standing legal reconceptualisation of 
the external audit function in the Anglo-American system.  
A key function in the new model is played by an external public body – the Public 
Auditing Board (PAB), in charge of the appointment and remuneration of auditors, as 
well as the setting of auditing standards. The PAB operates as an autonomous institution, 
independent from executive government, and funded by the fees paid by companies 
requiring audits.  In the suggested model, the PAB operates as a guarantor of auditors’ 
independence, as it appoints and compensates auditors. The PAB is able to appoint 
independent auditors either from its in-house practice, or to outsource them from private 
practice. Under this regime, a contractual relationship is created between the PAB and a 
company requiring audit, and hence client claims for negligently prepared audits would 
be brought against the auditors and the PAB. Moreover, auditors are no longer directly 
hired and paid by the very companies they audit, which breaks up the close relationship 
between the auditors and management. Auditors’ independence is further strengthened 
by a total ban on the provision of consulting services simultaneously with audits.  
 
The model draws on several aspects of the Limperg’s and Flint’s theories of auditing and 
proposes extending the scope of audit, so that it includes financial information relevant 
to the core stakeholders, such as employees and creditors. The model, however, does not 
suggest these stakeholders should have a locus standi in negligent audits claims. As the 
evidence shows the auditing profession faces an ever increasing litigation pressure, which 
may culminate in the bankruptcy of one of the biggest audit firms. This in turn can lead 
to further problems associated with increased concentration of the audit market and 
limited choice of auditors. For this reason, the thesis suggests that laws governing 
negligent audit claims should be restrictive, perhaps similar to the Caparo ruling, in order 
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to protect auditors from frivolous suits. At the same time the model envisages that 
auditors’ exposure to claims for negligence should decrease naturally as a result of 
increased audit quality. This is due to the proposed structural reforms eliminating 
conflicts of interest, pervasive incentives inherent in the current audit arrangements, and 
creating truly autonomous and independent auditors. 
 
6.1. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF A NEW AUDIT 
MODEL 
The contemporary statutory financial audit has a clear legal purpose of providing an 
independent opinion on the truth and fairness of financial accounts. The auditors’ ultimate 
client is the audited company. This simple agency model of the statutory audit, however, 
does not take into account the interests of other stakeholders that have a keen interest in 
the companies. For example, creditors, such as lenders or suppliers, may see audit as 
providing assurance that companies will continue to pay for the goods, services, or 
finance. Employees may want the audit to provide some comfort about job security and 
future direction of the organisation. This chapter argues that the scope of companies’ 
disclosure and audits should be extended in order to include financial information relevant 
to these core stakeholders. This would meet the information needs of employees and 
creditors, and reconcile their expectations of audit. This is explored in more detail later 
in this chapter.  
In the proposed model audit of private corporations is transferred to a state-backed 
institution. There are numerous benefits of having autonomous, public auditors. Most 
importantly, corporations would not hire their own auditors; it would be the task of the 
Public Auditing Board. This arrangement, discussed in detail below, would enable the 
auditors to be truly independent of their clients. Furthermore, the Public Auditing Board, 
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responsible for setting auditing standards, would be able to apply the standards more 
consistently, mitigating problems caused by ambiguous rules. Last but not least, the 
public auditing body would be better placed to further public interest. According to 
Shapiro, ‘even though capitalist societies leave investment decisions in private hands, the 
allocation of productive economic resources to entities that can best use them is a matter 
of extreme importance to literally everyone, including future generations and those too 
poor to ever participate in the market directly’.844 
The idea of moving audit of the corporations into the public domain had already been 
suggested in the US before the Securities Act of 1933 was passed. The early draft of the 
legislation assigned this duty to a corps of national auditors in the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO), an oversight branch of the US Congress.845 As Swanson noted, 
the final decision to leave the auditing of financial statements to private sector auditors 
was due to the fact that neither government nor industry wanted to collectivise auditing.846 
According to Swanson, ‘…People didn’t want to accelerate the centralization of power, 
because what happens with the centralization of power is you get corruption and 
stagnation. Nobody wanted that.’847  Also most of the senators had little or no knowledge 
regarding the accounting profession and hence were easily influenced by the American 
Institute of Accountants (the predecessor of the AICPA), which lobbied to give the audit 
franchise to its members – the CPAs.848 It must be acknowledged that corruption and 
complacency can affect public institutions, on balance; however, this is relatively less of 
a problem in developed economies than poor quality audits. Potential corruption could 
also be counterbalanced, as the new model eliminates any conflicts of interest originating 
                                                 
844 Amy Shapiro, ‘Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune?: Auditing Regulation and Clients’ Incentives’ 
(2005) 35 Seton Hall Law Review 1029, p. 1072. 
845 Sunder (n 412) p. 12. 
846 Tennessee Tech accounting professor  G.A. Swanson quoted in  Brewster (n 94) p. 80. 
847 Brewster (n 94) p. 80.  
848 Ibid p.80. 
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from the fact that auditors are hired and paid by their clients. It also provides greater 
transparency of the audit process, which is governed and supervised by an independent 
agency with a statutory backing. 
The idea of having financial statements audited by a public institution was then revisited 
in the 1950s. The US Congress considered the possibility of auditors being employed by 
the Federal Government. 849 As suggested by Gaa, this could have enabled a closer 
monitoring and control of the auditing profession, which would have benefited society as 
a whole by means of improved financial reporting and more stable capital markets.850 
Despite this early debate, mandatory auditing by self-regulated private sector auditors has 
remained largely the regular practice. The previous decades, however, showed the 
increasing role of the state in the regulation of financial reporting. 
As chapter three argued, the increasing role of the state has been noticeable in the areas 
of standard setting, by establishing strong policing institutions such as the SEC and FRRS 
or audit governance institutions such as the PCAOB and FRC. Also the new model, with 
the establishment of the Public Auditing Board, envisages a greater role of the state in 
audit regulation. This seems to be in line with the findings of Baggott, who demonstrates 
that a typical progression in the regulatory system’s development is a move away from 
voluntary, to a statutory-based system, involving increased participation by outsiders.851 
                                                 
849 Andrew Barr, 'The Independent Accountant and the SEC' (Address of Andrew Barr before the Twenty-
First Annual Ohio State University Institute on Accounting, Columbus, Ohio 1959) available at 
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1950/1959_0521_BarrInde
pendentT.pdf  p. 6, accessed 16 February 2016. 
850 James Gaa, 'Critical Commentaries: The Expectations Game: Regulation of Auditors by Government 
and the Profession' (1991) 2 (1) Critical Perspectives on Accounting 83, p. 86. 
851 This trend is not uniform and in some cases the reverse move can be observed; in Rob Baggott, 
'Regulatory Reform in Britain: The Changing Face of Self-Regulation' (1989) 67(4) Public Administration 
435, p. 437. 
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Baggott’s general analysis of regulation is comparable to Whittington’s analysis of the 
regulation of financial reporting. Whittington identifies three general systems of 
regulation: self or private regulation, which is usually carried out by professional bodies; 
broadly based private regulation, which involves representation of a broader range of 
interests; and public regulation, where formal authority of law backs a regulatory body.852 
He finds that the regulation of accounting and audit has moved from self or private 
regulation to broadly-based private regulation (with elements of public regulation).853 As 
chapter two argued, this is due to the numerous scandals affecting the auditing profession, 
lack of consistent theoretical underpinning of the audit function, and the strong need to 
protect capital markets by means of audit. The proposal of a new model in this thesis, 
with the Public Auditing Board at the centre, remains in line with the observed trends that 
public regulation plays an increasing role in the area of financial reporting.  
The structure of the proposed Public Auditing Board is similar in the structure and 
functioning of the Audit Commission responsible for conducting audits for local 
authorities in England and Wales between 1983 and 2015.854 Ironically, the Audit 
Commission was closed in 2015, in order to replace the centralised arrangements for the 
                                                 
852 Whittington (n 805) pp. 316-318. 
853 Whittington (n 805) p. 317. 
854 The Audit Commission’s closed in April 2015 as a result of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 
2014. The competencies of the Audit Commission were split among the Public Sector Audit Appointments 
Ltd., National Audit Office, Financial Reporting Council and Cabinet Office. The new transitional body - 
the Public Sector Audit Appointments Ltd. is responsible for overseeing the Commission’s current external 
audit contracts with audit firms from April 2015 up to 2020. It manages the contracts and exercises statutory 
powers to appoint auditors, and sets the fees. According to the new framework, local bodies will have to 
appoint their own independent external auditors at least once every five years. They will need to consult 
and take into account the advice of an independent auditor panel. Accountancy professional bodies will 
register audit firms and auditors. They will be required to have rules and practices in place that cover the 
eligibility of firms to be appointed as local auditors and also the qualifications, experience and criteria that 
individuals will need to have to sign an audit report. They will also monitor and enforce audit standards. 
This will be supervised by the Financial Reporting Council’s Audit Quality Review. The scope of the audit 
will remain very similar to the current audit, and auditors will continue to be required to comply with a 
code of practice produced by the National Audit Office and have regard to its guidance. The Cabinet Office 
will be responsible for the National Fraud Initiative; available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/418151/The_future_of_the
_Audit_Commission.pdf  accessed 30 December 2015.  
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audit of local bodies, with a more ‘localist approach’, enabling the local bodies to appoint 
their own auditors from an open and competitive market.855 The Audit Commission 
changed the traditional public sector model of auditing by introducing genuinely 
autonomous auditors.856 Auditors were appointed by the Audit Commission and 
answerable only to the public and the ‘courts’ instead of their ‘clients’ in the field.857 The 
Commission operated independently from government, and its formal governing body 
was made up of several commissioners and a chairman. The day-to-day operations of the 
organisation were managed by a team of managing directors led by the Chief 
Executive.858  
The Audit Commission Act conferred statutory powers and duties on the auditor in 
person. The way in which the auditor performed his duties, including decisions relating 
to possible illegality, was free from any external influence. All of an auditor’s 
professional responsibilities were to be discharged independently of the Audit 
Commission, which could not influence the way in which audit was performed. In law, 
the auditor remained accountable to the courts for the way in which he exercised his 
statutory duties.859 As far as financing was concerned, the Audit Commission purchased 
audits from the pool of audit firms and district auditors and ‘resold’ them to the audited 
                                                 
855 Department for Communities and Local Government, Local Audit and Accountability Bill, May 2013, 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/198057/Local_Audit_and_
Accountability_Bill_-_plain_English_guide.pdf accessed 30 December 2015.  
856 Michael Heseltine, Where There's a Will (Hutchinson, London 1987), pp. 37 - 40. 
857 It was a novel idea, as there was no emphasis on independence of auditors of public institutions before 
1983. For many years auditors worked so closely with the local authorities that they were often considered 
part of the municipal family; in Duncan Cambell-Smith, Follow the Money. The Audit Commission, Public 
Money and the Management of Public Services, 1983-2008 (Penguin Group, London 2008), p. 2. 
858 Under Part II of the Act the Audit Commission had four statutory functions in relation to audit. It 
appointed auditors to local government and NHS bodies. It prepared and kept under review the Codes of 
Audit Practice, which prescribed how auditors should discharge their statutory duties. It also prescribed 
scales of fees for audits and made arrangements for the certification of grant claims and returns. See The 
Audit Commission, available at http://www.audit-
commission.gov.uk/aboutus/howwearerun/pages/default.aspx, accessed 23 May 2012. 
859 Radford (n 781) p. 914. 
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bodies – building a mark-up into the process and generating extra cash to pay for its 
national report work and publications.860 While towards the end of its functioning it had 
begun to receive some funding from government, it remained substantially self-funded.861  
As far as the appointment of auditors is concerned, the Audit Commission was able to 
appoint auditors both from private firms and from among the District Audit Service 
(DAS), its in-house practice. From the very beginning of the Commission’s work, it was 
clear that the DAS would not cope on its own and that some of the audit work had to be 
delegated to private firms. The usual practice for over twenty years was to outsource about 
thirty per cent of the audit work to private sector audit firms, with the remaining seventy 
per cent being done by DAS auditors.862  
Whilst agency theory is useful in explaining the rationale of the external audit function in 
the present Anglo-American arrangements, it does not explain the way the auditors are 
appointed. Even though agency theory suggests that auditors should be hired by and be 
accountable to shareholders, in reality individual shareholders are too diverse and rarely 
have time to be directly involved in the hiring process.863 In practice this task is usually 
delegated to the company directors who choose auditors and their selection is usually 
rubber-stamped by shareholders at the annual general meetings.864 It is worth noticing, 
                                                 
860 Cambell-Smith (n 857)  p. 8. 
861 Cambell-Smith (n 857)  p. 12. 
862 Cambell-Smith (n 857)  p. 12. 
863 Prem Sikka, Steven Filling, and Pik Liew, The Audit Crunch: Reforming Auditing' (2009) 24(2) 
Managerial Auditing Journal  135, p. 138. 
864This way of appointing auditors is typical for the UK and US system, which are characterized by 
dispersed ownership. The role and appointment of auditors can be performed differently in countries with 
other corporate governance settings. For example, in the Nordic context, the auditor is appointed by the 
general meeting. Even though it is usually the board or audit committee that propose an auditor, the general 
meeting is never bound by their suggestion and has the unrestricted power to make a different decision. 
Furthermore, minority shareholders holding at least 10% of the shares can demand an appointment of a 
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that initially in the UK in the nineteenth century, the law required auditors to be selected 
by a shareholder vote in order to guarantee that the agent stayed faithful to its principal.865 
This practice, however, had gradually become much less feasible. As shareholders had 
become increasingly dispersed, holding small stakes in various entities, they could not, 
as a matter of practice, negotiate subjects of audit engagements with multiple auditors 
performing audits at thousands of corporations.866  
The current auditing model makes auditors dependent upon clients for their fees, as a 
result of which their advice and opinions may be favourable towards them. According to 
Coffee, ‘watchdogs hired by those they are to watch typically turn into pets, not 
guardians.’867 Drawing on the elements of the structure and functioning of the Audit 
Commission, the main functions of the proposed model institution - the PAB include the 
appointment and remuneration of auditors.868  
As far as the current appointment of auditors is concerned, according to s.475 of the 
Companies Act 2006 the only companies that are exempt from audit requirements are the 
ones that are small, dormant, or non-profit-making and subject to public sector audit. In 
the US, under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, audit is required for an ‘issuer’.869 
It would be practically impossible for the PAB to conduct audits for all the companies 
                                                 
special ‘minority auditor’; in Per Lekvall, The Nordic Corporate Governance Model (SNS Forlag, 2014), 
p. 82. 
 
865 Coffee (n 51) p. 113. 
866 Coffee (n 51) p. 340. 
867 Coffee (n 51) p. 335. 
868 Analogous to ss. 12, 13 and 14 of the Part III of the Local Government Finance Act 1982, creating Audit 
Commission for Local Authorities in England and Wales. 
869 Definition of an issuer is contained in Sec.3 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 – ‘an issuer – any 
person who issues or proposes to issue any security…’. This thesis will refer to audits of public companies 
that are subject to securities laws. 
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covered by these requirements.870 Appointments of auditors would have to be restricted 
only to listed companies, as there is a considerable public interest in the provision of good 
quality audits to listed companies. This is due to the amount of public savings located in 
these companies and their importance to the economy. Public listed companies produce 
benefits for many individuals, including shareholders receiving dividends, bondholders 
earning interests, or employees getting salaries, health and retirement benefits. These 
corporations also pay taxes, produce new technologies and make scientific discoveries.871 
For practical reasons, the PAB’s ability to appoint auditors should therefore be restricted 
to listed companies, which are usually the biggest and most sensitive to the economy.  
Moreover, conducting audits for large companies operating in various markets would 
require sufficient knowledge and expertise from the auditors. Independent appointments 
would have to take account of different strategies and operational approaches of audit 
clients.872 The PAB could consider appointing auditors from among its in-house practice, 
as well as private firms which already possess the knowledge of the client’s industry and 
infrastructure, to deal with the major clients. There is also no reason why the PAB could 
not receive expert advice with regards to the requirements of specific industries. The 
Audit Commission was able to appoint auditors both from private practice and from 
among its in-house practice, which was the sixth largest audit practice in the UK.873 
Approximately thirty per cent of Audit Commission audits were conducted by private 
sector audit firms such as Deloitte, KPMG, PKF, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Grant 
Thornton. These firms proved to have the necessary skills, expertise and resources to meet 
                                                 
870 There are over 2600 listed companies in the UK and over 3200 listed only on NYSE in the US. 
871 Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, 
Corporations, and the Public (Berrett-Koehler Publishers Inc., San Francisco 2012) p. 104 
872  The Accountancy Foundation Review Board, ‘The Regulatory Solution in the UK’ available via 
http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/Regulatory_Solutions_in_the_UK_0303_final_web.pdf accessed 6th 
January 2012. 
873 The Audit Commission, available at http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/audit-
regime/pages/default.aspx accessed 25th May 2012. 
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the Audit Commission’s exacting standards.874 Moreover, if the PAB allowed firms from 
the private sector to be appointed to conduct some audits, subject to fulfilling quality 
requirements, and established indicative fee rates, the practice of ‘low balling’, with its 
detrimental effects on audit quality could be diminished.875 
As far as funding is concerned, in order to establish and maintain true institutional 
independence, the PAB should not have to rely on government for its finance. Its funding 
should come from companies requiring audits. The PAB could purchase audits from the 
auditors, such as private audit firms or its in-house practice, and resell it to the audited 
bodies, building a mark-up along the way, which would support paying for the 
maintenance and expenditure of the Board.  
As far as the legal form of the PAB is concerned, there are a number of possibilities, 
ranging from a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation (quango), also known 
as a non-departmental public body,876  a public interest company (PIC),877 a company 
                                                 
874  See (n 873).  
875
 See (n 872). 
876 Quangos remain independent from government; but they are directly financed by it. Quangos, however, 
have lost popularity due to their lack of accountability to the public and service users. It is often considered 
that they lack accountability even to these public bodies that finance them. Another disadvantage of this 
legal form is the fact that members of the board are usually employed on a part time basis and lack sufficient 
expertise, in Resource Centre, Not for Profit Organisations: A Brief Guide to Legal Structures for 
Community and Voluntary Organisations and Social Enterprises (Brighton: Brighton & Hove, 2012), 
available at http://www.resourcecentre.org.uk/information/legal-structures-for-not-for-profit-
organisations/ accessed 19 February 2016. 
877 PIC is a not-for-profit company, accountable to its stakeholders and providing public services. It is 
structured as a company limited by guarantee without shareholders and its activities are financed by debt 
or subsidy. The lack of shareholders in the public interest companies means that their corporate governance 
must be organised differently than in the public limited companies. Appointed members fulfil the same role 
as shareholders in the public limited companies. They do not have a financial stake in the company though 
and if the company goes bust, they must pay out a fixed sum (often a payment of £1). They can also be 
directors on the board. Members can be selected from the general public, from among the stakeholders and 
can include staff, industry experts, public utility users or even government officials. Beyond this, the PICs 
are flexible with regards to their organisation. There would be some difficulties, though, to structure the 
board, so that it brings it the interests of all the stakeholders. Also, stakeholders are often criticised for being 
too unfocused and unable to undertake tough decisions, but the fact that they do not have any financial 
interest in the company increases the accountability of public services and prevents the potentially harmful 
profit-maximising attitude of shareholders, in (n 876).  
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limited by guarantee, or a social enterprise, which trades in order to fulfil social aims.878 
Most importantly, however, the Board must be free from any links to government in order 
to ensure independence and accountability of its decision-making process.  
In the suggested model, the PAB could operate as the auditing standards setter. The 
standards would have to change in order to accommodate wider stakeholders and their 
audit needs. 879 Similarly to the Audit Commission, the PAB would also prepare and 
review the code of audit practice constituting the best professional practice regarding 
standards, techniques and procedures adopted by auditors. Auditors’ reappointment 
would depend on the PAB’s judgement of how well an auditor discharged his duties under 
the law and met the requirements of the code. The PAB could also provide auditors with 
a significant amount of guidance, advice, and training, and ensure that auditors achieve 
the same standards and were subject to the same quality reviews.880 
It has to be acknowledged that the suggested model can give rise to several problems. 
One of the main criticisms of establishing a public body which appoints and remunerates 
                                                 
878 Social enterprise can adopt any of the following legal forms: partnership or limited liability partnership, 
limited company, community interest company, industrial and provident society; in Resource Centre (n 
876). The differences between the PICS and social enterprises are more theoretical and philosophical than 
legal. If the public service involved is a monopoly, then it will more likely be structured as a PIC. If it 
competes with other institutions in the provision of services, it will be a social enterprise, in  Paul Gosling, 
Accountability in Public Services (ACCA,  London), p. 38. 
879 This could potentially be a problematic area, as the UK auditing standards are based on International 
Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and International Standard on Quality Control (ISQC), which makes them 
compatible with regulatory frameworks, including the EC’s Statutory Audit Directive. Any regulatory 
changes would cause practical difficulties, because of the international context of standard setting. In 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, available via 
https://www.icaew.com/library/subject-gateways/auditing/knowledge-guide-to-uk-auditing-standards 
accessed 15 February 2018.  
 
880  Radford (n 781) p. 915. 
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auditors is that it would require substantive changes in the current governance framework 
and company law. To begin with, according to the UK Corporate Governance Code, the 
audit committee makes recommendations to the board in relation to the appointment and 
removal of the auditor. The audit committee also approves the remuneration and terms of 
engagement of the external auditor, reviews and monitors the auditor’s independence, 
develops and implements policy on the engagement of the auditor to supply non-audit 
services. Under the new model these competencies of the audit committee would be 
transferred to the public agency, and hence the role of the audit committee in the current 
shape would be made redundant.881 Moreover, at present according to the Companies Act 
2006 it is the shareholders that approve auditors in the general meeting. Under the new 
model this task would be delegated to the public agency, taking away the current control 
right of the shareholders.  
One can also argue that such a drastic overhaul is not necessary in view of the recent 
changes put forward by the new EU Audit Framework. 882 The legislation introduced, 
among others, mandatory firm rotation, restrictions on the provision of certain non-audit 
services and fee capping, and new monitoring and reporting requirements imposed on 
audit committees of PIEs. The rationale behind this reform was to eliminate misaligned 
incentives, conflict of interests and lack of competition.883 Whilst it is still too early to 
                                                 
881 On the other hand, the use of independent audit committees, whilst potentially mitigating the problems 
of auditor independence, clearly does not eliminate the conflict of interest dilemma. After all, audit 
committee members are paid by the company and can be dependent on top management for different 
benefits, such as referrals to boards of other companies.   
882 See n 530.  
883 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘UK implementation of the EU Directive on statutory 
audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, and of the EU Regulation on specific requirements 
 281 
assess the full impact of the reform, the key assumptions of the thesis are that without a 
major regulatory overhaul of the current auditing arrangements suggested in this chapter, 
any further attempts of reform would be futile.  
The model can also raise concerns about the independence of the members of the public 
agency. It can be argued that their true independence may be unattainable, as it is very 
difficult for people with expertise and significant experience not to have any connection 
with the relevant industry. Moreover, irrespective of the motive for the initial regulation 
and the establishment of the regulatory agency, it is probable that the agency might 
eventually be captured by the special interests of the accounting industry. In order to 
counteract the regulatory capture, it is advisable to increase transparency of the agency’s 
internal processes, but this can lead to further increases in operational costs.  
Some commentators claim that moving audits into the public sphere could create the same 
incentives as is the case of other civil servants, with its corollary low efficiency and poor 
customer service.884 Admittedly, it is also likely that the cost of audits would rise. It is 
inevitable, however, that good quality audits would require more time and resources. If 
the PAB were to increase the quality of audits and enhance confidence in financial reports, 
it might well be that the cost of establishing the Board would be a small price to pay. 
Having discussed the general structure of the Public Auditing Board and its potential 
criticism, the following section explains how the suggested model proposes to solve the 
problems inherent in the current audit arrangements. It addresses key issues discussed in 
                                                 
regarding statutory audit of public interest entities 2014’, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470195/BIS-15-606-
impact-assessment-audit-and-reporting-requirements.pdf accessed 11 February 2018.  
 
884 Shapiro (n 844) p. 1073.  
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the previous chapters, such as lack of auditors’ independence, accountability deficits, and 
concentration of the audit market. 
6.2.  NEW MODEL AS A SOLUTION TO OLD PROBLEMS 
Having discussed the structure and functioning of the Public Auditing Board, this section 
continues developing the proposed model by attempting to provide resolutions to the 
problems inherent in the current audit arrangement, which were discussed extensively in 
chapter four. The problem of insufficient auditors’ independence – a fundamental concept 
in enhancing public confidence and reliability of auditors’ reports is analysed first. The 
problems of auditors’ accountability deficits and the excessive concentration of the audit 
market follow.  
6.2.1. RESTORING AUDITORS’ INDEPENDENCE 
Audit is an important part of the framework that underlies capital markets.885 Audits 
provide independent verification of the information included in the financial statements 
presented by the managers to the public.886 They are beneficial to numerous stakeholders, 
not only by providing information to the market that financial statements produced by 
managers are reliable, but they also reduce the cost of information exchange.887 If the 
auditor does not act independently, then audit loses value to all parties. 
According to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Council, 
‘Independence, both historically and philosophically, is the foundation of the public 
                                                 
885 Vivien Beattie and Stella Fearnley, 'Auditor Independence and Non-Audit Services: A Literature 
Review’, available at http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/research-and-academics/publications-and-
projects/~/media/Files/Technical/Research-and-academics/publications-and-projects/audit-and-assurance-
publications/auditor-independence-and-non-audit-services.ashx accessed 19 February 2016.  
886 Karla M. Johnstone, Michael H. Sutton, and Terry D. Warfield, 'Antecedents and Consequences on 
Independence Risk: Framework for Analysis' (2001) 15(1) Accounting Horizons 1, p.2. 
887 Dopuch and Simunic (n 730)  
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accounting profession and upon its maintenance depends the profession’s strength and its 
stature’.888 Auditors must be independent from their clients’ interests. As former judge of 
the US Supreme Court Warren Burger wrote: 
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial 
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any 
employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant 
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s 
creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This ‘public 
watchdog’ function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from 
the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. 889 
The rationale of the suggested audit model, which moves audit into the public sector, is 
its ability to guarantee the true independence of auditors. The proposed model addresses 
the agency problem that arises because auditors are hired and paid by their clients. By 
creating an independent, public agency responsible for the audit of public companies, a 
direct principal-agent relationship between investors and auditors is restored. Companies 
would no longer have any influence on the appointment and remuneration of auditors, as 
this would be the role of the audit agency.  
The ICAEW claims that ‘as long as audit appointments and fees are determined by the 
shareholders of the company being audited, the auditor can never be economically 
independent of the client’.890 The basic principle of the proposed model is that the 
appointment should not be made by persons whose positions may be affected by the 
outcome of an audit opinion and who have an interest in influencing the auditors in their 
                                                 
888 John L. Carey, The Rise of the Accounting Profession: To Responsibility and Authority, 1937-1969 
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, New York 1969), p. 182. 
889 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984). 
890 ICAEW, available at http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/ethics/auditor-independence/auditor-
independence-approach accessed 19 February 2016. 
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investigation or report. If auditors are in such a position, then they are potentially exposed 
to pressure and influence. This in turn can impair their independence. 
Directors should not be in a position to recommend auditors who report to shareholders 
on the performance of the company. This is, however, the prevalent practice in the UK 
and the US. The mere fact that shareholders retain the power not to endorse the directors’ 
recommendation and occasionally exercise this option does not ensure that the practice 
invariably operates in the public interest in all other cases. Also the bidding process, 
whereby directors are presented with offers from a number of auditors in order to make a 
selection, has the potential for even greater threats to auditor independence. This is 
because such a procedure gives directors an opportunity to exercise improper influence 
on the freedom of investigation and pressure on the fee. If directors have a selfish 
incentive, they are able to influence audit outcomes and simultaneously present 
themselves as having a proper regard for cost effectiveness. Also according to Flint, an 
auditor who is willing to work for less than an economic fee for the work and 
responsibility involved, expecting at the same time to recover any ‘discount’ by later 
increased fees on a continuing appointment, has immediately compromised 
independence. An interest in re-appointment can produce a conscious or unconscious 
predisposition to avoid confrontation with directors on difficult matters or difference of 
opinion.891 
For shareholders alone to have the responsibility to appoint and remunerate auditors is 
hardly practicable, and in any event raises other reservations. First of all, even if 
shareholders were endowed with real power to make corporate decisions, the temptation 
to inflate earnings and other accounting measures might persist. Inevitably, some 
                                                 
891 Flint (n 3) pp. 75-76. 
 285 
shareholders apply a short-term approach to decisions on buying, holding or selling stock. 
They are often called ‘day-traders’ or ‘speculators’, whose main business it is to buy 
cheap, sell with a mark-up, and to exit the company as soon as they make a profit.892 It 
would be difficult for the reformer to distinguish between short-term oriented 
shareholders and those interested in the long-term value of the company. Hence, 
empowering shareholders is not a panacea, as it is impossible to know which shareholders 
to empower.893 
Furthermore, following Flint’s theory that audit is a social phenomenon, companies’ 
auditors who are appointed primarily to report to shareholders, are likely to be perceived 
by other interest groups as the shareholders’ auditors and to be suspected of having a 
shareholder bias, unless they are appointed by truly independent, external body, acting in 
the public interest. Employees and their representatives, creditors and other stakeholders, 
whose interests may conflict with those of shareholders, are unlikely to accept the 
shareholders’ auditors also reporting to them, unless they are satisfied that the 
arrangements for appointment ensure complete impartiality.894 
The role of the auditors should be appreciated by all parties participating in the operation 
of capital markets. An auditor should not be an advocate for any particular party. If the 
parties require a partisan commitment to their interest at the time of a conflict, it is not 
the auditor that they should turn to. The overriding principle of the suggested model is 
that the audit should perform a totally independent function, and all parties with an 
interest should have confidence in the integrity, impartiality and objectivity of auditors, 
otherwise the social purpose of audit will become frustrated. Once appointed, the 
                                                 
892 Ronen (n 760) p.132. 
893 Ronen (n 760) p.132. 
894 Flint (n 3) p.78.  
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principal measures for the protection of an auditor would include irrevocability during 
the tenure of the appointment – except for misconduct. 
Another important issue which potentially affects auditors’ independence is the 
involvement of auditors in other work, such as consulting services. The basic question 
which arises here is whether involvement in another capacity, consciously or 
unconsciously, influences the mental attitude of an auditor, introduces a personal interest 
in the outcome, or exposes the auditor to influence or pressure which is prejudicial to their 
independence; or whether such involvement would lead an interested party to believe that 
the auditor’s independence was compromised, or would be damaging to the authority of 
the auditor in the opinion of any such person.895  
It has been difficult to assess a definite impact of non-audit services on auditors’ 
independence in the current system. This is due to the fact that independence is in fact 
unobservable and hence difficult to measure. It is generally agreed, however, that the joint 
provision of audit and consulting negatively affects the perception of auditor 
independence. Also, according to research discussed in chapter four, certain consulting 
services, such as financial system design and implementation, create conflicts of interest 
that may bias an auditor’s opinion on financial statements, because they partially reflect 
the auditor’s own work.896 Also consulting revenues may increase the auditor’s financial 
dependence on any given client.  An audit firm, which provides both audit and consulting 
services, deriving significant income from the latter, does not want to lose a client. This, 
in turn, can lead to a situation, where auditors do not challenge dubious accounting 
practices, causing lower financial reporting quality.  
                                                 
895 Flint (n 3) p.80. 
896 Ronen (n 760) p. 136. 
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The proposed model suggests that auditors should be free from any other business 
relationships, such as consulting, with their clients.897 The correct mental attitude, 
independent thought and action, impartiality and use of freedom of investigation and 
reporting, are ultimately dependent on the personal qualities of the auditor. This thesis, 
however, argues that an audit system should be designed in such a way as to eliminate all 
possible organisational deficiencies, which give auditors an opportunity not to act in an 
independent way. The possibility of providing non-audit services is an example of such a 
deficiency. As the Enron debacle showed, consulting can be damaging to the 
independence of auditors, and destroy the value of audit for the persons for whose benefit 
it is performed.    
 
6.2.2.  INCREASED AUDITORS’ ACCOUNTABILITY 
Why is there a need to increase one’s accountability? First of all, accountability enhances 
the integrity of governance. It prevents corruption and nepotism. It fulfils the deterrence 
role for those who might potentially abuse power vested in them.898 The process of 
accountability is also important in order to improve performance. It is considered to foster 
individual and group learning, as norms are produced, internalised and adjusted through 
accountability.899 Accountability also creates trust and confidence in public institutions 
and helps to bridge the gap between citizens and their representatives.900 The auditing 
profession’s influence, power and lack of accountability in the present audit model have 
                                                 
897 The statutory ban on providing consulting services is in place in France, see Hatherly (n 757) p. 548. 
898 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform (Cambridge 
University Press, New York 1999) p.7. 
899 Peter Aucoin and Ralph Heinztman, 'The Dialectics of Accountability for Performance in Public 
Management Reform' (2000) 66 (1) International Review of Administrative Sciences 45 , p 45. 
900 Aucoin (n 899) p. 50. 
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been widely criticised.901 The aim of this section is to examine how the new model, which 
moves audits of private corporations into public domain, can enhance auditors’ 
accountability in the legal and social spheres. 
It was argued in chapter four that the auditing profession suffers from legal accountability 
deficits caused by excessive regulatory protection gained over the past decades. First of 
all, the extent and level of the standard of care owed by the auditors is relatively lax.902 
Claimants, in particular those who lack a contractual relationship with auditors, find it 
hard to recover damages for loss resulting from negligent audits. These claimants’ loss is 
purely economic and the courts have adopted a restrictive approach with regards to the 
recoverability of pure economic loss, particularly in tortious cases.903 Furthermore, both 
in the UK and the US, international auditing firms have adopted the limited liability 
partnership vehicle that reduces partners’ personal liability for business. Last, but not 
least, auditors are also protected by means of proportionate liability and limited liability 
agreements.  
These protective regulatory arrangements were enacted in order to limit tort exposure and 
litigation against auditors. It has been argued that in the case of a massive claim resulting 
in the collapse of one of the Big Four firms, the negative effects on the auditing market 
would be significant.904 Partners and staff at the remaining firms may become excessively 
                                                 
901 Austin Mitchell and Prem Sikka, 'Accounting for Change: The Institutions of Accountancy' (1993) 4(1) 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting March 29; Prem Sikka, Hugh Willmott and Tony Lowe, 'Guardians of 
Knowledge and Public Interest: Evidence and Issues of Accountability in the UK Accountancy Profession' 
(1989) 2(2) Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 47; Hugh Willmott, 'Serving the Public 
Interest? A Critical Analysis of a Professional Claim' in D.J. Cooper and Trevor M. Hopper (eds), Critical 
Accounts (Macmillan, London 1990). 
902 As far as auditor liability to third parties in US is concerned, the majority of the states now follow the 
approach found in the Restatements of Torts (1977), according to which third parties are able to sue a 
negligent auditor, if they belong to the group of foreseen individuals, whom the public accountant would 
expect to rely on audit. For more detailed analysis see chapter four. 
903 Roach (n 110) p. 140. 
904 London Economics, ‘Study on the Economic Impact of Auditor’s Liability Regimes – Final report to 
EC-DG Internal Market and Services’ September 2006, p. 115. 
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risk-averse and unwilling to provide audit services to risky clients, such as start-up 
businesses or those in the finance sector.905 This could create a market whereby 
companies would struggle to appoint a suitable auditor, which in turn could lead to poor 
quality audits or an increase in fees charged by those willing to take on risky 
engagements. All of that might adversely affect investors’ confidence in the value and 
effectiveness of audits, and the reputations of the remaining audit firms. The collapse of 
one of the Big Four auditing firms would also cause a further concentration of the audit 
market, as the majority of the clients of the failed firm would most likely be picked up by 
the three remaining ones.906  
There are numerous ways in which audit firms can control their exposure to claims of 
negligence. Perhaps the most obvious is not being negligent in the first place. The aim of 
the suggested model is to create such an organisational structure that will enable auditors 
to exercise due care and provide high quality audits. To begin with, auditors would no 
longer find themselves in a position of a conflict of interest, as the Public Auditing Board 
would be responsible for their appointment and compensation. Furthermore, the ‘low-
balling’ phenomenon would be eliminated, as under the proposed regime, auditors would 
not be allowed to provide consulting services to their audit clients. These changes would 
restore the true independence of auditors and enhance the quality of audits. The 
establishment of an external public audit body would not be without influence on 
litigation. If the quality of audit was to be challenged, substantial claims could be made 
against both the auditor and the appointment body. That is why the model envisages 
maintaining the current legal status quo with regards to auditors’ tortious liability to third 
parties for negligent audits. It does not advocate extending auditors’ liability by granting 
                                                 
905 There is already some evidence of auditors dropping high-risk clients, e.g. in 2003 Deloitte dropped 
Huntington Life Sciences, in 2004 Grant Thornton dropped Parmalat; in Roach (n 110)  p. 141. 
906 Roach (n 110) p. 142.  
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locus standi to various stakeholders relying on auditors’ reports. The Caparo-based 
system would protect auditors from excessive litigation and major claims against the 
biggest audit firms. At the same time, it is suggested that the litigation levels against 
auditors would drop as a matter of course, because of the enhanced quality of audits. 
This thesis has also argued that there are social accountability deficits in the current 
auditing regime. Auditing firms are the police force of capital markets and perform a 
significant public function. They are also subject to private sector pressures, which 
compromise their public function. For this reason this thesis suggests delegating audits to 
a designated state regulator and making auditors accountable not only to shareholders, 
but also to employees and to creditors. It is also desirable to reconsider the scope of 
auditing, which has been inhibited by the narrow perception that audit’s sole purpose is 
to lend credibility to the financial statements. 
There appears to be little academic literature that specifically addresses stakeholders and 
their expectations of audit. In the 1990s Sutton and Arnold looked at the US Single Audit 
Act 1984 and proposed transposing its requirements from the public to the private sector 
in order to introduce a social dimension of public accountability to corporate 
stakeholders.907 They argued that the information needs of various stakeholders are 
disregarded by the standard setters and that the quality of corporate social disclosures 
should be enhanced. They aimed at creating a more inclusive model of corporate 
reporting. Their model, however, did not consider the diverse needs of stakeholders and 
the way they should be incorporated into the corporate audit. Roberts has also examined 
a stakeholder approach to the corporate single audit.908 He argued that stakeholder theory 
                                                 
907 Steve G. Sutton and Vicky Arnold, ‘Towards a Framework For a Corporate Single Audit: Meeting 
Financial Statements Users’ Needs’ (1998) 9(2) Critical Perspectives on Accounting 177. 
908 Robin W. Roberts, ‘A Stakeholder Approach to the Corporate Single Audit’ (1998) 9(3) Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 227. 
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provides an adequate grounding for designing a corporate single audit that would 
accommodate the diverse information needs of multiple corporate stakeholders. He 
argued that the success of stakeholder-based corporate single audit would be contingent 
on the ‘development of reporting and attestation requirements that lead to the 
dissemination of reliable corporate social responsibility information, and a change in the 
relative power of the corporate stakeholder groups that influence the adoption of 
regulated, mandatory corporate social reporting’. 909 
The corporate single audit theory, however, fails to address some of the practical issues 
of trying to meet stakeholders needs through the statutory audit. To begin with, if audit 
was to be restructured to accommodate multiple stakeholders, it is likely that its purpose 
would change. It would become less valuable to shareholders as a means of mitigating 
the agency problem. It would also necessitate a change to the legal purpose of audit. 
Furthermore, in order to meet all the potential stakeholders’ expectations, it would require 
corporations and auditors to provide more information, which raises concerns about the 
completeness of information, its accessibility for all stakeholders, and invariably an 
increase in cost.910 
This thesis advocates a model, which unlike the single corporate audit, does not purport 
to deal with issues pertaining to stakeholder governance. It suggests a more focused 
financial stakeholder model that addresses the financial aspects of core stakeholders, such 
as creditors and employees. First of all, it advocates extending auditable financial 
information about the reporting entity that would be useful to present and potential 
                                                 
909 Roberts (n 908) p. 227. 
910 ICAEW, Evolution. Stakeholder Expectations of Audit, December 2008, available at 
http://www.icaew.com/~/media/corporate/files/technical/audit%20and%20assurance/audit%20quality/aud
it%20quality%20forum%20evolution/evolution%20stakeholder%20expectations%20of%20an%20audit.a
shx accessed 12 June 2016. 
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creditors in making decisions in their capacity as capital providers. This could include 
information about the general level of debt, or timely payment of invoices.911 As far as 
employees are concerned, the proposed auditable human capital information could 
include the total cost of the workforce employed (inclusive of contingent labour), 
recruitment costs, total investment in training, and development and employee 
engagement survey scores.912 
The suggested model draws on the work of Flint, who argued that a preoccupation with 
accounting number-oriented auditing has obscured a realisation of the social purpose of 
auditing.913 Flint argued that it is desirable that auditors take into account the interests of 
other stakeholders while performing their public function. Flint also provided some 
arguments for the extended accountability of auditors. To begin with, he insisted that 
when individuals engage in performing a public function, mainly in the provision of a 
professional service, they must be accountable for efficiency and effectiveness with 
which the service is delivered.914 Furthermore, he argued that where a party produces an 
account, or information, which is publicly available and which is known to be used or to 
be relied upon by an identifiable group, a constructive relationship of accountability is 
created. Despite the fact that such a relationship is not legally constituted, it is real in 
                                                 
911 A welcome change in this direction can be found in the recent Reporting on Payment Practices and 
Performance Regulations 2017. It introduced a new transparency requirement that is intended to promote a 
culture of better payment practices. According to the Regulations, all large UK companies and LLPs, which 
exceed certain size threshold, now have to report on their payment policies and practices and report on 
performance against their policies twice a year. Specifically, each business is required to publish among 
others: standard payment terms; average time the business has taken to pay suppliers, from the invoice date; 
details of the proportion of invoices that have been paid by the business beyond the agreed terms; how 
much late payment interest has been paid and is due to be paid by the business to the supplier. The rationale 
for this Regulation is to tackle a widespread problem of late payment of the invoices, which can be 
particularly burdensome for small suppliers to larger corporations. 
912 Evidence suggests that employee engagement is positively linked to an organisation’s financial 
performance, available at http://www.valuingyourtalent.com/for-external-stakeholders/external-
perspectives/towards-standardised-measures# accessed 13 June 2016. 
913 Flint (n 3) p. 24. 
914 Flint (n 3) p. 26. 
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practical terms and should be respected.915 Accordingly, it is likely that under the 
proposed regime auditors’ accountability would increase, as auditors would be reporting 
on information vital not only for shareholders, but also stakeholders, such as employees 
and creditors, and as such they would be responsible for the quality of the service 
provided to these parties.916 
As far as the subject and scope of audit reports are concerned, another issue that requires 
attention is the problem of the expectations gap. A failure on the part of auditors and 
audit-policy makers to recognise the social dimension of an auditors’ work and to respond 
to legitimate societal pressure, results in frustration of the social purpose of audit and the 
emergence of the expectation gap. The expectation gap can be damaging, as it produces 
unrealistic expectations of audit and leads to the overall disappointment with its value. In 
the following paragraphs this thesis proposes steps that need to be taken to strengthen 
public confidence in the audit approach and to increase auditors’ social accountability.  
As chapter four argued, the auditors’ role defined by law and standards is to provide an 
opinion as to whether the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial 
health of a company. The auditors’ role is not to detect fraud or provide an absolute 
                                                 
915 Flint (n 3) p. 24. 
916 As an alternative, Burton suggests that increased accountability could be satisfactorily achieved through 
the development of legal standards and enforcement through the legal process. He points that once social 
accountability becomes a norm; it would be applied by the courts and would become part of the legal 
structure of the reporting environment; in John C. Burton, 'Symposium on Ethics in Corporate Financial 
Reporting' (1972) 133(1) Journal of Accountancy 46,  p. 49. Mautz, on the other hand, claims that 
functioning of the independent audit is resolved ultimately by social consent. He argued that ‘…Society 
either accepts or rejects the role that a professional group assumes for itself; in time the group either finds 
a role acceptable to society or the group disappears. As conditions and apparent needs change, society may 
reject roles formerly considered acceptable so professional groups must continually be alert to the 
desirability of role modification and revision’, in Robert Kuhn Mautz, 'The Role of the Independent Auditor 
in a Market Economy' (1975) (unpublished background paper for the AICPA Commission on Auditor's 
Responsibility), p. 2. 
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assurance or guarantee that the financial statements are correct. According to the ISA 240 
applicable in the UK: 
An auditor conducting an audit in accordance with ISAs (UK and Ireland) is 
responsible for obtaining reasonable assurance that the financial statements taken 
as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error. 
Owing to the inherent limitations of an audit, there is an unavoidable risk that some 
material misstatements of the financial statements may not be detected, even though 
the audit is properly planned and performed in accordance with the ISA.917 
Neither of the terms ‘reasonable assurance’ nor ‘material misstatement’ has been 
precisely defined, and hence the auditor’s responsibility to find fraud depends on 
particular interpretations of these terms.918 In the US, the standard on responsibilities and 
functions of the independent auditor states that: 
The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, 
whether caused by error or fraud. Because of the nature of audit evidence and the 
characteristics of fraud, the auditor is able to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, 
assurance that material misstatements are detected. The auditor has no 
responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that 
misstatements, whether caused by errors or fraud, that are not material to the 
financial statements are detected.919 
The primary responsibility for fraud policing lies with the board and it is part of the 
directors’ fiduciary obligation to protect a company’s assets. The auditor’s role is centred 
on planning and performing his work in such a way as to have a reasonable expectation 
of detecting material misstatements. Fraud, by its very nature, is very difficult to detect, 
                                                 
917 IFAC Handbook, International Standard on Auditing  (UK and Ireland) 240, The Auditor’s 
Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in and Audit of Financial Statements, p. 3.  
918 Power (n 15) p. 23. 
919 AS 1001 Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor 
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as it requires forgery, collusion, and management overriding the control systems. Placing 
a duty to detect fraud on the auditor is not a solution, as he will never be able to guarantee 
that no such fraud has occurred.920 This thesis suggests that a better safeguard against 
some categories of fraud and poor quality audits would be carrying out more extensive 
audits. 
The financial crisis of 2008 has shown that there are many concerns related to the current 
standards of financial reporting, particularly to increased inherent volatility of accounting 
numbers. According to Humphrey, the valuation methods contained both in the US 
GAAP (FAS 157) and international accounting standards such as IAS39, which were 
drafted during the times of stable markets, are difficult to apply to volatile and highly 
illiquid assets currently held by the banks.921 Moreover, these methods of valuation 
require exercising professional judgement. Using judgement in relation to the verification 
of valuations and the materiality of assessments causes further problems with regards to 
the transparency of the audit practice, due to its lack of visibility.  
It is suggested that audits should not operate on a simple pass or fail basis, where almost 
all the companies pass every year. Large companies’ audit reports should be more 
extensive and perhaps even contain a more nuanced grading system in order to provide a 
more complete picture. It would be beneficial if audit reports could include more details 
and frequent inclusion of commentary about the risks of misstatement; explanations of 
changes to the audit approach, materiality or risk assessment over time. In the banking 
context, audit reports should analyse risks, particularly in relation to complex financial 
instruments, the evaluation of which is exceptionally difficult. Perhaps the reports should 
                                                 
920 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (‘The Cadbury Report’), 
London: Gee, 1992, par. 5.24. 
921 Humphrey (n 2) p. 818. 
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also make clear that a company engaged in aggressive, though legal, accounting. The 
rationale behind it would be to get far greater information, to spread knowledge, and make 
the stakeholders and potential investors familiar with the exact findings of audits. It would 
also enable these parties to compare companies in a more consistent manner.  
One step towards better audit reports was taken by the Financial Reporting Council, 
which introduced new reporting requirements for the financial years beginning on or after 
1 October 2012. In the UK, auditors are now required to comment on particular risks that 
companies encounter and to explain what they did to manage these risks. They are also 
expected to discuss which parts of a company they audited, to communicate what figure 
they deemed to be the lower limit for materiality, and to provide explanations as to how 
they arrived at this number. One concern raised regarding British rules is that they might 
be filled with ‘boilerplate’, providing little useful information.922 It will be interesting to 
see the long-term impact of extended audit reports, but this is surely a good start to give 
firms opportunities to indicate just how diligent they have been.  
Many in the auditing profession respond to criticism that audit was ‘the dog that didn’t 
bark’ at the onset of the financial crisis 2008 by claiming that it followed all the necessary 
rules.923 Adding new rules and imposing a duty to detect fraud in the hope that these will 
be sufficient to catch the next set of follies is likely to be less effective than reorganising 
the auditing practice under the suggested regime and inspiring the profession to value 
transparency, accountability and public interest. The proposed model can also be 
                                                 
922 Citi Research spotted boilerplate in several audits conducted by the PwC. Each of them highlighted the 
same risks, potential fraud and potential overriding of internal controls, in Floyd Norris, ‘Holding Auditors 
Accountable on Reports’, The New York Times, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/business/holding-auditors-accountable.html?_r=0 accessed 17 June 
2016. 
923 Paul Buddery, Steven Frank and Martin Martinoff, ‘Enlightening Professions? A Vision for Audit and 
a Better Society’, ICAEW 2014, available at https://www.thersa.org/discover/publications-and-
articles/reports/.../Download accessed 17 June 2016. 
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beneficial in decreasing the concentration of the current audit market. The next section 
will further explain this issue. 
  
6.2.3.  INCREASED CONCENTRATION OF THE AUDIT MARKET 
The mandatory nature of public company audit contributes to the fact that the demand 
remains inelastic. The supply side, however, is limited to the biggest first tier audit firms. 
There are numerous explanations for this phenomenon, most notably a high barrier to 
entry for the mid-tier audit firms. Smaller audit firms are considered to lack the resources 
to provide audits for the largest listed companies. The Big Four audit firms are claimed 
to be better, and more experienced in handling big and complex clients operations, due to 
their technical capabilities, industry specialisation and expertise. Consequently, allowing 
a second-tier audit firm to audit a large public corporation could be potentially risky as a 
result of high cost of resources needed to perform audits for the largest organisations. 
According to the Oxera report, however, the majority of the surveyed corporations 
believed that mid-tier audit firms are technically capable of conducting audits in big 
corporations, but less than 10 per cent would actually consider using a mid-tier firm. This 
could be due to the reputation, which is considered a significant driver in the choice of 
auditor, ‘favouring the Big Four, whether this is based on real or perceived differences 
between the Big Four and mid-tier audit firms.’924 This implies that large corporations 
choose audit firms not necessarily because of their capability and price, but because of 
their reputations among the investing public. 
                                                 
924 OXERA (n 734) p. 3. 
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Another problem caused by the highly concentrated audit market is the lack of real choice 
of audit providers. In some sectors, such as insurance and banking, concentration is even 
higher than usual and the choice even more limited. In the UK, for example, only three 
out of four audit firms provide audits for banks. This could be of concern to companies 
requiring an industry-specialist auditor. Furthermore, the choice of these companies 
would be considerably limited, especially if they wanted to avoid the auditor of a 
competitor. 
The suggested model could improve the concentration of the audit market by empowering 
the external public body to have a central capacity to procure audit. Auditors would then 
be chosen from among the in-house, first-tier, and mid-tier audit firms based on the 
competence and capabilities of individual firms. This would lead to a situation where 
audit committees would no longer be reliant on reputation and the branding of audit firms 
while making their choices. It would also provide the dual benefit of increasing auditor’s 
independence, and increasing competition in the market. 
6.3.  CONCLUSIONS 
The model proposed in this chapter provided an example of the structural overhaul of the 
external audit model, which moves audits to the public domain. The rationale behind this 
proposal is to alleviate the problems of the current audit model discussed in the previous 
chapters, reinstate the independence and watchdog function of auditors, provide better 
quality audits and restore public confidence in the capital markets. A key function in this 
model is played by an external, public body - the Public Auditing Board, which is in 




The model provides solutions to the problems analysed in chapter four, such as 
independence, accountability deficiencies, and excessive concentration of the audit 
market. It deals with independence issues in two ways. First, it addresses the ‘mother of 
all conflicts’ problem that arises when an audited company choses its own auditor and 
pays audit fees. In the proposed model, managers no longer have any influence on the 
appointment and remuneration of auditors, as this becomes a prerogative of the Board. 
Second, auditors are not allowed to provide consulting services to the companies they 
audit, which secures maximum perceived independence.  
 
Presently audit firms are granted a public franchise to conduct audits, but with conflicting 
private sector pressures.925 The proposed model holds that applying the public sector audit 
model for listed company audits is worthwhile, as there is a strong public interest in the 
efficient and effective audit of private sector companies, which can be commissioned by 
independent auditors working for an independent auditing body. The new model suggests 
certain improvements to tackle the issue of accountability deficits. To begin with, it 
focuses on structural reform, eliminating conflicts of interest and pervasive incentives 
inherent in the present arrangement which would enable auditors to conduct audits of 
better quality. This, in turn, should decrease auditors’ exposure to claims of negligence. 
To follow, the new model addresses the financial aspects, not only of shareholders, but 
also other core stakeholders such as employees and creditors. Following Flint, it argues 
that auditors should consider the interests of other stakeholders, whilst performing their 
public function. Furthermore, it also suggests extending the scope and subjects of audits, 
by requiring auditors to provide more elaborate and descriptive information regarding, 
for example, risks of material misstatements or the concept of materiality. Under the 
                                                 
925 Sikka (n 6). 
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proposed regime, the problem of excessive concentration of the audit market could be 
tackled by enabling the PAB to award audit contracts, not only to auditors from its in-




CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
The integrity and public confidence in the market depend on the availability of timely and 
trustworthy accounting information on company financial performance. An assurance 
function of audit should be an essential part of the framework that supports our capital 
markets.926 However, numerous well-publicised accounting scandals, climaxing in the 
2002 bankruptcy of Enron, and the financial crisis of 2008 encouraged the scrutiny of the 
basic auditing model. This thesis argued that the current audit model is fundamentally 
flawed and fails to perform its purpose of providing assurance and increased confidence 
in the audited financial statements. The thesis also suggested a regulatory overhaul in 
order to restore confidence in capital markets. The purpose of this chapter is to bring 
together the analyses from the previous chapters.  
One of the most interesting findings of this thesis relates to the theoretical framework for 
auditing. Despite the importance of audit for capital markets and society, there has not 
been much interest in the study of its theoretical underpinning. The purpose of audit 
remains unclear and there is very little known of what is now called ‘field work’ in 
auditing. In order to clarify these issues, the thesis focused on the works of Limpberg, 
Mautz and Sharaf, Flint and the agency cost theory in its analysis of the theoretical 
framework for auditing. Following Limpberg, the importance of auditors’ independence, 
and that audits should adjust to the changing needs of the society, have been emphasised 
throughout the thesis. Furthermore, building on Flint’s work, the thesis argued that 
auditors should do more than merely provide an opinion on financial statements. As 
auditors fulfil the social function of protecting capital markets, audits should be 
                                                 
926 Michael Power, ‘Auditing and the Production of Legitimacy’ (2003) 28(4) Accounting, Organisations 
and Society 379, p.380. 
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performed for the benefit of numerous stakeholders, who have an interest in the audited 
financial statements. 
The studies on regulation of audit draw significantly upon financial reporting literature. 
Although the latter is vast, with its focal point on political science and business, it 
concentrates mainly on accounting rather than auditing studies. There is not much 
literature that considers audit regulation in a comprehensive way. The thesis attempted to 
fill this gap by providing an analysis of the regulatory framework of auditing. It provided 
answers as to why, how and by whom audit is regulated.  Perhaps the most interesting 
finding is that none of the general theories of regulation fully explains the reasons for the 
existing regulation of audit. The evidence shows that auditing theory changes in response 
to government regulation, which is usually altered after major accounting scandals. This 
goes some way towards explaining why the current regulation of audit lacks a strong 
theoretical grounding and is reactionary.  
Another finding contributes to the debate as to how audit is regulated. Most of the studies 
are centred on the advantages and disadvantages of rule-based versus principle-based 
regulation. The thesis, however, indicated that it is difficult to favor one approach over 
the other, since both can be useful in the regulatory process. Moreover, regulators’ efforts 
should be refocused on eliminating pervasive auditors’ incentives to acquiesce to 
managers’ demands and encouraging auditors to use their judgement transparently and 
with integrity. This would provide true independence to auditors and enhance the quality 
of audits, irrespectively of the type of regulation.  
The thesis also examined a variety of players that participate in audit regulation. The 
evidence indicates that alongside the general increase in regulation, states are 
progressively more involved in the area of audit governance via institutions such as the 
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PCAOB and the FRC. The thesis also argued that whilst discussing regulatory players 
one should not forget about the big audit firms, which are powerful lobbyists with 
significant influence on governments and international financial institutions. This is 
important, as according to the capture theory, it may lead to the profession’s control of 
the regulatory process and negatively affect the independence of the regulator and the 
quality of audits. 
In order to support the main claim of the thesis, that the audit model is flawed, a 
considerable part of the thesis covered the analysis of the problems inherent in the audit 
model. The thesis focused on three areas, which, according to the literature in this area 
and author’s perspective, have been particularly problematic in the current audit 
arrangements. These are: lack of auditors’ independence, accountability deficits, and 
excessive concentration of the audit market.  
As far as independence is concerned, the research findings indicated that the UK and the 
US auditing systems fail to deliver true independence. According to the AICPA Council, 
‘Independence, both historically and philosophically, is the foundation of the public 
accounting profession and upon its maintenance depends the profession’s strength and its 
stature’.927 Independence is also a sole justification for the existence of accounting firms. 
The current auditing system institutionalizes at least two potential threats to 
independence. Firstly, there is an inherent conflict of interest in the audit model 
originating from the fact that auditors are hired, paid, and fired by the companies. Clients, 
who have the ability to select their auditors, have many reasons to choose an audit firm 
based on the likelihood that the auditors will deliver a clean audit opinion. The fact that 
the probability of a client changing auditors increases following a critical audit report is 
                                                 
927 Carey (n 888) p. 182. 
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likely to reduce the auditor’s desire to issue such a report.928 This, in turn, affects auditor’s 
independence. 
Another threat to auditor’s independence is the provision of consulting services. Over the 
years, consulting has grown to become a significant source of income for audit firms. The 
increasing use of MAS could potentially compromise auditors’ independence firstly by 
making the auditor vulnerable to economic pressures from audit clients and secondly, by 
creating an interest in a certain result of the audit work, i.e. by putting the auditor in a 
position of auditing his own non-audit work.929 The empirical evidence, however, is 
inconclusive as to whether providing consulting services affects auditors’ independence. 
It is doubtful, though, from an independence standpoint, that the perspectives required to 
perform non-audit services are compatible with the strict objectivity and allegiance to 
public interest required of statutory auditors. Finding new and innovative ways to further 
the client’s business goals and maximize its returns on investment are not particularly 
conducive to the objective, public-oriented mind-set required of auditors. The findings 
show that this movement has been economically driven and reflects the declining role of 
audit within practice. 
Another clear finding of the thesis is that auditors suffer from accountability deficits in 
three areas: legal, professional, and social. The decline of the profession in the legal 
sphere lies paradoxically at the heart of the profession’s lobbying activities on auditor’s 
liability. First of all, it is very difficult for clients and non-clients to sue auditors for 
negligent audits. Secondly, due to the introduction of proportionate liability in the US, 
and limitation liability agreements in the UK, auditors can now decrease the amount of 
compensation that can be owed to those harmed by negligent audits. The introduction of 
                                                 
928 Moore (n 498) p. 13. 
929 Freier (n 752). 
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the Limited Liability Partnership and elimination of vicarious liability of partners made 
the auditors’ situation even more shielded. As Joseph Stiglitz has written: 
Any incentive scheme involves carrots and sticks. There were plenty of carrots 
encouraging the accounting firms to look the other way. Traditionally, there had 
been one big stick discouraging them. If things went awry, they could be sued… In 
1995, (US) Congress… provided substantial liability protection for the auditors. 
But we may have gone too far: insulated from suits, the accountants are now willing 
to take more ‘gambles’.930 
Also, disciplinary sanctions imposed by professional associations of accountants are not 
sufficiently severe to deter acquiescent auditors. The sanctions usually involve relatively 
small fines and admonishment. Hardly ever an accountant is expelled or suspended from 
the professional association. The occasional legal penalty and punishment of corrupt 
individuals are inadequate solutions to a systemic problem within the institutional 
structure of auditing. Consequently, this apparent success in the legislative and political 
spheres makes the auditors undeterred and unaccountable, and can lead to poor quality 
audits and the irreparable damage to the core economic interests of the accountancy 
profession.  
Auditors also suffer from social accountability deficits, despite the fact that they have a 
duty to perform their function with a view of protecting public interest. This thesis argued, 
following Limperg and Flint, that audit function should not be reduced to lending 
credibility to the financial statements, but that auditors should become guardians of 
capital markets and public interest. The social accountability of auditors is also 
problematic when defining the function of audit. Auditors claim that their sole 
                                                 
930 Joseph Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties. Why We're Paying the Price for the Greediest Decade in History 
(Penguin Books, London 2003), p. 136. 
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responsibility is to provide an objective opinion on whether the financial statements 
present a true and fair view of the financial condition of their clients. Society, on the other 
hand, expects them to detect irregularities, fraud, and to prevent accounting scandals, 
which cause substantial injury to innocent stakeholders.931 This leads to the expectations 
gap, which is considered a threat to effective corporate governance and the legitimacy of 
the institutions of auditing.  
The research findings indicated that the present, Anglo-American auditing model is 
flawed. Superficial reform and occasional sanctions are unlikely to fix it. To that end, the 
thesis explored different theoretical micro and macro audit models, as well as country-
specific international options providing ideas for the new regulatory audit paradigm. 
Following the example of the Audit Commission macro option, the new model suggests 
the need to move auditing to the public domain in order to protect  investors, stakeholders, 
and the wider community. This arrangement also reduces the aforementioned problems 
of auditors’ lack of independence and accountability, as well as excessive concentration 
of the audit market. A key function in this model is played by an independent, public 
body, responsible for the appointment and remuneration of the auditors of the listed 
companies. In this arrangement, following the French model, auditors would be 
prohibited from selling consultancy services to audit clients. This way, the true 
independence of auditors would be restored for the benefit of the stakeholders. 
Elimination of pervasive incentives would also enable auditors to improve the quality of 
audits and decrease the litigation level for negligent audits against the profession. The 
independent appointments would also help alleviate the problem of excessive 
concentration of the audit market, as the state agency would be capable of procuring 
                                                 
931 This was particularly noticeable at a time of the recent financial crisis, when auditors’ silence contributed 
to the losses of depositors and customers. 
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auditors from among its in-house practice, first-tier and mid-tier audit firms, increasing 
at the same time the supply of audit services.  
This thesis argued that accountability deficits should be tackled by requiring auditors to 
conduct audits in the interests of a wider group of stakeholders such as employees and 
creditors, and that audit reports should be extended in order to include more descriptive 
information related to, for example, risks of material misstatements and the concept of 
materiality. More detailed and informative audit reports would provide a more complete 
picture of the financial health of companies, and enable stakeholders to compare 
companies in a more consistent manner. It can be argued that such dramatic reforms 
would be very costly. It is submitted, however, that the costs of creating truly independent 
audits are worthwhile for the stakeholders, financial markets, and for the vast majority of 
citizens who invest in capital markets, either directly or by means of pension funds. The 
costs of the reform would be a small price to pay in order to fix the inefficient system, 
which offers false claims of independence, false assurance to the users of corporate 
financial statements, and unaccountable auditors. 
The real goal of the statutory audit system is not to prevent every single case of inaccurate 
financial statements, but rather to prevent most instances of misstatements and to deliver 
high quality audits so that investors and stakeholders are reasonably assured.932 The 
proposed restructuring of the statutory audit system could provide a long-term solution 
that enables production of good quality audits, prevents another Enron-type crisis, and 
strengthens capital markets and the economy. 
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